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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 
1.1  Responding to the new demands of climate change
1.1.1 Climate adaptation and new demands for governance
Climate change adaptation is witnessing an enormous increase in attention since 
the turn of the millennium. While policy discourses on climate change were long 
preoccupied with mitigation, relegating adaption to the realm of defeatism (Pielke, 
Prins, Rayner & Sarewitz, 2007), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) started to push adaptation as a necessary strategy to complement mitigation 
in its Third Assessment Report published in 2001. Now, in its Fifth Assessment 
Report, the IPCC observes that adaptation is slowly but surely, with high confidence, 
becoming embedded in some planning processes (IPCC, 2014, p. 8). These planning 
processes include efforts by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the European Commission and its EU strategy on adaptation 
to climate change (EC, 2013), strategies by nation states (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; 
Biesbroek et al., 2010), or by regions and cities (Bulkeley, 2013). Scholarly publications 
on climate adaptation increase steadily (Berrang-Ford, Ford & Paterson, 2011), while 
new research programmes on climate adaptation have been set up across the globe. 
 The adaptation of humans to climate and its changes is not new. The legacies of flood 
barriers, building design principles, or irrigation systems are all prime examples for 
ways in which people coped with the variability, changes and extremes of the climates 
they lived in. What is new, according to Adger et al. (2009), are the deliberate and 
self-conscious attempts to realise a desired state based on the idea of climate change. 
 However, climate adaptation is an issue of much disagreement. Similar to the 
various ways people engage with climate change (Hulme, 2009), the interpretations 
differ of what climate change adaptation is and what societal responses are needed. 
Consider the following three examples. First, while the UNFCCC used the concept 
‘adaptation’ for deliberate adjustments to anthropogenic climatic changes, the IPCC 
used the term more broadly for actions based on actual or expected climate stimuli 
(Pielke, 2005). Second, the IPCC used concepts such as planned adaptation, 
anticipatory adaptation, or autonomous adaptation to distinguish among different 
types of social responses. Third, Adger et al. (2009) saw the future-oriented idea 
that at least several generations in the twenty-ﬁrst century will experience progressively 
changing climates as a core distinctive focus in the current discourse on climate 
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change adaptation. However, the first Dutch Delta Programme to deal with climate 
change consequences framed its response firmly in the observed climatic changes 
that had occurred in the past (Vink, Boezeman, Dewulf & Termeer, 2013), effectively 
leaving out the idea of accelerating future climate change. These three examples 
show that the concept of climate change adaptation is used to signify responses to 
different things in human environments, in different ways and with different time 
scales. Hence, the question of what climate change adaptation is, is in itself an 
inextricable element of its governance.
 The latter observation is central in argumentations concluding that climate 
change adaptation is a “wicked problem” (Jordan, Huitema, Van Asselt, Rayner & 
Berkhout, 2010; Termeer et al., 2011). Drawing upon Rittel and Webber’s (1973) 
notion of these type of problems, it is exactly the indeterminateness of the issue, its 
complexity, political sensitivity and all-pervasiveness that make climate adaptation 
such a thorny political and scholarly interesting topic. Ironically, despite Rittel and 
Webber’s central claim that there are no definitive formulations to wicked problems, 
a substantial part of the climate change adaptation literature (e.g. Fröhlich & 
Knieling, 2013; Füssel, 2007; Hezri & Dovers, 2006; Termeer et al., 2011) deals with 
the characteristics of climate change that define the issue as a wicked issue, setting 
it apart from other policy issues while making the claim that the issue raises new 
demands on governance. In its summary of the adaptation literature, the IPCC 
(Jones et al., 2014) provides three characteristics. First, timescales are much longer 
and impacts are broader than with other problems, demanding the integration of 
climate knowledge with many other forms of projections. Second, changes may be 
non-marginal and irreversible, which makes the standard economic or environmental 
instruments aimed to facilitate decisions ‘at the margin’ less useful. Third, the 
future may be fundamentally different, which makes learning from the past and 
anticipating based on experiences not suitable.
 Given the characteristics of climate change adaptation, scholars have concluded 
that current governance institutions and instruments are not able to cope with 
climate adaptation (Füssel, 2007, p. 268). Drawing on theories of institutional 
change, Dovers and Hezri (2010, p. 212) state that “If climate change represents a 
shift in the operating environment of societies, then institutional change is 
necessary so that policy processes allow decisions to be informed and made 
differently, and more attention must be paid to the mechanics of such change”. 
Climate change challenges governance arrangements by cutting through policy 
domains, administrative levels and embedded responsibilities thereby invoking a 
need for changes (Termeer et al., 2011). Climate adaptation would require a form of 
“adaptive governance” (Folke, Hahn, Olsson & Norberg, 2005), in which inclusiveness, 
multiplicity, flexibility and learning are central features. According to Füssel (2007, 
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p. 268) successful adaptation to unprecedented climatic changes requires the 
adoption of new assessment methods other than the traditional instruments of 
 climate-sensitive fields such as water management, the entrance of new actors or 
existing actors in sensitive policy fields to change their perspectives, and the 
invention and adoption of new policy measures. Even though this literature is 
highly prescriptive of what needs to be done, a central assumption is that the 
wickedness of climate change will ultimately change the way we govern, as soon as 
the ‘barriers’ to do so have been identified and resolved (Biesbroek, 2014; Moser & 
Ekstrom, 2010). However, by essentialising the characteristics of climate change, 
one overlooks that the naming and taming of wicked problems are part and parcel 
of the way issues are handled in governance. Hence, what is or is not at stake needs 
to be explained rather than assumed.
1.1.2 Climate adaptation and new demands on science-policy interfaces
Science and knowledge have pivotal roles in the governance of climate change. 
Authoritative science continues to be important in both the identification of climate 
impacts as well as in formulating proposals for adaptive action. However, climate 
change is said to have put existing science-policy interfaces under pressure 
(Kirchhoff, Lemos & Dessai, 2013; Lemos, Kirchhoff & Ramprasad, 2012; Leroy, 
Driessen & Van Vierssen, 2010a). Science-policy interfaces, which denote the insti-
tutionalised “social processes which encompass relations between scientists and 
other actors in the policy process, and which allow for exchanges, co-evolution, and 
joint construction of knowledge with the aim of enriching decision-making” (Van 
den Hove, 2007, p. 815), are facing the dual issue of maintaining credibility and 
legitimacy. Science is running into its epistemological and cognitive limits to deal 
with many of its contemporary issues (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993), while the 
knowledge constructed at these interfaces is simultaneously under pressure of 
democratisation (e.g. Nowotny, 2003). 
 The aforementioned characteristics of climate change adaptation are again said 
to be a case in point here. First, the complexities, uncertainties and time-scales 
make climate change a challenging issue for science. Accepting uncertainties as the 
inherent counterpart of climate change requires new ways to deal with scientific 
knowledge and new strategies for robust adaptation (Hallegatte, 2009; Wilby & 
Dessai, 2010). Second, we live in testing times for climate science (Jasanoff, 2010b), 
as the issue of climate change has increasingly been politicised with controversies 
proliferating and impasses abound. The identification, assessment and evaluation 
of climate change impacts heavily rely on science, making climate change adaptation 
an endeavour facing potential controversy, deadlocks and paralysis. Third, and 
closely related to the former two, is the observation that even though climatic 
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change is generally constructed as a global phenomenon, the impacts are felt on the 
regional level. This makes climate adaptation a challenging issue for ‘downscaling’ 
global circulation models and connecting them to physical or social impacts 
(Corburn, 2009; Wilby & Wigley, 1997). While stable science-policy interfaces have 
institutionalised predominantly at the scale of nation states, it remains an open 
question whether they are responsive enough to deal with adaptation at regional 
levels. Fourth, the all-pervasiveness of climate change is considered a challenge. For 
example, Kirchhoff, Lemos, and Dessai (2013, p. 394) claim that “the urgency and 
widespread reach of projected climate change impacts demand more than 
incremental improvements [of the science-policy interface].”
 These characteristics of climate change have led to the conclusion that the 
existing science-policy interfaces are not capable to deal with the peculiarities of 
climate change adaptation. For example, the Dutch national research programme 
Knowledge for Climate has been built on the observation that “Climate change has 
a number of characteristics that make it hard to follow normal scientific procedures 
and that is the reason for a demand for new ways to connect science and policy” 
(Knowledge for Climate, 2009, p. 34, my translation). In response, a substantial 
group of scholars have been working on sets of prescriptions and challenges for 
reorganising more responsive science-policy interfaces to better deal with climate 
change (Lemos et al., 2012; Van den Hove, 2007). Leroy et al. conclude that “societal 
participation, mutual learning and opening up pre-existing organisational and 
institutional boundaries are among the key words here to ensure a more responsible, 
more legitimate and more effective science-policy interface” (2010a, p. 28). 
1.1.3 Climate change adaptation - a dedicated field or mainstreaming? 
The observation that both governance institutions in general and science-policy 
arrangements in particular are under pressure, has fuelled research on the question 
of whether there should be shifts in science-policy arrangements in relation to 
climate adaptation. A substantial part of the literature suggests that adaptation 
requires the emergence of new and dedicated governance arrangements with 
associated actors, objectives and procedures. Whether in some form of adaptive 
governance (see e.g. Folke et al., 2005; Füssel, 2007), planned adaptation centres 
around deliberative efforts to engage with the consequences of climate change 
(Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Often this approach is associated with the hazard-based 
approach originally promoted by the IPCC (Füssel, 2007). This top-down approach 
starts with emission scenarios and General Circulation Models to get a grip on 
global climate change, and goes via Regional Circulation Models to impact models 
and adaptation options. The rise of broad climate risk assessment studies and 
national adaptation strategies reflect this way of engaging with climate change, 
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which has raised the question of whether climate adaptation policy is institutional-
ising as a distinct and delineated policy field of its own (Massey & Huitema, 2013). 
Even though the IPCC approach has increasingly become complemented with 
more bottom-up vulnerability-based approaches, and integrative approaches 
combining the two, the key point here is that climate adaptation is a deliberative 
effort and requires resources, methodologies and science-policy relations to enable 
the process to flourish.
 A substantial other part of the literature (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; Smit & 
Wandel, 2006) observes that in policy practice ‘mainstreaming’ is the dominant 
form and that policies are hardly ever undertaken for climate adaptation motivations 
alone. Mainstreaming has become one of the central concepts in current debates on 
climate adaptation policy and refers to both the process of embedding climate 
change considerations into on-going policies, budgets or governing capacities, as 
well as realising a state in which climate considerations have become a ‘busi-
ness-as-usual’ part of planning. The way the concept is articulated, mainstreaming 
closely resembles scholarly understanding of ‘policy integration’ in environmental 
policy (Lenschow, 2001; Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 2000), or the mainstreaming of 
gender issues in existing programmes and procedures. This ‘lifting’ approach is 
propagated by a series of scholars (Klein, Schipper & Dessai, 2005; Kok & De 
Coninck, 2007; Swart & Raes, 2007) who perceive this strategy as a more effective 
and cost-efficient way of using scarce human resources than the design, 
implementation and management of climate adaptation policy as a stand-alone 
activity. While the IPCC now observes small and cautious steps of integrating climate 
adaptation issues in ongoing policy concerns (IPCC, 2014), critics predominantly 
see a process of incrementalism and policy failure (Howlett, 2014).
 Governmental bodies on various levels have adapted mainstreaming as one of 
the central ideas to base both their strategy and objectives on. For example, the 
2007 Dutch National Adaptation Strategy strived “to make adaptation to climate 
change already in 2015 an integral part (“mainstream”) of policies” (VROM et al., 
2007, p. 4, my translation). The 2013 Climate Agenda (I&M, 2013) reconfirms that 
strategy to routinise and integrate attention for climatic changes in all land use 
policies, as well as to further develop knowledge and tools for a broad range of 
policy sectors to become ‘climate robust’. At the European level, the 2009 EU white 
paper aims to “review [each policy area] of how policies could be re-focused or 
amended to facilitate adaptation” (EC, 2009, p. 8). Again, the 2013 European 
Adaptation Strategy reconfirms the approach to mainstream adaptation measures 
into EU policy programmes and its funding schemes. At the global level, the United 
Nations Development Programme recognises mainstreaming as one of its key 
principles in realising development as a means to integrate “considerations of climate 
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change adaptation into policy-making, budgeting, implementation and monitoring 
processes at national, sector and sub national levels” (UNEP & UNDP, 2011, p. 3).
Much of this literature has a normative and prescriptive character on how the issue 
of climate change can optimally be managed. In consequence, evaluations are made 
whether there is indeed progress towards a predefined conceptualisation of climate 
adaptation, whether governance institutions have sufficient adaptive capacity or 
whether there is progress towards realising the prescribed ideal types of dealing 
with knowledge at the science-policy interface, e.g. if uncertainties are now dealt 
with in a ‘sound’ way  (Füssel & Hildén, 2014). There is much less in-depth social 
scientific knowledge about the actual way in which science-policy interfaces respond to 
the demands of climate change and how they handle the phenomenon of climate 
change to develop the claims aimed to enrich decision making. Of course, much 
interesting research studied the emergence of global knowledge about climate 
change in relation to new global science-policy institutions (Hulme, 2010; Miller, 
2001). The actual handling of climate change in regional adaptation practices is still 
underexposed. Therefore, this thesis has its empirical focus on the role of knowledge 
in regional climate adaptation practices.
 The observation that on the one hand the wicked problem of climate change 
raises new demands for governance institutions in general, and for science-policy 
relations in particular, while on the other hand scholars have been observing processes 
of mainstreaming in which existing policy domains are taking up the issue of 
adaptation instead of the emergence of a new policy field raises a remarkable puzzle. 
First, the scholarly assumption was that the uncertainties, complexities, normative 
positions and high stakes surrounding climate change make its public policy suspect 
to controversies, apathy and conflicts. Indeed, the legacies of developing climate 
change mitigation policies are rife with controversies. Second, the assumption in the 
adaptation literature was that handling climate change adaptation was particularly 
difficult because at the regional level at which adaptation is dealt with, no well- 
established patterns of science-policy interactions have institutionalised in contrary 
to those at the level of the nation state. Mainstreaming adaptation with pre-existing 
science-policy interfaces not designed for climate change therefore potentially add to 
the issue’s thorniness. With climate adaptation policies slowly but steadily taking off, 
these policy processes, in the Netherlands at least, are not without difficulty, yet do 
not come to grinding halts because of vicious controversies over climate change. 
Given the aforementioned expectations, it is striking that “weakly institutionalised 
knowledge withstands partisan attacks and manages to keep the engines of policy 
humming without paralysing conflict or stifling dissent” (Jasanoff, 2011, p. 307). 
Without the expected deadlocks and controversy, do these policy fields successfully 
tame the wicked problem? Or do these fields manage to disregard the issue of climate 
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change with general approval? Or, in more analytical terms, how is knowledge about 
climate change impacts handled in these processes of mainstreaming climate change?
1.2  The problematic role of science and knowledge
1.2.1 Knowledge and policy
It has been convincingly argued that science-society relations are in a crisis (Beck, 
2009; Bijker, Bal & Hendriks, 2009; Nowotny, 2003). Science and technology are 
at once both the drivers behind, the identificators of and the solutions to many of 
the environmental problems societies face. With the interrelated processes of 
‘scientisation of politics’ and ‘politicisation of science’, Weingart (1999) has referred 
to the process of an increasing demand on science in the political arena which has 
pushed science to ever more uncertain fields of knowledge. In turn, science’s 
contradictory truth claims in political controversies are threatening to erode science’s 
authority and a de-legitimation of scientific knowledge for political decision making. 
Paradoxically, the mere observation that ever more policy fields engage in a 
science-aided quest to combat the consequences of climate change, highlights that, 
despite any crisis, the exchange between science and politics has by no means stalled. 
 Authoritative knowledge plays a central part in climate change adaptation. 
Developing an understanding of the consequences of climate change and of ways to 
respond to climate impacts is of course an important function. Knowledge is used 
to base legal decisions on, to develop new plans for development or further shape 
the direction of climate adaptation research. While knowledge on ‘what is’ may 
have different origins, e.g. spiritual, experiential or common-sensual, it is scientific 
knowledge that is awarded a prominent place. In practice, the use of scientific 
knowledge in adaptation decisions has been showed to be problematic. For example, 
despite the commonsensical logic that making better climate predictions available 
for policy makers in water management or urban planning is useful, empirical 
studies show that this knowledge often fails to make an impact on the policy 
practice of urban planning or water management (Eliasson, 2000; Hebbert & 
Mackillop, 2013; Rayner, Lach & Ingram, 2005). According to Kirchhoff, Lemos, 
and Dessai (2013, p. 394) the pace of the uptake of climate knowledge in decision 
making is slow.
 The problematic role of scientific knowledge in decision making has been of 
interest to many academic disciplines. The diagnosis of these problems vary (see 
e.g. Dunn, 1980; Radaelli, 1995; Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007; Weiss, 1998) as well as the 
proposed solutions to alleviate these problems (see for the institutionalisation of 
these ideas Stone, 2002). Authors have pointed to the functional differentiation and 
the structural differences of worlds of science and policy-making, with potentially 
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conflicting values, reward systems and languages (Caplan, 1979). Other structuralist 
analyses, often relating to Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), emphasise that the way 
science behind controversial risks is handled, is influenced by cultural values and 
beliefs different societies hold. Some see predominantly communication problems, 
whether or not influenced by the media (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Because 
researchers and policy makers do not speak the same language, or do not have the 
possibilities to communicate,  knowledge transfer fails. Others emphasise the 
dominant role of interest and power. Knowledge is either accepted to confirm 
predisposed positions or used as ammunition to win partisan battles (Collingridge 
& Reeve, 1986; Sarewitz, 2004). Timeliness is central to Kingdonian analyses, as 
knowledge can be coupled to decisions only when windows of opportunity are open 
(Kingdon, 1995). Scholars building on the work of Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) 
predominantly look at epistemological problems, and ways to overcome the issue of 
inherent uncertainties in dealing with climate change. 
 In the literature on climate change adaptation, the way of thinking about the 
production and application of knowledge has been amended and complemented to 
do justice to the insights put forward by these disciplines. The original approach 
promoted by the IPCC was still linear, rationalist and top-down. In this model the 
scientific discovery of climate change and its impacts would result in the need for 
action (Parry & Carter, 1998). Decision making was centred around the 
identification of risks and the evaluation of management options. Because of 
critique to this automatic and linear way of thinking, the latest review by the IPCC 
(Jones et al., 2014) suggests that the orthodoxy has now shifted to include the 
context of decision making in the process of handling knowledge. Accordingly, the 
IPCC concludes that “knowledge generation and exchange includes knowledge 
generation, development, brokering, exchange and application to practice” (Jones 
et al., 2014, p. 199). Abstract and fundamental knowledge is not readily useful, these 
authors conclude, and should be supplemented with decision-support processes 
and tools, such as iterative risk management and climate services. The rise of joint 
knowledge production projects (Hegger, Lamers, Van Zeijl-Rozema & Dieperink, 
2012), the foundation of new intermediary institutions (Cash et al., 2003; Kirchhoff, 
Lemos & Dessai, 2013), or research programmes found on transdisciplinary or 
post-normal principles (Reinecke et al., 2013) in relation to climate adaptation 
reflect that way of thinking.
 Notwithstanding the recognition of the many subtle ways knowledge can 
influence and enlighten policy (Weiss, 1998), the dominant perspective here is that 
once scientific knowledge has been discovered it needs to be diffused, transferred or 
applied in decision making (see e.g. Klein et al., 2014; Lemos et al., 2012). Credible 
knowledge is produced by clearly delineated suppliers, scientists, and delineated 
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consumers, policy makers. Challenges arise because of the existence of a ‘gap’ 
between science and policy, and ‘barriers’ need to be overcome to better use 
scientific knowledge in the policy process. However, this supply-and-demand 
model is problematic for a thorough understanding of how climate change is 
handled in collective decision-making processes on adaptation for two reasons.
 First, the way in which a knowledge claim by science was created, validated or 
contested is rarely questioned. To strip scientific knowledge from its origins and by 
assuming that scientific knowledge intrinsically meets criteria of credibility and 
objectivity, fails to understand how truth claims about climate change are arrived 
at, against what criteria they are judged, how they are embedded in structures of 
power or other forms of knowledge, and how this in turn may alter the understanding 
of climate change. While it is readily accepted that what constitutes useful 
knowledge differs per situation, it is often assumed that criteria for credibility are 
universalist. This conflicts not only with empirical studies showing that the 
construction of scientific facts about climate change are constantly stabilised in 
dialog with politics (Miller, 2001; Shackley & Wynne, 1996) and that objectivity or 
credibility is an achievement rather than a given (Jasanoff, 2011; Shapin, 1995), but 
also that ways in which climate impacts are known, evaluated and handled as well 
as ways of dealing with uncertainties differs across political cultures (Adger et al., 
2009; Dovers & Hezri, 2010). The answer on the question what credible knowledge 
is, can only be answered within the grown constellation in which knowledge about 
climate change is legitimately generated to base collective decision making on.
 A second problem following from the former is the assumption that science is 
a monopolist of what is credibly known and knowledge remains static in the process 
of its transfer from science to society. Studies on the making of science and 
technology highlight the processes of modification when a fact or artefacts is made 
to circulate and the alignment of networks this requires (Fujimura, 1992; Latour, 
1987; Pinch & Bijker, 1984). For example, Latour argues that “the first and easiest 
way to find people who will immediately believe the statement, invest in the project, 
or buy the prototype, is to tailor the object in such a way that it caters [to] these 
people’s explicit interests” (Latour, 1987, p. 109, emphasis in orginal). At some point 
in time, statements may become completely stabilised and black-boxed, naturalising 
them into facts and allowing them to circulate more freely. In the case of climate 
change the statements on what is or will happen are far from stable, as well as the 
way to establish the relevant impacts in relation to various policy fields. Empirical 
studies on knowledge production for climate adaptation have convincingly shown 
that the claims themselves change in the process (Corburn, 2009; Shackley & 
Wynne, 1996). Hence, this demands a more dynamic perspective on knowledge 
than the supply-and-demand model has to offer.
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1.2.2 Constructionist perspectives
An alternative to the study of the role of knowledge in decision making is offered by 
constructionist theories, which have made the practices in which accounts of the 
natural world are assembled and achieve the status as reality as its central object 
of study (Fujimura, 1992; Jasanoff, 2004; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). In the case of 
climate change, the contention that scientific knowledge is constructed has become 
commonplace. Several arguments are given (see for a discussion also Yearley, 
2009). First, the inherent complexity of climate change makes any representation 
thereof dependent upon human choices, but also on the enabling web of instruments, 
models and practices to make something as global mean temperature possible 
(Hulme, 2010). Second, climate projections in themselves are dependent on human 
and non-human emission behaviour, and the assumptions about changes therein. 
Third, the making of projections and assessments requires a complicated set of 
tasks, inputs and organisation all to be done within sets of criteria to do so in a 
legitimate way. 
 This study does not take interest in the construction of scientific knowledge 
about climate impacts per se, but rather how knowledge claims are constructed in 
the direct relation of public policy response to these claims. Scholars in science and 
technology studies (Bijker et al., 2009; Jasanoff, 1990; Shackley & Wynne, 1996), 
sociology (Hannigan, 2006; Yearley, 2009) or anthropology (Barnes et al., 2013; 
Rayner, 2012) have made this particular knowledge making their research domain 
and contributed to offering a richer and more in-depth understanding of how 
 policy-relevant knowledge is made, stabilised, perceived and influences policy. In 
these processes, knowing and ordering are constantly enmeshed and develop in a 
co-evolutionary way (Jasanoff, 2004). Policy affects the production and stabilisation 
of knowledge, while that knowledge simultaneously supports and justiﬁes that 
policy. By not taking a priori assumptions of what demarcates scientific knowledge 
from other types of knowledge, or clear distinctions between the categories of 
science and politics, these studies have taken effort in explaining how the credibility 
and acceptability of particular knowledge claims are a constant achievement. 
 The ways in which knowledge is handled in political decision making has been 
shown to institutionalise in different ways. The literature has offered various 
typologies to account for those multiple and often co-existent ways of science- 
politics interaction, such as risk governance regimes (Millstone, 2009; Renn, 2008), 
boundary arrangements (Hoppe, 2005), the organisation of knowledge programmes 
(Cash et al., 2003; Clark et al., 2011), or civic epistemologies (Jasanoff, 2005; Miller, 
2008). Others have raised the issue whether the way societies produce knowledge 
is changing, e.g. by referring to a shift from mode 1 to mode 2 (Gibbons et al., 1997) or 
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from normal to post-normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). Notwithstanding 
the usefulness of these typologies in their own right, I refer to them here in order to 
acknowledge the idea that the wicked problem of climate change is addressed in 
arrangements with distinct ways to construct, review, validate, deliberate and 
decide over politically relevant knowledge. Consequently, how new knowledge 
translates into new institutions, tools, repertoires and policies is not self-evident. In 
the absence of universally recognised proof and of ways to establish those proofs, 
the acceptance of evidence requires explanation.
 Interestingly, various  authors have made the case that it may be fruitful to refer 
to particular national styles of handling evidence or of science-politics relations 
(Halffman, 2005; Jasanoff, 2005; Miller, 2008). With the concept of civic epistemologies 
Jasanoff refers to the ways through which “a nation’s citizens come to know things 
in common and to apply their knowledge to the conduct of politics” (2005, p. 9). 
With comparative studies of nations she analysed how societies have developed 
different ways in which evidence is constructed, demonstrated and is informing 
collective choices. To answer the question “does climate adaptation policy need 
probabilities?” (Dessai & Hulme, 2004), the concept of civic epistemologies would 
suggest that the answer may very well be different for different nations.
 Next to national styles, others have argued that policy sectors themselves grow 
similar, e.g. due to professional isomorphic processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or 
under the influence of consensual knowledge by cross-border epistemic communities 
(Haas, 1989). Halffman (2003) argued that the regimes used to establish evidence 
may resemble those in the same policy field in other places rather than other policy 
field within a nation’s territorial border. Knowledge about climate change may 
therefore possibly be handled in different sectoral styles when different policy fields 
deal with climate change impacts. This raises the question how knowledge about 
phenomena is constituted by orders in different policy fields operating within the 
same civic epistemology and whether and how knowledge about these phenomenon 
changes when it is appropriated by public policy. 
1.3  Aim and approach of this thesis
1.3.1 Research question
Climate change adaptation offers a particularly interesting case to study how claims 
about emerging phenomena are constructed in different policy fields. If one now 
can observe mainstreaming of climate change in pre-existing policy fields with 
pre-existing science-policy interfaces, this makes climate change adaptation an 
interesting case to understand how different policy fields respond to the same 
phenomenon, in this case the wicked problem of climate change. A whole range of 
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climate effects are considered, such as increasing temperatures, rising sea levels or 
fluctuating precipitation patterns. To base decision making on these consequences 
are to be translated into meaningful effects for the collective issues in particular 
policy fields. In this process choices have to be made. Which effects are relevant and 
for whom? What is up for collective action and what is individual responsibility? To 
which questions should scarce research funds be allocated? What policy options to 
explore? Knowledge on climate impacts are tailored in order to connect to current 
affairs, objectives, tasks of involved policy fields. At the same time, climate change 
may in turn also change the tasks, objectives or responsibilities in these policy 
fields. For example, the collective answer on whether urban warming is a ‘liveability’, 
a ‘public health’ or a ‘non’ issue, has effects on what indicators to monitor, when 
proof is sufficient to act and in what way it should be legitimately addressed.
 With this book I aim to add to the understanding of how wicked problems are 
tamed and dealt with in the process of constructing knowledge for decision making. 
By making in-depth analyses of how claims about climate change are constructed, 
validated and agreed upon, I aim to develop a richer understanding of the 
problematic role of knowledge in the policy process. In the absence of the possibility 
of universal truths about climate change, how are claims about the impacts of 
climate change constructed in different policy fields, and how do knowledge claims 
about climate change adaptation transform and get stabilised in the direct relation to 
decision making? 
1.3.2 A constructionist approach 
Having presented the central question that will guide this study, I now turn to the 
question how this objective can be meaningfully approached using a set of theoretical 
and methodological building blocks. Rather than elaborating the theoretical and 
methodological foundations of this thesis in full detail – these are the topics to be 
explored in the next chapter – I will delimit myself here to formulating what can be 
thought of as a ‘memorandum of preconditions’ for scaffolding a theoretical and 
methodological framework. 
 Earlier I indicated that the role of knowledge has gained substantial attention 
in the literature. However, the universalist and static assumptions about knowledge, 
as well as the lack of thorough attention for the contexts in which knowledge is 
created and validated to inform decision making, obscures the understanding of 
climate change adaptation. A constructionist perspective seems a promising alternative 
to build an understanding of how governance institutions and science-policy 
interfaces respond to the new demands of the wicked problem of climate change. 
 First, the study of climate change requires a framework able to study the 
construction and transformation of knowledge as a highly dynamic process. 
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Climate change adaptation is an emerging phenomenon. In the absence of clear 
understandings of both the complexities of the issue and normative positions for 
collective action, as well as established ways of addressing the phenomenon, one 
may expect a relatively volatile process of constructing statements on what is and 
what ought. Co-production is particularly directed to study those emergent 
phenomena, showing “how certain conceptual designs and cognitive formulations 
gain ground at the expense of others, and how, once adopted, these successful 
settlements come to be seen as natural, inevitable or determined in advance” 
(Jasanoff, 2004, p. 277). It is addressed to display the mechanisms by which 
understandings gain ground and how these mechanisms “routinely involve the 
production or reconstitution of scientific or technical knowledge” (ibid).
 Second, my endeavour needs a theoretical framework that leaves many of the 
assumptions and categories sufficiently open. For example, rather than defining 
what constitutes knowledge, climate effects, experts or decision-makers, I will 
provide descriptive accounts on how these elements are made and maintained in 
the processes of addressing and handling climate change. As I have argued, the 
definition of what climate change is, is an inextricable element of its governance. 
The processes defining the relevant categories should thus be an integral part of 
study, and so do the contexts in which authoritative claims are constructed and 
stabilised to respond to the demands of climate change.
 Building on the former two points, I will use an interpretative approach 
(Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006) to study how understandings about climate effects 
are made. This means I will reconstruct the ways in which meaning about climate 
change is made in different contexts and what elements make this particular 
understanding possible. As such, it should enable an understanding of the 
microprocesses (Jasanoff, 1990; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) through which knowledge 
gets articulated, negotiated, gains legitimacy, and restructures practices. 
1.3.3 Cases in adaptation
The heart of the study are three qualitative case studies of knowledge construction 
processes about climate impacts in the Netherlands. Critical cases “can be defined 
as having strategic importance in relation to the general problem” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p. 229) and sufficient ‘variation’ in them can advance in-depth knowledge in the 
phenomenon the researcher wants to study. My cases vary in the responsivity of 
policy contexts to appropriate climate change. By taking the differential responsivity 
as a starting point, the cases should offer a rich and potentially contrasting 
understanding of how particular processes of appropriating and handling climate 
change affect the construction and transformation of what climate change means 
for collective decision making. While I do not aim to do a comparative case study, 
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my case selection was based on three ideas to guarantee sufficient variation in my 
cases. First, these cases are to offer a variation in different policy fields that address 
climate change effects, as this may shed light on how the understanding of climate 
change is affected by pre-existing science-policy interfaces in different policy fields. 
Second, the extent to which stabilised and codified relations between science and 
policy have been formed around the topic for which knowledge is constructed 
differs. Third, the cases are varied on the type of activity of decision making the 
production of knowledge is predominantly related to, i.e. agenda setting, policy 
formulation and implementation. The following brief introduction on the three 
cases elaborates on these characteristics of the cases.
 The first case study describes the second Delta Committee, an ad hoc state 
advisory committee installed in 2007 to directly inform the cabinet on a range of 
policy options to strategically deal with the long-term safety of the Dutch coast. The 
Delta Committee, chaired by the eminent former minister Veerman, involved 
scientists from various disciplines, politicians and policy makers active in different 
policy fields, as well as members originating from the private sector. Instead of 
presenting a set of coastal options, the Committee presented a far broader yet 
univocal and science-based vision on the long-term protection of the Netherlands. 
The Committee’s vision shaped subsequent institutional reform and reformulated 
the policy agenda of Dutch climate adaptation governance. This was remarkable 
because many of the policy options it presented were non-incremental and were 
coupled to a climate scenario which went well beyond common projections of the 
IPCC and the Dutch Royal Meteorological Organisation KNMI. Furthermore, the 
Committee broke with alternative ‘living with water’ discourses gaining ground in 
the field of water management in favour of a strategy reinvigorating both the 
collective and the central state.
 The Delta Committee is particularly interesting as it presented a crucial case in 
the transformation of both the understanding of what climate change means for the 
Netherlands as well as how to strategically govern climate change adaptation. It was 
hence a pressure cooker of co-production. While some would readily argue that the 
Delta Committee was predominantly a water safety organ, a closer look of the 
committee shows that it involved or touched upon varying policy domains in 
advising its long-term strategic national policies, from coastal management to 
agriculture, and from spatial planning to fiscal policy. From the perspective of 
co-production, it is especially interesting to see how the committee was so effective 
in redefining what climate change adaptation in the Netherlands is by mobilising 
particular sets of scientific and technical knowledges.
 The second case deals with regional water management in the north-eastern 
part of the Netherlands. In this case study the project ‘Droge Voeten 2050’ plays the 
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central part. This project brought together an intergovernmental group of civil 
servants who were demanded to advise on the long-term consequences of climate 
change and to prepare a set of authoritative and acceptable policies to adapt to these 
changes. Climatic changes were said to be one of the main reasons to revisit the 
regional flood risk management policies, even though the man-made drainage 
system had been posing challenges for the local population for centuries. 
 In the Netherlands, water management in general, and water risk governance 
in particular, are among the most established policy regimes. The field is dominated 
by a few well-institutionalised agencies and characterised by largely formalised 
competencies and procedures. The Dutch national government, the provinces and 
the water authorities had agreed to establish flood safety norms for the regional 
water barriers and to cyclically reassess whether the systems were meeting those 
norms. The project Droge Voeten 2050 was also the result of implementing that 
agreement. The longstanding tradition of regional water management, its history of 
being challenged to respond to new demands for integrating knowledge, and its 
strongly institutionalised character make regional water management a particularly 
interesting case to study how pre-existing institutions respond to the new demands 
of climate change. 
 The third case goes into the depth of the processes of constructing policy-relevant 
knowledge for the (re-)emerging issue of urban warming in the Netherlands. 
I zoom in on projects in Rotterdam, Arnhem and Utrecht. With the increasing 
awareness for climate change adaptation, the urban climate also regained attention 
in urban development strategies. Even though the topic had for long been important 
for the scientific discipline of urban meteorology, the circulation and institutional-
isation of that discipline’s knowledge in Dutch urban planning practices had been 
very limited. A core question in urban adaptation debates is whether and how 
urban warming should be a legitimate issue on the governmental agenda, and, if so, 
whether it should be a matter of town planning, public health, social cohesion 
policy, or any other field of collective organisation. Translating global environmental 
change into meaning for local affairs goes hand in hand with a process of 
simultaneously stabilising both epistemic and political legitimacy for particular 
ways of locally knowing and dealing with global climate change. 
 Adaptation to urban warming provides a particularly interesting case to study 
the transformation of knowledge, as these construction processes are directly 
related to the formation of new meaningful issues of governance. Around these 
issues new networks of cooperation and exchange emerged between hitherto rather 
disconnected elements. In contrast to the regional water management case, here 
one may possibly observe a highly volatile transformation process in an instable 
context. In this particular case, disconnected worlds, such as urban planning, 
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urban meteorology, public health and politics, may form new productive relations 
around the issue of urban warming, through which these worlds themselves change 
as well. 
1.3.4 Thesis outline 
With the central aim of this thesis in mind and a general idea on what work needs 
to be done, the next chapter will build the theoretical and conceptual apparatus. It 
will go into the depth of the scholarly understanding of the relationships between 
science and policy and some of its problematic flaws. Grounded in a constructionist 
and interpretivist tradition, I present an alternative set of concepts to enable an 
understanding of how claims about climate change get constructed, deconstructed 
and transformed. This is followed by the elaboration of a methodological strategy 
aligned with these theoretical starting points. The third chapter then discusses the 
case of the Delta Committee advising on strategic policy development in the face of 
climate change. In chapter four I proceed to a discussion of how the policy field of 
regional water management in northeast Netherlands responded to the challenges 
of climate change for the future of the local water system. The fifth chapter deals 
with urban adaptation policy in relation to the emerging issue of urban warming. 
The final chapter presents a discussion of the processes of appropriating and 
handling climate change to develop authoritative knowledge claims in relation to 
collective decision making. I will conclude that knowledge transforms in the 
process of climate change adaptation. Thinking in terms of knowledge transfer is 
misleading. I will argue that transformation has a Janus face. While transformation 
brings some aspects of climate impacts into sharp focus enabling adaptive action, 
transformation also closes down resulting in a partial blindness for other climate 
risks.
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Theorising science-policy relations
2.1  The problematic role of knowledge in addressing wicked issues
As I have argued in the previous chapter, climate change has grown into a demanding 
societal issue over the last decades. Throughout the academic literature, as well as 
in many of the policy strategies drafted to address it, climatic change adaptation is 
thought “a wicked problem par excellence” (Jordan et al., 2010), requiring substantial 
societal change to address its challenges (Leroy, Driessen & Van Vierssen, 2010b; 
O’Brien, 2012). Science and scientific knowledge play prominent roles in climate 
change adaptation. Science plays a political role in naming and explaining climate 
change as an environmental threat to which society should respond, while invoking 
scientific expertise is pivotal for legitimising political action (Beck, 2009; Weingart, 
1999). 
 The objective of this chapter is to develop a theoretical frame to study how 
knowledge claims about climate change get constructed, deconstructed and 
transformed when different policy fields engage in adaptation. The problematic role 
of science has attracted an enormous body of scientific work. The role of knowledge 
in addressing the wicked problem of climate change adaptation is considered 
particularly problematic. First, the complexities and uncertainties surrounding the 
concept of climate change pushes science to its cognitive limits. Second, the reliance 
on a politicised climate science makes adaptation potentially rife with controversy 
and paralysis. Third, mainstreaming climate change requires the meaningful 
re-articulation of a global phenomenon for various pre-existing policy domains at 
regional levels, with science-policy interfaces not designed for addressing climate 
change. Fourth, the pace of uptake of climate knowledge in decision making is, 
according to commentators, slow.
 However, to study how knowledge about climate change is handled in different 
policy fields, I cannot draw on the dominant perspective on the role of knowledge 
in the policy process. This perspective has long been inspired by positivistic thought 
in which facts discovered in science are transferred to society in order to make 
policies more rational. The social sciences have challenged this understanding, by 
arguing that persuasive claims about the environment are constructed, not only 
through the practices of scientific communities alone, but also through interaction 
with society (Clarke, 2005; Jasanoff, 2004; Leroy et al., 2010a; Yearley, 2009). The 
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universalist and static assumptions about knowledge and a lack of attention to the 
contexts in which knowledge is created, obscure a thorough understanding of the 
emerging phenomenon of climate change adaptation. As I have argued in the 
previous chapter, an alternative theoretical framework should, on the one hand, 
enable the study of construction and validating knowledge for adaptation as a 
dynamic process. On the other hand, the theoretical framework should leave many 
of the categories and assumptions in addressing climate change sufficiently open.
 To overcome the problems of the dominant understanding of the role of 
knowledge in the policy process, I will first show how a positivistic understanding 
is still substantially informing current theorising on this subject in general, and in 
thinking about climate change adaptation in particular. I discuss how the 
knowledge utilisation literature offers starting points to go beyond the problems 
sketched, yet that conceptualising science-policy relations with a supply-and-de-
mand model has three fundamental flaws. To overcome those flaws, I present an 
alternative analytical model by drawing upon the constructionist literature on the 
subject in the second part of this chapter. The developed conceptual apparatus is to 
provide a richer and more precise understanding of how knowledge claims about 
climate change get (re-)constructed in a process of multiple interacting social 
worlds, in which all of these worlds place demands on the construction of those 
claims.
2.2  The linear model as a performative heuristic
The link between science and politics is a lively topic in many academic fields, of 
which policy sciences (Radaelli, 1995) and social studies of science (Jasanoff, 2004) 
are notable ones. A central model to conceptualise their relationship has been 
coined the ‘linear model’ (e.g. Pielke, 2007). In this model, basic science is the social 
institution geared towards the discovery of ‘truth’, which is then transferred via 
applied research to inform political decision making. Many authors trace the 
origins of the linear model back to the Enlightenment and the development of a 
rational-modernist discourse (Leroy et al., 2010a). Modern science was to rationalise 
society and to liberate humankind from irrationality grounded in superstition, 
religion, or prejudice. In what Jasanoff (2003) terms a social contract, science was to 
produce the scientific discoveries, technology, trained personnel, and ultimately 
prosperity on society’s behalf. For this it would receive substantial autonomy and 
funding from governments, particularly in post-war United states but also 
elsewhere throughout the western world. ‘Curiosity-driven’ basic research could be 
regulating itself by means of peer review, the central institution of ‘organised 
scepticism’.
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Three important assumptions can therefore be distinguished in the linear model. 
First, pure science is the main origin of objective ‘truth’, discovered through the 
positivist ‘scientific methods’. Second, its relation with society is predominantly 
uni-directional. Discovered truths trickle down from the reservoir of knowledge, 
or are transferred to society. Third, facts can be readily separated from values, and 
‘science’ is concerned with the former while ‘politics’ deals with the latter. Hence, 
the features of a pre-existing policy field that will eventually consume scientific 
knowledge is irrelevant to its production in this model. Policy influence on 
knowledge production is seen as a disturbance.
 Although it was long assumed that the application of knowledge to policy was 
unproblematic and linear (Jasanoff, 2003), social scientists have showed its profound 
problems. The linear model is challenged as a description of science-policy relations 
as being plainly unrealistic, undesirable, or unfit for contemporary complex 
problems (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998; Leroy et al., 2010a; 
Nowotny, 2003; Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007). Despite the criticism it received, and to 
which I will return shortly, several elements of this model are currently still 
informing the development of theories on science-policy relations, the actual 
organisation of research around contemporary environmental problems, and 
popular understanding of the relation between science and policy.
 First, experts and expertise are seen as contributors to an ongoing rationalisa-
tion of the policy process. More scientific knowledge would contribute to better, i.e. 
more effective and more efficient, decision making. Pleas that policies must be 
“evidence based” or “science based” are more recent examples of this logic (Rayner, 
2007). In the Dutch case for example, the National Programme for Spatial 
Adaptation to Climate Change (ARK) stated that as climate change will yield 
unprecedented changes, policy making could no longer be grounded in experiences 
of the past and “Scientific insights concerning changes in the future […] should, in 
the face of climate change, be the basis for all spatial plans and investments” 
(VROM et al., 2007, p. 26). 
 Second, as facts can be clearly separated from values, science must be defended 
as an independent sphere concerned with finding facts, placed at enough distance 
from politics as the sphere where struggles over power and values are settled 
(Hoppe, 2005; Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998). Empirical research has shown how this 
distinction was institutionalised in different models granting primacy to either 
science or politics (Halffman, 2005; Millstone, 2009). Here climate science is also a 
point in case. In the last decade, curiosity-driven, fundamental research on climate 
change has been supplemented by demand-driven, applied research programmes 
that focus on climate impacts and the feasibility of adaptation strategies (Swart, 
Biesbroek & Capela Lourenço, 2014). International examples are Knowledge for 
34
CHAPTER TWO
Climate (the Netherlands), KLIMZUG (Germany), NORKLIMA (Norway) or 
GICC (France). However, applied research, and ultimately basic research as well, is 
funded to achieve a goal that is external to science itself (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007). 
While the direction of research in demand-driven programmes is explicitly tailored 
to meet the needs of funders, Sarewitz & Pielke conclude that the subjects of 
fundamental research are also influenced by strategic decisions and societal interests, 
albeit in subtle ways.
2.3  Supply-and-demand perspectives
2.3.1 Two distinct worlds
Despite the criticism the linear model may have received, its assumptions are still 
informing theorising on science policy relations. For instance, the two communities 
theory in knowledge utilisation (Caplan, 1979; Landry, Amara & Lamari, 2001), 
producer-user models (Lemos et al., 2012), or supply-and-demand models of 
knowledge (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007) clearly reflect a two-world hypothesis as one 
of its main building blocks. Scientists, researchers, or experts on the one hand, and 
civil servants, politicians, and other policy makers on the other, are thought to inhabit 
two different worlds characterised by fundamentally different logics, languages, 
reward systems, motives, and codes of conduct. Many attempts to describe the 
cultures of these different worlds boil down to some version of the Mertonian norms of 
“Communalism, Universalism, Disinterestedness, and Organised Scepticism” 
(Merton, 1973, pp. 267-278) for the former, and a Lasswellian typology of politics 
being about “who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell, 1936) for the latter. However, 
the central topic these literatures aim to understand is not to the characteristics of 
the two worlds per se, but rather how scientific knowledge impacts the policy 
process and its decisions. Often, a dismal picture is presented in which knowledge 
rarely gets used in the policy process. 
 However, the literature on knowledge utilisation has long rejected the idea 
that the mere accumulation of knowledge, or better explained knowledge, would 
necessarily lead to more knowledge informed decisions. For example, despite the 
commonsensical logic that making better climate predictions available for policy 
makers is useful, empirical studies show that this knowledge may very well fail to 
make an impact on the policy practice of, say, urban planning and design (Eliasson, 
2000; Hebbert & Mackillop, 2013), water resources management (Rayner et al., 
2005), or coastal management (Tribbia & Moser, 2008). Suggested reasons for this 
failure are various. For example, Sarewitz & Pielke (2007) list mismatches with 
decision-maker needs, poor communication, conflicts with belief systems or 
interests, unavailability during the time needed, misfit with the decision context, or 
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the mistrust of information. Hence, the assumption of a uni-directional flow of 
information from science to policy is shown to be fundamentally flawed: discovered 
truths do not trickle down and get applied automatically. They are (or are not) 
actively transferred to society. The knowledge utilisation literature amends such 
naïve understanding in two important ways, by focusing on different forms of 
knowledge use and on the ongoing interaction between science and politics.
 First, what has been termed ‘instrumental use’, the direct application of knowledge 
into decisions, is rare. Instrumental use is found mostly with well-structured problems, 
when information is non-controversial and fits the routine operating procedures of 
the policy process towards stable and agreed objectives, such as traffic safety (e.g. 
Bax, 2011). However, it is also hardly the only way in which knowledge may 
influence the policy process. For instance, Weiss (1998) has pointed to the more 
subtle enlightenment function evaluation research may have to the policy process. 
Knowledge may influence the development or modification of policies in many 
diffuse ways, and may have effects on multiple types users in different ways. 
Longer-term effects of knowledge may affect perceptions or the more general ways 
of understanding. With ‘conceptual use’, scholars in this field have been pointing to 
the indirect effect of knowledge on the understanding of policy makers of their 
policy problems (Caplan, 1979; Radaelli, 1995; Weiss, 1998).
 Second, knowledge gets used through processes of interaction between science 
and politics (Caplan, 1979; McNie, 2007; Rich & Oh, 2000; Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007). 
Knowledge does not come rolling through some pipeline running from the production 
plants of science to get consumed in decision arenas of politics. Collaborative 
arrangements are key to processes of ‘linking’ or ‘reconciling’ in knowledge utilisation. 
Based on the various aforementioned characteristics of the two worlds, collaboration 
may have various functions, e.g. overcoming jargon issues, reciprocal learning on 
what the one world needs and the other can offer, delimiting costly search processes, or 
making knowledge accessible. Collaboration is, however, not a sufficient condition 
for knowledge use. Divergent belief systems or interests of involved organisations 
may very well result in non-use, strategic use or symbolic use of knowledge (Rich & 
Oh, 2000; Weiss, 1998).
2.3.2 Bridging the ‘gap’
The metaphor of a ‘gap’ between the two worlds reflects an important element in the 
understanding of the knowledge process (Caplan, 1979; Lemos et al., 2012; O’Brien, 
2013; Rich & Oh, 2000). Also, IPCC’s work group II on adaptation concludes ‘with 
very high confidence’ in its Fifth Assessment Report that knowledge deficits are an 
adaptation constraint, even though addressing these deficits may not necessarily 
lead to action (Klein et al., 2014, pp. 911-912). The intrinsic differences yield a divide, 
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which may be exaggerated by actors on either side perceiving that politicians either 
misuse truthful knowledge in strategic ways or that scientists supply knowledge 
that has no value to decision maker needs. Building on the notion of the ‘gap’, much 
literature on science-policy relations has focused on ways to ‘bridge’ that gap in 
order to allow for a more fruitful exchange. The IPCC assures that
A good climate decision […] may require a dialog between users and specialists to 
jointly ascertain how a specific task can best be undertaken within a given context with 
the current state of scientific knowledge. This dialog may be facilitated by individuals 
[…] and boundary organisations, who bridge the gap between research and practice.
(Jones et al., 2014, p. 200, emphasis added)
The gap is also a central issue the adaptation research programmes aim to address. 
The Knowledge for Climate programme observes that “the bridge between 
knowledge about the climate and the Dutch planning practice is still small. Planners 
and scientists do not succeed in finding one another and speak different languages, 
despite all current initiatives” (Knowledge for Climate, 2009, p. 24). Hence, tapping 
the ‘reservoir of knowledge’ comes with many difficulties.
 Approaches to ‘bridge the gap’ are various, and so are the understandings on 
what happens on these bridges. Building on ideas put forward in the knowledge 
utilisation and science communication literature, scholars have focused on 
mechanisms of improving communication. Some scholars suggest mechanisms to 
be implemented on the micro scale of individuals, and focus on joint fact finding 
projects (Karl, Susskind & Wallace, 2007) or on the role of advisors (Pielke, 2007; 
Turnhout, Stuiver, Klostermann, Harms & Leeuwis, 2013) that have to operate as 
proper ‘boundary workers’. Others focus on the macro-scale of institutional infra-
structures. Ways to facilitate communication focused on institutional innovations 
such as the creation of knowledge systems (Cash et al., 2003; Clark et al., 2011) and 
intermediary organisations (Guston, 2000, 2001). Central to all of these approaches 
is that actors on both sides of the divide lack a good understanding of what science 
has to offer or what the needs in the political process are, or what characteristics 
knowledge should have in order to make the leap. Thus, important tasks for these 
intermediary institutions, projects, or individuals are to translate, mediate, 
negotiate, and coordinate the flow of knowledge. Checks and balances have to 
secure that communication may take place in a productive, open and transparent 
way, preventing experts from becoming ‘stealth issue advocates’ (Pielke, 2007) 
speaking invalid truth in the name of science.
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2.3.3 What understanding of knowledge? 
As I have showed, recent literature has fundamentally amended and elaborated the 
understanding of how knowledge travels between suppliers and demanders, and 
the problems encountered on this travel. However, the conceptualisation of 
knowledge itself remains rather close to positivist thought. Scientific knowledge is 
considered to be the mirror of reality, or at least as the best current approximation 
of that reality in Popperian post-positivism. Scientific knowledge comprises 
information and theories that come closest to the ‘truth’ about reality. Sarewitz, for 
instance, understands facts as “a statement about the world whose truth or falseness 
can be tested” (Sarewitz, 2004, footnote 5). In the knowledge utilisation literature, 
knowledge is generally understood as the product of a research-driven practice that 
may find different uses in policy. By amending a ‘trickle down’ notion into one of 
‘knowledge transfer’, the literature building upon the supply-and-demand metaphor 
maintains that scientific method is the route to arrive at a sound and impartial 
understanding of reality. The institution of science is the locus from which 
knowledge originates, in this case on future climatic changes and their impacts. 
 Some authors in the knowledge utilisation literature see scientific knowledge as a 
subset in the broader category of knowledge. Weiss, for example, defined knowledge as 
comprising data, ideas and arguments (Weiss, 1998). Scientific knowledge then is 
not the only form of knowledge, especially not when meant as the conceptualisation of 
relationships between various elements that make up policy-relevant knowledge. 
Building upon this broader understanding of knowledge, authors have pointed at 
the existence of bureaucratic knowledge, stakeholder knowledge, local knowledge 
or fiducial knowledge (Edelenbos, van Buuren & van Schie, 2011; Hunt & Shackley, 
1999). While making arguments for the importance of these ‘other’ types of 
knowledge in the policy process, these types of knowledge are simultaneously 
demarcated from and positioned vis-à-vis scientific, academic or expert knowledge.
 Hence, in the approaches discussed so far, the cognitive authority of science is 
not questioned (Gieryn, 1995). The result of such reasoning is that knowledge itself 
does not, or even cannot, change when leaving the confined location of science, yet 
only gets recombined with, or made compatible to other forms of knowledge. 
Knowledge is stored in a reservoir, waiting to get used. A prime example of this 
conceptualisation can be found in Lemos et al.’s (2012) conceptualisation of why 
climate knowledge may remain ‘on the shelf ’ and how a ‘piece of information goes 
from being useful to usable’: through high-quality interaction the actors’ 
perceptions of knowledge alter, possibly leading to convergence between explicit 
scientific knowledge and the tacit knowledge of users in the decision-making 
process (see for the dominance of this perspective in the adaptation literature also 
the IPCC’s latest summary in Klein et al., 2014, pp. 911-913). 
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2.3.4 Summarising drawbacks
Despite interesting and sophisticated insights on the role of knowledge in the deci-
sion-making process, the knowledge utilisation literature does have a range of 
drawbacks. First, these approaches assume clear separations between science and 
politics, and between facts and values. A stream of literature in science studies has 
shown that these categories tend to break down on close inspection and that the 
clear distinctions between facts and values are contingent constructions (Gieryn, 
1983, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004; Latour, 2005; Weingart, 1999). The categories of science 
and politics are over-universalised (Miller, 2001), reifying the differences within 
these domains, e.g between climate science and engineering, or between legislature 
and executive bodies. The two-world understanding needs to be relaxed to allow for 
a multitude of social worlds to interact, that may operate in different ways and may 
place different demands on these interactions.
 Second, these studies portray science as the single origin of knowledge about 
nature that policy makers then can more or less easily access. The process of how 
knowledge affects the policy process is still very uni-directional, with an 
understanding that “information processing by individual decision-makers 
generally consists of different, but interrelated stages (i.e. information acquisition, 
dissemination, and use/impact)” (Rich & Oh, 2000, p. 177). The suggestion that one 
group of privileged actors solely constructs the understanding of reality needs to be 
relaxed, in favour of a conceptualisation with explicit attention for the situated 
context in which knowledge is produced and consumed.
 Third, and related to its objectivist understanding of knowledge production, 
this literature suggests that in the process of application or use, the knowledge 
itself, once produced, does not change and remains stable, even though it might be 
selectively used or applied. Once a set of findings has gained scientific legitimacy by 
passing the scientific standards, it is moved out of the scientific sphere into the 
policy sphere. Notions of ‘knowledge transfer’ (Caplan, 1979) or ‘adoption’ (Lemos 
et al., 2012) are examples thereof.
2.4  Co-production as an alternative
To overcome the downsides of the supply-and-demand understanding of knowledge, 
I build on a constructionist understanding of knowledge. A constructionist ontology 
should not be understood as a relativist ‘anything goes’ and reality does ‘not exist’ 
(e.g. Irwin, 2001; Latour, 2005). Constructions within this tradition are not more or 
less “true” in an absolutist sense (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), nor are they anything goes 
imaginations that one simply ‘believes’ in (Latour, 2005, pp. 90-101). It means that 
accounts of what is are constructed, that some constructions are more sophisticate or 
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more stable, yet that constructions could have possibly been different. Different 
accounts of climate impacts are possible. Rather than the heroic positivist understanding 
of discovering ‘truth out there’, a more humble constructivist perspective “examines 
the practices by which accounts of the natural world are put together and achieve 
the status of reality” (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998, p. 4). Irwin explains that a key point 
about “constructions is that they should be seen as fluid rather than fixed” (2001, 
p. 176 emphasis in original) within particular settings addressing particular issues. 
Over time particular accounts may become less contested and less open for 
transformation, gradually becoming to be stabilised. 
 The notion of ‘co-production’ (Jasanoff, 2004) questions a priori separations 
such as the clear distinctions between scientific facts and political values. Rather, 
studies in this perspective aim to understand how knowledge claims become stable, 
authoritative, get institutionalised and reorder science and society. Scientific 
knowledge is not understood as a mirror of reality. “Durable representations of 
the environment […] do not arise from scientific activity alone, through scientists’ 
representations of the world as it is, but are sustained by shared normative and 
cultural understandings of the world as it ought to be”, Jasanoff claims, and 
“environmental knowledge achieves robustness through continual interaction – or 
conversation – between fact-finding and meaning-making” (2010a, p. 248). Hence, 
rather than just pointing at the process of joint production of knowledge between 
agents, the concept refers to the intertwined constitutive links between knowledge 
making and social order. It therefore aims to avoid both social and scientific 
determinism, but sees knowledge as the product of social work and simultaneously 
as constitutive for social order. Especially on the governance of environmental 
issues such as climate change, particular ways of knowledge have been shown to be 
intimately intertwined with ways of decision making on behalf of the public 
(Hulme, 2010; Irwin, 2001; Jasanoff, 2005; Miller, 2001; Scott, 1998; Shackley, 1997; 
Shackley & Wynne, 1996).
 The analytical power of co-production as an interpretive framework to 
understand how knowledge claims come into being at the interplay of cognitive and 
political commitments can be illustrated with the example of climate impacts in 
the Netherlands. The two large-scale scientific research programmes on climate 
change adaptation, Climate Changes Spatial Planning (2004-2011) and Knowledge 
for Climate (2008-2014), are organised around principles of societal engagement in 
the very production of their knowledge, because climate change “will affect all 
segments and sectors of the society and the economy of the Netherlands, but it also 
brings new opportunities for major innovations” (Kabat & Driessen, 2009, p. 4). 
The programmes direct investments in knowledge production on climate risks 
along the lines of so called ‘hotspots’, places where science and practices are to 
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collaborate during the entire process of knowledge production and consumption. It 
is clear that the understanding of what climate change means for the Netherlands, 
as well as the direction of reordering of the Netherlands alongside these new 
understandings is thus an amalgam of both scientific knowledge and political, 
cultural, and economic commitments. Hotspots are selected, the two scientific 
directors of these programmes explain, on the basis of “(i) economic importance 
and the importance of the investment agenda, (ii) expected impact of climate 
change, (iii) ambitions relating to innovation and adaptation and (iv) national and 
international transferability”, and include “major infrastructural and economic 
pillars of the Netherlands, such as Schiphol Mainport and the Port of Rotterdam.” 
(Kabat & Driessen, 2009, p. 5). Despite the in-depth understanding of climate 
change effects on the Dutch water sector, as well as innovative ways to adapt this 
Dutch science policy strategy yielded, the Dutch strategy was also severely criticised 
by the Dutch Court of Audit on the grounds that it left the (scientific) understanding 
of many of the climate risks obscured (The Netherlands Court of Audit, 2012, 
pp. 33-34).
 Despite the co-production concept’s advantages for overcoming the downsides 
of the user-producer models, it cannot be readily used as an interpretive framework. 
A downside of the co-production perspective is that it is an idiom and an ontology 
rather than a theoretical frame with usable concepts to analyse the process of 
knowledge transformation in adaptation. The development of a set of workable 
concepts to make up an analytical framework inspired by the co-production 
concepts, is the task of the next section.
2.5  Working on stable knowledge claims
In the previous sections, I outlined the problems inherent to a substantial part of 
the literature on science-policy relations in climate adaptation. Three of its 
assumptions are fundamentally flawed. One, the two-worlds assumption should be 
corrected to allow for a multitude of relevant worlds. Two, policy and politics are 
not passive receptors of scientific knowledge claims, but actively engage in their 
construction. Three, knowledge is not transferred to the realm of policy making 
without mutation. To operationalise the co-production model, this section advances 
a model of science policy relations that studies the production of climate adaptation 
knowledge at the intersection of multiple social worlds, working together work on 
stable and legitimate knowledge claims, through which the knowledge claims 
themselves get transformed. Two basic questions drive this section. First, how can 
we fruitfully conceptualise the setting in which knowledge about climate change is 
constructed, while acknowledging the differences between such entities as science 
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and politics, yet without essentialising their characteristics, or assuming the 
primacy of either one? Second, how can we understand the process of constructing, 
transforming, stabilising and deconstructing of knowledge about climate impacts in 
those different settings?
2.5.1 The setting: social worlds intersecting
In my need to conceptualise how relevant knowledge is constructed about climate 
impacts within particular policy fields, the conceptualisation of two distinct 
entities of “science” on the one hand and “politics” on the other does not offer 
enough analytical flexibility as conceptual points of departure for my analysis. 
I follow Miller’s (2001) criticism of a priori assumptions of those two entities of as 
homogenous, distinct, and stable. While it may be the case for well-established and 
stable institutional orders, Miller argues, it might be different around new issues. 
Climate change adaptation is, after all, a rather newly emerging issue, involving a 
variety of policy fields, inputs from scientific disciplines, perhaps yielding new 
adaptation fields, and possibly requiring societal change to accommodate it. To 
allow for more flexibility, it is needed to take one step back in order to make two 
steps forward. Much of the literature on scientific advice to policy (Bijker et al., 
2009; Guston, 2000; Halffman, 2003; Jasanoff, 1990; Lentsch & Weingart, 2011a; 
Owens, 2012; Pielke, 2007) makes a direct or indirect reference to science or politics 
as a ‘social world’. To better understand this important conceptual building block, 
I briefly turn to its origins.
 The social worlds framework focuses on meaning-making amongst collectives 
of various sorts and on collective action. Grounded in (American) pragmatism and 
developed mainly within a symbolic interactionist tradition, Clarke (Clarke, 1997, 
2005; Clarke & Star, 2008) explains that two elements are central to the 
understanding of social worlds. On the one hand, social worlds generate shared 
perspectives that then form the basis of collective action. Central here is the 
assumption that thought and action cannot be separated and that people concern 
themselves with something only when they intend to do with it or about it. Social 
worlds are also seen as universes of discourse, in which discourses denote the 
assemblage of language, motive and meaning leading to mutually understood ways 
of acting. On the other hand, commitment to and participation in social worlds are 
constitutive of individual and collective identities. Social worlds are affiliative 
mechanisms. Clarke (2005) refers to Strauss and Becker in their definition that 
social worlds are groups with a shared commitment to certain activities, sharing 
resources to realise goals, have inherited or innovative means of carrying out 
activities, and build shared ideologies on how to go about with the social world’s 
business. Individuals usually participate in a number of social worlds simultaneously. 
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Social worlds for example are climate science, engineering sciences, a policy 
community, or politics. Social worlds may have segments, or subdivisions or sub 
worlds, which are shifting when commitment alters or reorganises. Their structures 
are fluid, their temporarily stable forms being the product of ongoing reconstructions. 
 Social worlds operate alongside standard operating procedures that make 
collective action possible. Several researchers have focused on exploring the 
concrete work and its organisation in these social worlds (Clarke, 1997; Fujimura, 
1987; Fujimura & Chou, 1994; Gerson, 1983). Scientific social worlds centre around 
problem solving. They produce knowledge and its potential application around a 
shared understanding of what matters. They organise their production work then 
along the lines of shared operating procedures, consisting of sets of tasks, programmes, 
conventions, procedures and using tools. When groups have committed resources 
to particular ways of operating directed at specific problems, changes are expensive 
and require new investments. For example, solving complex problems may involve 
a number of calibrated measuring stations, models, procedures specifying different 
steps to be taken, specialised workers, etcetera which may work for one type of 
problems but not for others. Fujimura and Chou see the practices of scientific work 
as “historically located and collectively produced work processes, methods and 
rules for constructing data and theories and for verifying theories” (Fujimura & 
Chou, 1994, p. 1017).
 Crucial for establishing new lines of work or maintaining old ones is to maintain 
legitimacy for the problems a social world seeks to address (issue legitimacy) or 
practices through which knowledge is produced for this problem (method legitimacy) 
(Clarke, 1997; Gerson, 1983). Legitimacy, “a generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 
quoted in Scott, 2008, p. 59), is a relational concept here. Legitimacy is important to 
maintain stable commitment to the operating procedures, but also to maintain 
productive relations, support and funding by larger social worlds (Fujimura, 1987) 
or the wider institutional context (Gerson, 1983). Gieryn (1983) has coined the 
process through which a social world delineates distinctions between other worlds 
and through which it simultaneously aims to claim legitimacy for itself as ‘boundary 
work’. Resonating the symbolic interactionist tradition, he asks the question how 
and why science acquires ‘epistemic authority’ over some designated domains in 
processes of public decision making and how are boundaries of this domain 
reproduced and maintained. Gieryn (1999, p. 12) would respond that this is the 
effect of constant effort, negotiation, and existing only in the local and episodic 
re-enactment of actors, yet within a structural context of available resources, 
historical precedents, rhetorical repertoires, and expectations that constrain and 
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enable this work. With rhetorical repertoires scientists make efforts to depict an 
image of science distinguished from non-science, facts from values. Hence, social 
worlds should be understood as negotiated orders with contingent boundaries.
 The emphasis on standard operating procedures, historically developed 
constellations, and legitimacy brings understanding of how social worlds operate 
close to institutional perspectives, even though the social worlds framework emphasises 
more fluidity than the literature on institutions does. March & Olsen (2006) see 
institutions as relatively stable sets of rules and practices, embedded in structures 
of resources that make action possible and structures of meaning that explain 
behaviour, such as roles, identities, common purposes or belongings. Inhabited by 
actors, institutions are constantly re-enacted in conduct, guide behaviour and 
stabilise expectations. Institutions constrain and enable action, as they are backed 
by enforcement mechanisms or because deviations from routinised practices are 
costly: deviations increase economic risks, decrease the predictability of the 
process, require more thought, or reduce legitimacy or access to those resources 
that are attached to perceptions of legitimacy (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004). 
 A group of authors within the social worlds framework direct their attention 
especially to the intersection of and relationships between multiple social worlds 
(Clarke, 2005; Clarke & Star, 2008). Strauss denotes these intersections as arenas, 
where groups come together around issues of mutual concern and commitment to 
action. There, “various issues are debated, negotiated, fought out, forced and 
manipulated by representatives” of social worlds (Strauss, quoted in Clarke, 1997, p. 
70). It is in these arenas that constructivist scholars of knowledge production 
(Clarke, 1997, pp. 234-236; Gieryn, 1999, pp. 24-25; Jasanoff, 1990) claim to find 
what Latour & Woolgar (1986) term the ‘microprocesses’ of negotiation through 
which knowledge is stabilised and destabilised, and new types of collective action 
may emerge while others seize to exist. Negotiation, conflict and exchange between 
social worlds may yield in reconstructions of the negotiated social order. A scientific 
advisory organ, a risk evaluation project or joint applied research endeavour might 
be thought of as such arenas where different social worlds meet, and negotiations 
about how a problem is to be solved and to what questions knowledge is to be 
produced. These settings are hence interesting and important to study co-production 
(Jasanoff, 2004), which I will therefore direct my gaze on. I now proceed by 
elaborating a workable perspective on the process of knowledge production at these 
intersections of social worlds.
2.5.2 The process: producing knowledge claims 
A central aim of constructivist studies in knowledge production is to understand 
how claims become considered more legitimate than others - more factual - given 
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that the verification of a claim as a univocal mirror of reality is not possible. 
Constructing is never complete and an ongoing process, may succeed or fail when 
a factual claim is deconstructed and new theories and facts emerge. Scientific 
knowledge then develops through processes of negotiation around temporarily and 
relative stable facts. Stabilisation means the alignment of statements, theories, 
observations, and objects, as well as actor commitments supporting those facts. 
“We regard a particular factual claim as true not because it accurately reflects what 
is out there in nature, but because it has been certified as true by those who are 
considered competent to pass upon the truth and falsity of that kind of claim.” 
(Jasanoff, 1990, p. 13). Hence, the web of relations determines the trustworthiness 
of facts in a constructivist understanding. 
 Notwithstanding the constant flux of scientific knowledge, its uncertainties 
and its incompleteness, experts are asked to advise policy based on current bodies 
of knowledge. In her study on scientific advice to policy, she coined the output of 
successful advisory committees “serviceable truths” (Jasanoff, 1990, p. 250). This 
special kind of construct passes tests of scientific acceptability, and is directed to be 
useful for and to meet requirements of the policy process. Facts and values merge 
constantly, e.g. as defining something as a relevant scientific problem occurs within 
frameworks of values and interests defining something as such (Sarewitz, 2004), or 
because selecting risks to be included in an analysis may be based on non-scientific 
assumptions on what ‘proper policy needs’ are (Shackley, 1997). Hence, we may add 
that serviceable truths are negotiated to hold for a particular situation in a particular 
context. This, however, does not prohibit those truths to travel and have impacts 
beyond that negotiated situation. The impacts of climate change deemed relevant 
for the problems of a particular policy field are a prime example of serviceable 
truths. For instance, think of sets of potential and trustworthy interventions in a 
regional water system, in order to compensate for changing flood risks resulting 
from projected changes in extreme weather events. Assembling serviceable truths 
here requires bringing together different disciplines, e.g. meteorology for future 
weather changes, hydrology to understand combinations of weather stimuli on water 
levels, and engineering for effective interventions. Also, it requires a conceptualisation of 
‘risk’, an understanding of the extent of ‘compensation’ aimed at, and ‘realistically 
realisable’ interventions. In order to base collective decisions on these truths, they 
have to fit criteria of legitimacy when challenged in the judicial or political social 
world, or be compatible with an overarching policy strategy for the regional water 
system.
 In a constructionist conceptualisation of the knowledge construction process, 
it is useful to distinguish among three interrelated elements. Those elements are the 
(re-)framing of a wicked problem into a tractable issue, the construction of 
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knowledge claims for that issue and the stabilisation of legitimacy for those claims. 
This tripartite conceptualisation builds on three important questions raised by 
Jasanoff & Wynne (1998, pp. 5-6) in studying the relations between science and 
decision making in climate change governance. How scientists and their societies 
frame issues considered amendable by scientific resolution? How do scientists come 
to know particular facts regarding climate change? How do knowledge claims 
come to be accepted as authoritative by wider social constellations? In the same 
vein, I explained how, in the social worlds framework, worlds organise around a 
shared problem, organise work to produce knowledge to solve that problem, and 
need to negotiate legitimacy for their business (Clarke & Star, 2008; Fujimura, 1987; 
Gerson, 1983). Although I pull the three elements apart here for analytical purposes, 
they should be considered as interrelated, recursive and mutually constitutive.
 The first is (re-)framing complex issues into tractable issues. Climate change is 
said to be a “wicked problem” (Rittel & Webber, 1973), not only because of its 
multiplicity but also because potential impacts of, responses to, and values 
associated with climate change evolve constantly. According to Rittel and Webber 
wicked problems are amorphous, opaque, uncertain and potentially irresolvable. 
The potential challenges for any advisory project are thus massive. Out of the 
multiple attributes the issue may have, a selection is made of what partial elements 
of the problem are to be considered relevant to the situation at hand, whether these 
elements are to be considered natural, technical, political, social or legal, and who 
are to be involved in the resolution of the problem. Issue framing constitutes the 
significance of the situation, redefines it, and formulates strategies for its resolution 
(Rein & Schön, 1993, p. 153). Selection of what is and what is not the issue is at the 
heart of this process. An issue is not wicked because of some intrinsic characteristics 
of the issue, but the outcome of a negotiation process defining it as such.
 Fujimura (1987) has named the taming of wicked problems into more tractable 
ones the process of making problems “doable”. Doability, she insists, is to be 
conceptualised as the articulation of alignment across different social worlds. 
Through this articulation a work space is created that is more structured, less 
ambiguous and more delineated. Articulation means the pulling together of all the 
different elements that are needed to carry out a the production of knowledge, 
which both contains anticipatory actions and hoc decisions on how work is carried 
out. For example, doing an analysis of flood risk changes in the face of climate 
change requires a theory of risk, the purchase, development and calibration of an 
hydrological model, time series data, a procedure to derive stochastic functions, 
producing results in agreed upon timeframes, but also funds to hire consultants to 
carry out specific tasks, transform climate models to fit hydrological models, to 
coordinate whether this fits the political decision to carry out a climate risk analysis, 
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and the obligations stipulated in the water act. The articulation of doable problems 
needs to align the demands, restrictions and opportunities of all social worlds 
intersecting around an issue.
 The second element is the construction of knowledge claims. This construction 
of knowledge claims centres around an assembling process of aligning different 
elements to make accounts aimed at contributing to the resolution of the problematic 
issue at hand. Knowledge is not so much stored in the mind, but rather in carriers 
such as symbols, objects, language and classifications that in turn are mobilised in 
new situations. Stated differently, “cognitive abilities do not reside in ‘you’ but are 
distributed throughout the formatted setting” (Latour, 2005, p. 211). In this process 
of constructing new knowledge claims, it is often necessary to make recombinations 
between elements resulting from different scientific worlds, for example output 
from climate models with insights from hydrological science, or to correct weather 
time series to for anthropogenic interference in order to purify it into natural 
changes only. In this process choices have to be made, such as what indicators have 
to be considered, or what promising policy options have to be explored on their 
effectiveness. Hence, facts and values merge constantly in these microprocesses of 
negotiation. Simultaneously, knowledge claims may be deconstructed, breaking up 
the issue up into its constituent parts to scrutinise the solidity of a claim, reveal 
value laden assumptions, or make relations with other elements (Jasanoff, 1990, 
p. 13; Miller, 2001; Shackley & Wynne, 1996).
 The cooperation of multiple worlds in order to produce serviceable truths is 
enhanced by the infrastructure stabilising their relations, allowing for exchange, 
and enhance joint work (Clarke & Star, 2008; Fujimura, 1992; Miller, 2001; Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). As I showed before, doing sophisticated analyses of flood risks 
requires multiple social worlds to work together and many different tasks have to be 
done. The infrastructure that enables the cooperation and stabilisation of social 
worlds vis-à-vis one another is enhanced by a set of standardised methods and 
boundary objects. Boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989), e.g. standard sets of 
data, work plans, categories, or procedures, are objects that sit between different 
social worlds, allowing them to exchange information and allow for a common 
understanding of an issue, without consensus on what that issue is exactly about. 
These infrastructures between social worlds may allow for quite a lot of interpretive 
flexibility among social worlds, e.g. in Shackley & Wynne’s (1996) boundary-order-
ing devices, or grow quite obdurate in Fujimura’s standardised packages (1992), 
when they are to a large extent codified, standardised, and routinised, and narrow 
possible practices and cross-world cooperation.
 The third element is stabilising the legitimacy of the knowledge claims. Those 
who are producing advice on climate adaptation (need to) take into account the 
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audiences they are aiming to address. This does not mean that science is just 
‘popularised’, it also means taking into account the needs of other lines of work 
(Bijker et al., 2009, pp. 44, 146). In a challenge of cross-domain orchestration 
(Miller, 2001) a multiplicity of audiences are being served to which the knowledge 
claims need to appear credible. The multiplicities of audiences bring a multiplicity 
of needs and criteria for credibility and legitimacy into play. In the construction of 
knowledge claims, potentially conflicting interpretations are negotiated and settled 
by drawing on elements – observations, statements, theories, sources of epistemic 
authority – that make an assembled set of elements to look more factual than 
others. This may be understood as enrolling a web of allies who are supportive to a 
particular construction (Callon, 1986; Fujimura, 1992; Latour, 1987). Closure 
around a particular knowledge claim may prove to be only a temporary stabilisation, 
when an issue becomes controversial and support is withdrawn. In their study of 
advisory scientists working on the representations of scientific uncertainties 
around climate change, Shackley & Wynne (1996) see this as a process of negotiation 
of credibility with policy communities as well as with the research communities 
whose work they are elucidating. Representations of claims, in this case about 
uncertainty, are shaped through this process.
 Sismondo (2010) argues that the process of re-shaping science for a wider 
public is not fundamentally different from the processes shaping knowledge in 
basic science. In most scientific work, e.g. the reduction of complexity of raw data 
in order to make models, doing interpretations of data, and transforming and 
connecting interpretations into more universal theories, negotiation is about 
whether this reshaping is to be considered credible and acceptable. Researchers in 
other scientific social worlds making use of outcomes re-shape them in order to fit 
their own lines of work. Popularising scientific knowledge to move it outside the 
realm of science into non-scientific social worlds also requires representations that 
reshape scientific knowledge to suit the new context. In some cases these rep-
resentations may be considered distortions, while other ways of doing come to be 
considered as legitimate. “Scientific knowledge is constructed through the collective 
transformation of statements, and popularisation can be seen as an extension of 
this process” (Hilgartner 1990 quoted in Sismondo, 2010, p. 173).
 The particular ways in which knowledge claims for decision making are 
constructed and evaluated institutionalise over time (Halffman, 2005; Hoppe, 
2005; Hunt & Shackley, 1999; Jasanoff, 2005; Miller, 2008; Millstone, 2009). For 
example, Jasanoff advances the concept of ‘civic epistemologies’ to refer to the “in-
stitutionalised practices by which members of a given society test and deploy 
knowledge claims used as a basis for collective choices [and] through which they 
assess the rationality and robustness of claims that seek to order their lives” (2005, 
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p. 255). While I do not aim to embark on a full discussion of institutions here, I do 
want to point that deviations from institutionalised patterns of knowledge 
production and evaluation may be costly. Institutional patterns grow more stable 
and obdurate, as patterns thicken by a growth of the reward structure, increased 
commitment, and objectification (Scott, 2008, pp. 121-128). They increase the 
strength of self-regulating mechanisms (Phillips et al., 2004). To understand how 
the construction and consumption of knowledge claims about climate change is 
influenced by the policy fields in which they are ‘mainstreamed’, I will indicate the 
relative hardness of institutionalised practices of constructing and evaluating 
knowledge claims in these fields by using three aspects of institutions (Scott, 2008). 
The first aspect is regulative, and refers to the extent to which evaluation criteria of 
knowledge claims and the procedures through which they are legitimately 
constructed are codified and formalised in sets of sanctioned rules and laws. The 
second is cognitive, and refers to the materialisation of knowledge infrastructures 
in categories, measuring stations, methods, protocols, theories and models that 
enable the construction of particular knowledge claims. The third is normative, 
and refers to the extent that the policy field is characterised by a consensus on 
general goals of the field, the appropriateness of the various roles actors have, and 
the absence of serious challenges of the legitimacy of operating procedures.
2.5.3 The transformation of knowledge claims
In the previous sections I have outlined that knowledge claims about climate 
impacts can be understood as constructions, gradually becoming (in-)stable 
through the interaction, negotiation and consensus building of multiple social 
worlds all laying demands on those claims. As I have discussed, deconstructing and 
reconstructing is a central practice in assembling serviceable truths (Bijker et al., 
2009; Gieryn, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990; Miller, 2001; Shackley & Wynne, 1996). I will 
use the term ‘moments of transformation’ to highlight those episodes in which 
transformation takes place. In their study on representations of uncertainty about 
climate change, Shackley & Wynne (1996) have distinguished among different 
types of transformation of those representations. In this final section, I develop a 
heuristic that enables me to distinguish among different types of transformations 
of knowledge claims about climate impacts and present a richer understanding of 
the construction process.
 The first is reduction. When confronted with a request to map the relevant 
climate impacts for a particular policy field, the possible impacts of climate change 
that might be considered are unknown by definition and potentially endless. At the 
same time, resources, time and obligations lay restrictions on these process. 
Through selection and negotiation the potentially endless set of elements to include 
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are narrowed down in order to arrive at a doable assessment project. Here, particular 
elements are included while intentionally or unintentionally excluding others. 
Relevant is demarcated from irrelevant, feasible from non-feasible. For example, 
when considering the impacts of climate change on a water system, choices have to 
be made on which effects to study, what timescales to consider, what data to use, 
and so on. Processes of reduction can also be found in the presentation of a 
representation of climate impacts for different targeted audiences.
 The second type I distinguish is extension. I understand extension as the logical 
opposite of reduction, and hence as the selection and negotiation of new elements 
to be added to a construction. A problem scope may be broadened to include 
previously unconsidered risks or extra time horizons on which those risks are 
studied. In the same vein, the use of extra methods, sources of data, or extra 
evaluation criteria are extensions. Another form of extension is a process of 
substantiating a claim about impacts by coupling other theories or bodies of 
knowledge to the representation of climate impacts. For example, when representing 
the impacts of future heat waves on an urban area, new substance is added when a 
representation of temperature effects on that city is coupled with knowledge about, 
say, the health effects on vulnerable groups of people. Similarly, ‘vulnerable groups’ 
may be extended to include not only people, but critical urban infrastructure as 
well. The process of deconstructing and reconstruction knowledge claims do not 
necessarily erode the authority of knowledge claims, many scholars of advisory 
practices content (Bijker et al., 2009; Jasanoff, 1990; Shackley & Wynne, 1996), as it 
opens up possibilities to strengthen the robustness and relevance of knowledge 
claims. 
 My third type is rhetorical packaging. According to Gieryn (1999, p. 4) factual 
statements or predictions about nature do not “move naked” from lab into 
courtroom, or from journal into boardroom. They are clothed in their representa-
tions – compelling arguments why this science is in this case the best source for 
trustworthy knowledge, narrations of why this particular way of scientific reasoning 
is bona fide, and other lines of reasoning are not (Shapin, 1995). This strongly relates 
to Gieryn’s notion of boundary-work, which denotes the discursive attribution of 
selected qualities to science, scientists and scientific methods in order to draw and 
maintain a boundary between what is science and what is not, in what is essentially 
a credibility contest. With the term ‘positioning’, Bijker et al. (2009) point to the 
rhetorical techniques in which connections of advisory claims to its publics are 
made, and issues are linked to current concerns. Also, it may be important to justify 
why something is not included. Shackley & Wynne (1996) observe a ‘scheduling 
into the future’ in representations, meaning that something is identified and 
postponed to be resolved at a later moment in time. With sentences like ‘we base 
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ourselves on current understanding, yet acknowledge that this is subject to change 
in this or that direction’ a claim is shielded from attacks that may erode its 
legitimacy, while sealing at least a temporary stable consensus.
 Lastly, I distinguish between redefinition and modification of knowledge 
claims. Where the previous types (reduction, extension, and rhetorical packaging) 
meant adding or extracting elements from the construction, with both redefinition 
and modification I refer to changes in the elements that make up a construction.  In 
processes of redefinition, the core assumptions or theoretical framework through 
which elements are interpreted changes, changing the web of relations between the 
elements that constitute the construction. Shackley & Wynne (1996) use the terms 
‘transformation’ and ‘condensation’ when a representation gets recast in another 
category. For instance, the impacts on urban areas are no longer considered as 
physical changes in meteorological variables, but redefined as public health risks. 
The whole set of relevant indicators as well as options for relevant policies changes.
With the term modification, I refer to changes made in some of the elements or the 
dimensions that constitute a construction. Through modification the way in which 
an issue is approached transforms. An example of modification is when the initial 
temporal dimension of climate change disappears in favour of a spatial differentia-
tion of climates. Transformations through modifications may be very subtle. For 
instance, when the current likelihood of occurrence of an extreme high water event 
changes because the time series data from which likelihoods were derived got 
revisited, reinterpreted, and corrected from a perspective of accelerating climate 
change. 
2.6  Conclusions on the conceptual framework
The objective of this chapter was to develop a workable conceptual model to gain 
in-depth understanding how knowledge claims about climate impacts are 
constructed in the process of ‘mainstreaming’ climate change in different policy 
fields. I have shown that models inspired by positivistic thought are hampered in 
their understanding of this processed by several flaws. By drawing upon a 
constructivist body of literature, I have presented an alternative model. In line with 
constructionist theories, this chapter provided tools to understand how knowledge 
about climate impacts is constructed in relation of their production and consumption 
practices.  Knowledge is seen here as negotiated, contingent, multiple, situated and 
going through a constant process of reconstruction. Therefore, instead of presenting 
a set of law-like expectations of what will happen in these construction processes, 
I have put forward a set of concepts that enable me to construct my own representation 
of these construction processes and compare them to accounts of other scholars. 
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I take these concepts as ‘sensitising concepts’, open and flexible enough, yet also 
guiding the gathering of my research material and initial analyses (Clarke, 2005; 
Yanow, 2009).
 The conceptual model directs me to look at the intersections of multiple social 
worlds where knowledge claims are (re-)constructed, (re-)negotiated, and (de-)
stabilised by representatives from those social worlds. I will start reconstructing 
the setting of the processes by  describing involved social worlds and their standard 
operating procedures that make legitimate actions possible, but also restrict them, 
and leave it an empirical question which social worlds are involved at these 
intersections. I will specifically focus on how involved social worlds place demands 
on the construction process of knowledge claims, which I understand as a process 
of framing an issue, constructing a claim about it, and negotiating its legitimacy 
across social worlds. In this process, I will follow whether and how knowledge 
claims change. I will distinguish among reduction, extension, rhetorical packaging, 
redefinition and modification to describe these changes.
 The research question guiding the remainder of this book is therefore to be 
reformulated as: How is knowledge about climate impacts constructed and stabilised 
at the intersection of multiple social worlds, and how is knowledge transformed in 
that process? Having outlined the theoretical approach of this dissertation, I now 
turn to how this informed the design of my empirical research in the next section.
2.7  Research strategy
2.7.1 Methodological approach
As I have explained in the previous sections of this chapter, I build on construction-
ist theories of knowledge production in the policy process. My conceptual model 
directs me to study how, at the intersections of multiple social worlds, knowledge 
claims are constructed, transformed and stabilised by representatives from those 
social worlds. To understand these processes I position my approach within an 
interpretive tradition. The methodological foundations of constructivist science 
studies (Clarke, 2005; Jasanoff, 2004, 2010a) and interpretative policy analysis 
(Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006) have much in common (Wesselink, 
Buchanan, Georgiadou & Turnhout, 2013). Both share a particular attention to the 
subjective meanings actors construct and mobilise in particular situations, and the 
approach of using thick descriptions to provide insights in the situated context of 
meaning-making. The use of constructionist-interpretive methods to generate and 
construct knowledge claims is similar.
 Also, both strands of literature emphasise the subjective role of the researcher 
in reconstructing and interpreting the microprocesses through which knowledge 
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about climate change gets articulated, negotiated, gains legitimacy, and restructures 
practices. Just as the subjects he or she studies, the researcher’s account is similarly 
situated, contingent and based upon his a priori theory-informed assumptions, 
concepts and choices with which the researcher approaches his research problem 
(Yanow, 2009). Hence, my knowledge claims are constructed as well, partly with 
the theoretical building blocks of the previous sections and partly with the empirical 
observations I made. In writing my narrative, I therefore chose to make use of the 
first person and make explicit that I myself observe, interpret or conclude. 
Nonetheless, I aimed to write persuasive accounts for the interpretations I made 
and aimed to do so by writing rich narratives using ample details and examples 
from my material to allow the reader an insight in my observations as well.
 Because much of the practices of transforming knowledge remain backstage 
and invisible for public scrutiny (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 240), I opted for a research 
approach using qualitative, in-depth case studies to open up the black boxes of 
transformation. As I explained in the introduction, I chose my case to yield 
sufficient variation in order to get a rich understanding on the processes of 
transformation. In the remainder of this section, I will explain how empirical 
material was gathered in order to reconstruct the three cases central in this study: 
the advisory practices of the Delta Committee, climate adaptation in regional flood 
risk management and the construction of knowledge in relation to the emergence 
of urban warming as an object of governance. I based my strategy for empirical 
research on two main principles.
 First, interpretative inquiry assumes that human actors constantly engage in 
interpretation and sense-making the world surrounding them and that the 
institutions, policies and actions reflect that meaning. Therefore, interpretive 
approaches use a methodology that focus on ‘lived experience’ and methods such as 
interviewing, participant observations, (political) ethnography and document 
analysis (Yanow, 2006, p. 17). These methods should enable the researcher to 
becoming sensible to the tacit knowledge and the implicit routines of scientists and 
policy makers under study. I therefore used various methods that enabled me to ‘be 
there’ and study the process of transformation in detail. In all my cases I made use 
of interviews and document analysis. Also, various meetings related to the cases 
were attended. In my regional flood risk management case I also made use of 
methods from the toolbox of action research. Action research, although many 
variants and sub-species of this academic tradition exist (Argyris & Schön, 1989; 
Reason & Bradbury, 2008; Van Buuren, Eshuis & Van Vliet, 2015), aims at 
developing knowledge in close contact between researchers and practitioners, in 
order to directly inform practice and simultaneously develop scholarly knowledge 
on these practices. It is to yield ‘better, situated knowledge’ (Argyris & Schön, 1989; 
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Friedman & Rogers, 2009), a motive to which the interpretive tradition aligns 
(Clarke, 2005; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Action research thus offered an 
entrance ticket to follow transformations in much detail. I elaborate on the methods 
used in the next section.
 Second, I used my sensitising concepts to guide my gathering of the empirical 
material. I started making initial ‘maps’ of the constellations involved in the 
particular regional translating of climate science for adaptation policies in each 
case study. By ‘mapping’ both the actors involved, e.g. experts, civil servants, 
politicians, representatives of knowledge institutes, local stakeholders, as well as 
the formal procedures and rules organizing the constellation, I got a quick and 
rough overview of the situation at hand. These maps then functioned as a starting 
point to zoom in and follow the construction of knowledge claims about climate 
change adaptation. Simultaneously, an interpretive research design should be 
sufficiently open to empirical surprises in the field and for the creation of new 
explanations arising from the field. By leaving much of my strategy and assumptions 
open, I left the question of what was ‘relevant’ in my cases to be determined by 
initial interviews in which respondents were asked to indicate relevant processes, 
actors and events.
2.7.2 Methodological account of the cases
Second Delta Committee
This case concerns the entire working period of the Committee, roughly running 
from September 2007 until September 2008. The research object includes all the 
work done within the Committee as well as the interactions of its members with the 
‘outside world’, ranging from scientific consultations to media appearances and 
political contacts. One of the initial questions guiding this case study was how the 
Committee dealt with the issue of ‘being effective’ in its particular and self-defined 
context. I therefore reconstructed how the Committee organised the production of 
the policy advice and how it dealt with controversial issues in presenting its advice. 
Rather than directly delineating the Committee as a water safety organ, I left open 
which social worlds were relevant for the Committee, how it mixed elements of 
these worlds and how the Committee engaged in iterative practices to work on the 
effectiveness of its advisory report.
 The most important part of the material consists of nine semi-structured 
interviews with members of the Committee and with members of its secretariat 
held between March and July 2011. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to over 2 
hours and were audio recorded (see also appendix A). The interviews are the main 
source of information on the Committee’s advisory practices. The first interviews 
were the most open. I asked what the respondents considered strong elements of the 
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committee, how deliberation was internally organised and how the Committee 
dealt with different social worlds. Gradually I selected subcases that were exemplary 
in the interviews for the various practices of the Committee, e.g. the negotiation 
over particular boundary objects such as the high-end scenario and recommendations 
like the delta director or delta dikes. In the later interviews I mainly discussed these 
subcases as well as my preliminary interpretations thereof. In addition, I did a 
content analysis of the Committee’s advisory report, its press releases and media 
utterances, commissioned background reports, and website. I constantly grouped 
and compared our interviews and documents with our initial categories in order to 
refine them. Furthermore, preliminary findings were compared with the social 
scientific literature on the Committee (De Boer, Wardekker & Van der Sluijs, 2010; 
De Vries & Wolsink, 2009; Schulz, Ferket & Van der Steen, 2013; Van Rijswoud, 
2012; Van Twist, Schulz, Van der Steen & Ferket, 2013; Verduijn, Meijerink & Leroy, 
2012) and with commentaries on the committee in the media.
Droge Voeten 2050
The second case study deals with the project ‘Droge Voeten 2050’, a case in developing 
a climate adaptation strategy in regional flood risk management. I followed this 
case from early 2011, when the intergovernmental project group was formed, until 
late 2014 when the final advice that group gave on policies was accepted by the 
parliaments of the provinces of Groningen and Drenthe and of the water authorities 
Noorderzijlvest and Hunze & Aa’s. My case study comprises the whole working 
period of the Droge Voeten project. Besides making use of the ‘normal’ methods of 
interpretive approaches, in this case interviewing, participant observations and 
document analysis, I also engaged action research together with Martijn Vink and 
the eight civil servants of the project group. While my personal research focus was 
on how climate change was given meaning in the project group and how it 
constructed answers to respond to the challenges climate change posed, the action 
research project had a different, yet related topic. Still, doing an action research 
provided both access to study this project closely over a long period of time, even to 
the board rooms of administrators bargaining over the project. Also, it gave the 
opportunity to organise reflection sessions with actors involved and observe why 
joint learning objectives fell short on ambitions as defensive routines were very 
hard to overcome.
 Action research focuses on problems as they emerge in action and is geared 
towards ongoing reflection and problem solving (Reason & Bradbury, 2008). We, 
Martijn Vink and myself, were asked for reflection on practical problem the project 
group was faced with. With the intergovernmental project group, we organised a 
collaborative learning process (Argyris, 2004) on how to organize stakeholder 
55
THEORISING SCIENCE-POLICY RELATIONS
participation more effectively in climate adaptation policies. The aim of our 
collaborative learning process was to learn how ‘effective’ stakeholder participation 
could be organised. When we were invited, we were able to draw on a body of knowledge 
on participation, but lacked an in-depth understanding of the idiosyncrasies of 
water management practices in this region. Tacit knowledge about how practitioners 
deal with regulation in practice, latent power struggles, or past participatory experiences 
in the region were unknown to us when we started. Therefore, we followed an action 
research strategy that was open, iterative, and aimed at facilitating a learning experience 
on participation. Over an intensive of roughly four years, we went through multiple 
cycles of observation, conclusion, and (re)action to enhance reflection as the project 
developed. 
 We organised workshops and reflection sessions which aimed at a) feeding the 
project group with insights from academic literature and discuss the relevance for 
this project, b) developing shared stakeholder participation information and 
options in DV2050, and c) developing of and reflecting on preliminary views, 
beliefs and analyses. We took a role as theory-informed sounding board in the 
learning process, provided tools (e.g. mapping potential participants) and always 
tried to open up the discussion for multiple ways of looking at the issue and multiple 
possible courses of action. We never advocated a particular form of participation as 
best, nor was our approach aimed at empowering particular stakeholders in the 
region.
 Between early 2011 and late 2014, I did participant observations of around 
twenty project meetings of DV2050 and of all five stakeholder meetings. Also I was 
present at a meeting of the administrative steering group. These, except for the 
steering group session, were audio recorded with permission, allowing me to 
re-listen to particular episodes in which participation was discussed. I gathered 
project documents and internal correspondence. In addition, I performed a content 
analysis of documents from predecessor and/or related projects that the project 
members mentioned and referred to. This was done to strengthen my understanding 
of the developments that initiated the DV2050 project, as well as to enable us to 
trace deviations in DV2050 from past processes. I had frequent face-to-face and 
email conversations with the eight project members over the course of the project 
as well as with some of the hired experts. In addition, I did interviews with members 
of previous projects as well as around fifteen short interviews with stakeholders 
during participation meetings. This was done in order to reconstruct interpreta-
tions by these actors as the process unfolded. 
 Together with DV2050 project members I conducted a small survey to gauge 
opinions of the stakeholders on the project. To facilitate ongoing reflection over this 
long research period, I used memos to document preliminary observations and 
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interpretations over the course of the project. Together with Vink I did rounds of 
reflection interviews with the project members to discuss motives for courses of 
action as well as our preliminary analyses (see appendix A), in order to allow project 
members to comment on them. This created a member check of whether our 
analysis made sense to practitioners. Furthermore, we shared preliminary analyses 
with a peer group of action researchers on adaptation governance. Project members 
provided comments on a preliminary version of this text.
Urban warming 
The third case deals with constructing policy relevant knowledge for the (re-)
emerging issue of urban warming in the Netherlands. A core question in urban 
adaptation debates was whether and how urban warming should be a legitimate 
issue on the governmental agenda, and, if so, whether it should be a matter of town 
planning, public health, social cohesion policy, or any other field of collective 
organisation. As the community involved in climate change and urban warming 
effects was (and still is) relatively small in the Netherlands, I follow the strategy of a 
nested case study and discuss the emergence of the issue using three subcases as 
illustrations for digging into the mechanisms of transformation: Rotterdam, 
Arnhem and Utrecht. All three cities got involved in research projects on the effects 
of urban warming due to climatic changes around 2008. For a substantial period of 
time, these cities were among the few Dutch cities which considered heat effects. In 
addition, these cities are particularly interesting because the articulation and 
constitution of urban warming as an issue of governance emerged in quite different 
institutional settings with different associated practices. In Rotterdam the issue 
was first dealt with in a research setting on urban climate impacts, while the central 
project in Arnhem was run by municipal civil servants aiming to make the issue 
relevant for urban planning. The project in Utrecht was lead by an environmental 
NGO which aimed to push the issue on the local political agenda. This enables a 
comparison of the effects of different constellations on the process of stabilising 
and destabilising urban warming as a phenomenon.
 My research material of urban warming consists of four main sources. First, 
I did twenty semi-structured interviews between early 2012 and late 2013. All 
interviews lasted for at least one hour and were audio recorded with permission. 
My respondents included municipal project leaders, policy advisors, public health 
officials, NGO campaigners, and (senior) scientists with different disciplinary 
backgrounds (see appendix A). Second, I collected a large collection of relevant 
documents dealing with the effects of climate change on Dutch cities. These documents 
include assessments with a predominant scientific character, e.g. academic publications, 
heat maps, effect studies, and synthesising documents for decision makers, as well 
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as proposed actions for governance, e.g. urban adaptation strategies, fact sheets for 
urban planners, and communications to the public. Third, I complemented my 
research strategy with a media analysis of items of (local) newspapers and news 
channels on the issue. Finally, I attended various public meetings dealing with the 
topic of urban warming that allowed for observations and shorter conversations 
with actors involved in urban warming.
2.7.3 Analysing and writing transformations
The analysis of my research material was based on principles developed in grounded 
theory (Clarke, 2005). This thesis aims not only to make interpretations of cases in 
climate change adaptation, but also conceptualise the process of constructing and 
transforming knowledge in relation to climate change adaptation decision making. 
Grounded theory, originally developed by Glazer and Strauss, aims at theory 
development by following an inductive approach for gathering, comparing and 
synthesising data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). As explained, I did not follow a purely 
inductive approach but started with a priori conceptualisations of my topic that 
guided my engagement with my research questions. Consequently, I did not start 
with an open coding of my material. I used my sensitising concepts to aid the 
collection of research material and to guide the initial stages of analysing my data. 
Analysing was thus an iterative process of coding the data to allow for meaningful 
themes to emerge and revisiting theoretical material. By constantly comparing my 
data with other data, data with concepts and concepts with theory, I aimed to 
develop a conceptualisation of the processes of transformation. I used computer 
software (Atlas TI) to help analyse the transcribed interviews, audio files, field 
notes, meeting minutes and documents.
 I had two basic strategies in strengthening the trustworthiness of my claims. 
The first strategy aimed to test and refine my findings by making use of the subjects 
I studied. The in-depth engagement with the empirical material in interpretive 
research is not only inevitable, it is also an important feature to strengthen the 
quality of the research. By letting my respondents read and comment texts I wrote, 
by presenting findings in workshops and focus sessions and by sharing preliminary 
findings in interviews I intended to find out whether they shared by observations. 
While they did not always shared my interpretations, they often recognised most of 
the observations. Moreover, different interpretations gave rise for further exploration 
of the reasons for divergence.
 My second strategy was to secure a sense of distance to my empirical material 
and prevent me for becoming too involved in the cases I studied (‘going native’). 
Reflection of other researchers, at my own institution as well as during various 
conferences and seminars, helped to zoom out and elaborate preliminary inter-
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pretations resulting from my observations. Also, the cases on the Delta Committee 
and on regional flood risk management were done in collaboration with a co-worker 
Martijn Vink, with whom I shared observations, reflections and frustrations during 
numerous travels to interviews or project sessions. I was part of a reflection group 
on action research within which I shared many of my observations made in the 
regional flood risk management case. Finally, the empirical cases this thesis is built 
on went through peer review processes for publication in academic journals and 
books. All of these encounters helped to sharpen my analysis and to bring it into 
conversation with other theories on the subject.
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Figure 3.1.  Study area of the Second Delta Committee: the Dutch delta.
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The Delta Committee: constructing  
a vision of a climate proof delta1
3.1  An advisory committee on adaptation
Late 2008, the second Delta Committee presented a comprehensive vision for the 
long-term protection (2100-2200) of the Netherlands in the face of climate change, 
laid down in the ‘Working together with water’ report (Deltacommissie, 2008, 
emphasis in original). Chaired by the well-known Dutch politician and former 
minister Cees Veerman, the Committee was asked to assess the impact of climate 
change on the Dutch coastal area and to advise on possible policy strategies to help 
shape the future of the Netherlands. In the response to ‘Working together with 
water’, the Dutch cabinet endorsed this vision, making it the starting point for 
further elaboration and decision making (Huizinga, 2008, pp. 2-4). Subsequently, 
the Committee’s recommendations shaped institutional reform and policy 
development in Dutch adaptive governance, provoking some debate in national 
newspapers but meeting relatively little opposition.
 The effectiveness of the Committee was remarkable for three reasons. First, the 
committee went well beyond the common IPCC and KNMI climate projections 
and recommended policies that were non-incremental. Second, the committee 
broke with a discourse that was gaining importance in the field of water management 
based on ‘living with water’, in which individuals would have more responsibility 
to cope with flood risks, in favour of a strategy in which the collective and a strong 
state would play central roles (Van Twist et al., 2013, pp. 17-20). Third, in the advisory 
process the committee transformed its assignment, by redefining its substantial scope 
and advising a strong univocal vision, instead of the requested policy alternatives.
 Most studies on the Committee’s report and the subsequent public debate 
focus on its output and treat the Committee as a single agent (e.g. Schulz et al., 2013; 
Van Rijswoud, 2012; Verduijn et al., 2012). This chapter understands the Delta 
Committee as an interesting and rare moment of co-production in the field of 
climate adaptation and aims to open up the black box of its advisory process. In the 
Committee, several social worlds intersected when representatives of politics, 
1 Part of this chapter was published as Boezeman, D., Vink, M., & Leroy, P. (2013). The Dutch Delta 
Committee as a boundary organisation. Environmental Science & Policy, 27, 162-171.
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science, departmental administration and industry met for the joint production of 
knowledge to re-shape adaptation policies in the Netherlands. Here scientific 
assessments of climate risks were forged together with normative ideas on how to 
respond to these risks, while simultaneously claims about climate change and 
social order transformed. I will focus on the work done within the Committee as 
well as the interactions of its members with the ‘outside world’, ranging from 
scientific consultations to media appearances and political contacts. As I focus on 
the construction, transformation and stabilisation of knowledge claims by the Delta 
Committee, I do not consider the events relating to the subsequent implementation 
of the Committee’s recommendations.
 The Second Delta Committee had a particular organisational form. The Committee 
can be understood as an ad hoc boundary organisation, as the Committee on the 
one hand consisted of both scientists, politicians and policy makers, while on the 
other hand the Committee was placed at a relative distance of science, policy and 
politics. Boundary organisations often play an important role in the science-policy 
interface, and some advocate them as a particularly promising way to reconcile the 
supply and demand of scientific knowledge for effective action (Clark et al., 2011; 
McNie, 2007, p. 32). While the need to bring science and policy together is almost 
beyond dispute nowadays, the understanding of the patterns of exchange and the 
conditions under which this exchange is effective is, however, limited (Guston, 2001, 
p. 400; 2005; Lentsch & Weingart, 2011b). 
 Boundary organisations, and scientific advisory boards at large, find themselves 
confronted with demands of both science and policy. They receive policy related 
assignments, often involving multiple policy dossiers, and need to provide knowledge 
that is scientifically rigorous. This is called the problem of ‘dual accountability’ (Cash 
et al., 2003; Guston, 2000). Several scholars observe that advisory organisations 
are confronted with increasing demands for transparency, participation and 
democratisation in western societies (Bijker et al., 2009; Nowotny, 2003), and may 
(have to) be responsive to the demands of a broader set of social worlds (Mahony, 
2013; Miller, 2001; Owens, 2012). The Delta Committee indeed faced a multitude of 
demands. Not only was the Committee to authoritatively advise on uncertain 
changes for the long term (2100-2200), it had to relate to a whole constellation of 
previous policy proposals and their advocates, to different scientific disciplines, to 
a missing sense of urgency for safety, yet a growing feeling of discontent for the lack 
of a vision in the water field, and to an ambiguous issue in which problems and 
solutions are interrelated in complex ways (Van Twist et al., 2013; Verduijn et al., 
2012; Vink et al., 2013). 
 From the perspective of transformation, as I have argued in chapter one, the 
Delta Committee is especially interesting because this committee was effective in 
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redefining what climate change adaptation in the Netherlands is by mobilising 
particular sets of scientific and technical knowledges. Studying this case enables 
the insight into transformation of climate change by scientific advisory committees 
operating in a context of strategic national long-term policy development. This 
chapter therefore has a double ambition. The first is to understand how knowledge 
claims by the Committee about climate change adaptation were constructed, 
transformed and stabilised in negotiation with multiple social worlds. The second 
is to critically reflect on the understanding of effective advisory practices in 
boundary organisations. 
 To answer these questions, this chapter reconstructs the advisory practices and 
organisation of the Delta Committee. To pave the road for a fruitful reflection on 
boundary organisations, the next section very briefly explains the concept, 
discussing its strengths and limitations, and sets out how ‘effective’ boundary 
organisations are conceptualised in the literature. I then put the Delta Committee 
and its mandate in the context of the Dutch science-policy landscape. The fourth 
section centres on the practices through which the Committee redeveloped its 
assignment to tame it into a doable project, constructed knowledge and stabilised 
its claims in negotiation with several social worlds that made demands. I distinguish 
between categories of practices mainly relating to the internal processing of 
knowledge in the Committee and practices relating to the external positioning and 
stabilising of the Committee’s claims. Section five discusses these findings vis-à-vis 
the literature on boundary organisations. The chapter ends with conclusions about 
the transformation of climate knowledge in the face of redeveloping a long-term 
national strategy to cope with water safety in the Netherlands. The section reflects 
on the partial destabilisation of the Committee’s constructed claims, when a 
controversy flared up about some of the transformations of climate change on 
which its vision was built. 
3.2  The Dutch Delta Committee as a boundary organisation
Advisory bodies like the Delta Committee operate in a boundary zone between 
social worlds. Often they are conceptualised as boundary organisations, which 
function as an intermediate between science and politics, facilitating the two-way 
flow of information (Guston, 2001; Lentsch & Weingart, 2011b; Miller, 2001). In her 
work on advisory organisations Jasanoff (1990) explains how demarcation and 
negotiation of acceptable ways of exchange between social worlds is central to 
practices of deconstructing and reconstructing knowledge. These organisations are 
hybrids and manage hybrids, mixing elements of different worlds which are often 
hard to disentangle. They are responsive to, draw on, and deliver translated output 
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to members on either side of the boundary. Guston (2001) distinguishes at least 
three characteristics of such organisations. First, both scientific and political actors, 
as well as professionals mediating the two, participate in these organisations. 
Second, they enable the joint production of boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 
1989), such as reports, norms or programmes. Therefore, they are places allowing 
for collaboration. Third, operating at the frontier of different worlds, boundary 
organisations have lines of accountability to both worlds. These double lines should 
also guarantee their role of mediator. 
 Boundary organisations provide serviceable truths (Bijker et al., 2009; Jasanoff, 
1990). Often, their output is suggested to be effectively usable when it is simultaneously 
perceived as credible, meaning scientifically adequate, salient, meaning relevant 
and timely for decision makers, and legitimate, meaning acceptable to divergent set of 
stakeholders (Cash et al., 2003; Clark et al., 2011). In the same light, durable claims are 
considered to be epistemologically, socially and politically robust (Lentsch & 
Weingart, 2011b; Nowotny, 2003). Both series of requirements refer to the merging 
of different social worlds’ norms in a knowledge claim and to the resilience of these 
claims to the subsequent testing and scrutinising across the social worlds. 
 While a highly generative concept, the boundary organisations concept has 
been criticised. First, the literature directs inquiries to look at the internal social 
arrangements and practices of committees (Guston, 2005; Lentsch & Weingart, 
2011b; Raman, 2005). The robustness of claims are suggested to be enhanced by 
practices such as reciprocal communication, mediation and translation, and by 
institutional features to create the systematic commitment to those practices and to 
stimulate members to cooperate (Cash et al., 2003). While the internal practices 
and organisation are important, this focus tends to overlook the back-stage practices 
of positioning the advisory report (Bijker et al., 2009). By interacting with a dynamic 
set of actors (Miller, 2001), boundary organisations attune their advisory report 
vis-à-vis dominant actors, ideas, narratives and institutional patterns of all involved 
social worlds. Second, organising constant feedback and working in an iterative 
style to strengthen credibility, salience and legitimacy are considered important 
features of boundary organisations (Lemos & Morehouse, 2005; White et al., 2010). 
Because the focus of boundary organisations literature is mostly on standing 
organisations, this raises questions whether and how iterative processes are 
embodied in short-term, ad hoc organisations such as the Delta Committee. Third, 
the boundary organisation assumes two clearly distinguishable and homogenous 
worlds (Miller, 2001; Parker & Crona, 2012). In the Delta Committee case, several 
worlds interact and are served. As I explained in chapter two, I do not define a 
priori which worlds are relevant, but leave it an empirical question how the 
Committee dealt with different social worlds that it regarded relevant.
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3.3  Contextualising the Committee
3.3.1 Appointment of the Committee
In September 2007, the Dutch cabinet appointed the ‘Committee on Sustainable 
Coastal Development’, more often referred to as the second Delta Committee or the 
Veerman Committee after its chair, to advise on the long-term protection of the 
Dutch coast. A ministerial decree specifies the Committee’s mandate (see pp 101-104 of 
the Committee’s report). The formal argumentation for its establishment was the 
confrontation of the Netherlands with climate change, combined with a strong 
growth of population and accumulated economic value, and a lack of a strategic 
vision to anticipate on the consequences of climate change on the Dutch coast. 
 The Dutch Advisory Bodies Framework Act regulates advisory committees. 
It specifies rules for composition, functioning, decision making and cabinet response. 
Members need to be experts in the advisory topic and have societal experience. The 
Veerman Committee was officially a committee of state, giving it more political 
weight than a normal committee even though there are no specific legal regulations 
for the functioning of committees of state (Van Twist et al., 2013, p. 21). The Delta 
Committee consisted of representatives from politics, science, engineering and 
civil service, some with an explicit political affiliation (see table 3.1). Law required 
that decisions were agreed upon by at least the majority of members. A disagreeing 
member could add a memorandum specifying its stance on the committee’s report. 
These legal stipulations granted the Committee importance and pertinence, offered 
manoeuvrability yet also confined its practices.  
 The exact origins of the idea to install a new Delta Committee are hard to trace, 
yet at least go back to advocacy by Vellinga and others hydrological experts in 2005 
(Van Rijswoud, 2012, p. 97; see for a Kingdonian reconstruction of the installation 
of the Committee also Van Twist et al., 2013). More important, however, were a 
number of reports revealing that Dutch water barriers did not live up to their, some 
would add: outdated, flood norms. This fuelled a sense of unrest and discomfort 
among experts within academia and the state, and the debate on the need for a new 
Delta plan. Especially the lack of a vision for the coast was prominent, and in 
absence of such a vision flood safety was said to lose terrain in competition to other 
issues on the policy agenda. The then dominant discourse within the field of water 
management was a trend towards more ‘living with water’. Concepts such as Integrated 
Water Management were gaining momentum within circles of bureaucracy and 
science, in which a ‘softer’ approach was envisioned such as flood resilient planning, 
combination of functions, and insurance schemes against flooding. The government 
was to gradually to reduce its almost sole responsibility of flood protection sharing 
it with other societal actors. The Balkenende IV cabinet wanted to break with this 
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trend in favour of a restoration of a central role of the state in the collective provision 
of safety. Various scholars traced substantive shifts in the dominant water safety 
discourse to the period of the Committee (Van Rijswoud, 2012; Van Twist et al., 
2013; Verkerk & Van Buuren, 2013; Vink et al., 2013).
3.3.2 Position of the Committee in the science-policy arrangement
The Delta Committee had to position itself vis-à-vis a historically grown constellation of 
previous advisory reports, historical symbolic events such as the 1953 coastal 
floods, floating ideas of how to cope with future flood safety, powerful interests, 
official water plans and programmes, and emerging political and policy issues. As 
elsewhere, the discussion on adaptation and its subsequent policies entered the 
Dutch political agendas later than mitigation (Biesbroek et al., 2010). The first 
comprehensive national programme on Adaptation Space and Climate was 
formulated in the second half of the 2000s. However, attention for adaptation was 
present in sectoral policy before. The Netherlands is a densely populated and 
flood-prone delta, and its water policy is of major importance. Climate adaptation 
is therefore highly ‘watercentric’ (Swart et al., 2009, p. 233). 
Member Member’s background 
Cees Veerman (chair) Former minister of agriculture and nature, prominent Christian 
democrat politician, chair of various committees, professor
Ineke Bakker Former DG (spatial planning) at the ministry of the environment
Jaap van Duijn Board of directors Robeco investment bank, professor of 
investment theory
Louise Fresco Professor of sustainable development in an international 
perspective, former assistant DG (agriculture) and research 
director at FAO 
Andries Heidema Mayor of Deventer, politician for Christenunie
Pavel Kabat Professor of earth system sciences, chair of (climate) research 
programmes and member of several advisory committees 
Tracy Metz Publicist and journalist on spatial issues
Koos van Oord CEO of a dredging and marine engineering company 
Marcel Stive Professor of Coastal Engineering and member of various advisory 
committees on water issues
Bart Parmet (secretary) Responsible for research, communication and preparation of  
the advice
Table 3.1.  The members of the Delta Committee.
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 Generally, the interactions between the political debate, policy development 
and climate science are strong in the Netherlands (Swart et al., 2009, p. 236) and 
individual scientists often play prominent roles as national policy advisors (Van 
Rijswoud, 2012). This is even more so for the water policy field in the Netherlands, 
in which engineering science, the state and industry are intricately interwoven 
(Molle, Mollinga & Wester, 2009). The ‘top sector water’, one of the key priorities in 
Dutch industry policy, is a clear example of this iron triangle. The ‘Eerbeek sessions’ 
(see for a reconstruction Van Twist et al., 2013, pp. 50-56) also reflect these intimate 
relations. During these Eerbeek sessions the ministry of public works started 
preparing a cabinet response in consultations with individuals - confidentially and 
in a private capacity, yet affiliated to relevant and powerful sectors - well before the 
Committee presented its report. Also, a range of large consultancy firms specialised 
in water issues, semi-public and public institutes are closely involved in water and 
adaptation governance (for an overview of coastal related knowledge institutes see 
Merkx, 2007).
 The Committee operated amidst a science-policy arrangement containing 
several knowledge institutes and advisory bodies that had advised on matters 
closely related to the Committee’s assignment. Knowledge institutes had made 
assessments, inventories of climate impacts and regional scenarios. In 1999, the 
‘Committee Water Policy 21st Century’ asked the Royal Netherlands Meteorological 
Institute KNMI together with the hydrological institutes RIZA of the Ministry of 
Public Works and WL | Delft Hydraulics (now: Deltares) to provide future scenarios 
of the sea level rise, river discharge, precipitation and soil subsidence: the WB21 
scenarios. As a follow-up, KNMI published four new scenarios in 2006, incorporating 
new information and new knowledge demands. Spatial-economic scenarios, 
referred to as the WLO scenarios, were developed by the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (NEAA), the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB) and the National Institute for Spatial Research (RPB). Before the installation 
of the Delta Committee, several standing and ad-hoc advisory committees were 
installed. Usually both prominent policy makers and scientists took part in these 
committees. They had the specific mandate to span the boundaries between science 
and policy. Among these bodies are the aforementioned Committee Water Policy 
21st Century, the Advisory Committee on Financing Primary Water Barriers 
(Vellinga et al., 2006), the Technical Advisory Committee on Water Works (TAW, 
until 2005), the Advisory Committee Water, chaired by the then Dutch crown 
prince, and the Platform Communication on Climate Change. The Committee 
could therefore build upon, yet also had to be sensitive to, an advanced inventory of 
regionalised scenarios, adaptation options, earlier advisory reports and applied 
research on climate change and water management.
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3.3.3 The Committee’s output: a comprehensive and institutionalisable vision
In September 2008, the Delta Committee presented ‘Working together with water’, 
encompassing its comprehensive vision on how the Netherlands could be made 
climate proof for the long term (outlines also in Kabat et al., 2009; Stive, Fresco, 
Kabat, Parmet & Veerman, 2011). The committee presented twelve recommendations 
to elaborate its vision and set the agenda for further policy development. The recommen-
dations can be split into two parts. The first part concerned eleven more or less concrete 
policies for engineering (see table 3.2 and figure 3.2), such as beach nourishments of 
Policy proposal Explanation
Safety Level Current safety levels of all dike rings should be increased by a 
factor 10
Plans for new urban 
development
The decision of property development in flood prone areas should 
be based on cost-benefit analysis
Areas outside the dikes New developments should not interfere with discharge 
possibilities and inhabitants are responsible to take preventive 
measures.
North Sea coast Building with nature by sand suppletions in such a way to grow 
land to create added value.
Wadden Sea area Wadden area should grow through sand suppletions, the 
conservation of the area should be monitored
South-western delta: 
Eastern Scheldt
The Eastern Scheldt Barrier is sufficient and its expectancy should 
be extended.
South-western delta: 
Western Scheldt
Should be kept open to maintain the estuary and shipping route  
to Antwerp. Dikes should be strengthened.
South-western delta: 
Krammer-Volkerak 
Zoommeer
Can possibly be a retention area for superfluous River water.  
A salinity gradient can offer ecological opportunities.
The major rivers area Implementation of ‘Room for the River’ and ‘Maaswerken’ 
programmes should be accelerated. Discharge capacity of the 
Rhine should increase to 18.000 m3/s
Rijnmond (mouth of  
the River Rhine)
A ‘closable-open’ system offers a combination of functions, 
extreme discharges should then be re-routed and fresh water 
supplied from Lake Ijssel. 
Lake IJssel area The water level should be raised by 1,5 meters to create a large 
fresh water reservoir.
Table 3.2.   The eleven engineering recommendations by the Delta Committee 
(2008, pp. 12-13).
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85 million m3/year of sand, increasing safety levels with a factor 10, the construction 
of breach-resistant super levees labelled ‘Delta Dikes’, and creating space for water 
storage.
 The second part, recommendation twelve, concerned institutional innovations. 
Through these innovations, the Committee aimed to depoliticise water safety, 
making it more resilient to budgetary and political cycles. The Committee pleaded 
Figure 3.2.   Location of regions addressed by the Committee’s recommendations 
(Stive et al., 2011, p. 117).
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for the appointment of a Delta director, who was anticipated to develop policies in a 
new series of Delta programmes, to be backed by a new Delta Act and Delta Fund 
fed with an annual 1 to 1.5 billion euro until 2100 (sic!). Especially the institutional 
recommendations had a clear impact. Shortly after the presentation of the advisory 
report, a Delta director was appointed and large-scale Delta policy programmes 
were initiated. January 2012 the Delta law came into force, providing the legal basis 
for the fund (Vink et al., 2013). The agendas for policy formulation by the Delta 
programmes were structured along eleven engineering recommendations of the 
Committee’s advice. Effectively, the installation of the Delta programmes meant a 
silent termination of the broader national Adaptation Space and Climate programme. 
While the Delta Committee is sometimes hailed for extending the water safety 
discourse to include fresh water problems as well, it also substantially narrowed 
down the meaning of adaptation for the Netherlands into a water safety issue by 
mobilizing predominantly engineering bodies of knowledge. 
 The Committee carefully worked on creating a sense of urgency, coupling the 
claims to an extensive rhetorical packaging. The backbone of that sense of urgency 
is formed by a scientific assessment exploring a worst-case climate change scenario. 
Following an additional commissioned study that went beyond the IPCC ‘07 
assessments or the KNMI ‘06 scenarios (published later as Katsman et al., 2011), the 
committee saw a local sea level rise for the Dutch coast of 0,65 to 1,30 meters in 2100 
and 2 to 4 meters in 2200 as plausible. In contrast, the KNMI ’06 scenarios projected 
0,35 up to 0,85 meters for 2100, without autonomous soil subsidence estimated by 
the Committee to be 0,10 meters in 2100 (p. 25). The Committee added that current 
flood protection standards were outdated and that audits revealed that even these 
outdated standards are not met. By referring to Dutch (1953 North Sea flood) and 
foreign (Hurricane Katrina) catastrophes, it concluded that major social disruption 
and economic disasters were conceivable, if not acted upon now. The report was 
communicated to the public at large in a carefully planned media strategy to 
increase its effectiveness. The report itself contained many images and is structured 
around a narrative readable for non-experts. Its publication was accompanied by a 
video, a website and commissioned background reports.
 A close look at the Committee’s vision shows it stressed continuity and change 
at the same time. The leading pillars, safety and sustainability, meant to the 
Committee the possibility to maintain current patterns of working and living in 
the safest delta in the world where the government guarantees water safety, which 
it terms the highest priority (pp. 39-42). The Committee’s vision firstly deviated 
from the dominant water discourse by looking further into the future (2100-2200), 
presenting a budget strategy for almost a century, and putting water shortage next 
to flooding on the safety agenda. Also, it declared to end control over nature in 
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coastal management by introducing the adaptive concepts of ‘developing with the 
climate’ and ‘building with nature’. On the other hand the Committee advised 
engineering policies combined with a reinforcement of centralised decision 
making, despite the softer rhetoric of accommodation (De Boer et al., 2010; De 
Vries & Wolsink, 2009). Here the substantive break with the then emerging ‘living 
with water’ discourse can most clearly be observed. Interestingly, the Committee 
most of all propagated institutional reform to reinforce policy development, rather 
than providing concrete solutions. The report can therefore be conceived of as a 
meta-vision, with the sting in the final, institutional recommendations.
3.4  Transforming knowledge for a climate proof delta
3.4.1 The Committee‘s practical problem
Within the Committee, several basic beliefs prevailed on how to construct claims 
for an advisory report that would not only usable in itself, but also on the conditions 
under which a report itself would more likely be used. To start, the report was to be 
finished during life of the cabinet, as later administrations would have other 
priorities. Also, it had to contain a clear and univocal narrative, rather than to 
provide all kinds of options. However, the recommendations given should also be 
sufficiently open in order to leave room for political deliberation. Its technical 
substance was therefore not the most important, but rather the provision of a clear 
perspective on how to organise the realisation of the proposed vision.
 I observed several simultaneous practices of the Committee through which the 
committee aimed at redeveloping its assignment into a doable advisory task, 
deconstructing and transforming knowledge claims, and worked on stabilising the 
knowledge claims it would make in its advisory report. The first group of practices 
relates to the internal processing of the advisory report. These are the ways of 
organising access to relevant political and scientific fields, for internal convening 
and deliberation, for the management of boundaries and for reaching closure. The 
second group of practices relates to the positioning of the Committee and its 
advisory report. The Committee engaged in an active debate with several social 
worlds. On the one hand this engagement allowed for merging and exchanging 
facts and values. On the other hand it enrolled important and authoritative actors 
backing the Committee’s vision. In my discussion of these practices I highlight how 
the committee transformed its mandate in order to advise on an adaptation strategy 
for the Netherlands suitable for a worst case climatic future.
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3.4.2 Internal processing: redefining the project and re-constructing claims
Connecting social worlds through membership
Central to the first meetings of the Committee was interpreting the given mandate 
and redeveloping it in a doable advisory project. I consider this a first moment of 
transformation. The wicked issue of climate change had to be reframed into a 
tractable problem to be addressed by the Committee’s recommendations. In other 
words, it was to agree on “the way the Delta Committee could anticipate sensibly on 
the many variables which make it hard to develop the requested sustainable policy 
strategies for the coast” (start notition 3 oktober 2007, quoted in Van Twist et al., 
2013, p. 26, my translation). I deal with the organisation of the Committee first 
before zooming in on the substantive deliberation in the next section. In organising 
the advisory process, the composition of the committee and its secretariat were of 
vital importance. Even more so than in standing committees, an ad hoc body like 
the Delta Committee is granted its relations to its environment through the 
composite sum of the social networks of the participating actors (see also table 3.1). 
Through its members the Committee had exchange routes across multiple boundaries, 
anchoring a range of social worlds to its conference table. This not only allowed for 
little interfaces between the sciences, politics, policy sub-fields and industry on the 
one hand and the committee on the other, but also provided the Committee with 
knowledge on the rationalities and norms of these different social worlds.
 Regarding the scientific disciplines, three of the committee members were 
active scientists, while several other members held extraordinary professorships, 
but do not primarily work in science. Kabat, Stive and Fresco can be regarded 
multidisciplinary in focus, but the main disciplines covered by these scientists are 
climate science, water engineering, sustainability and agriculture. All of them are 
highly reputed in the Netherlands and key figures in research programmes on 
climate change or other committees on water and agricultural issues. This grants 
them access to the state-of-the-art of knowledge on the one hand, and the authority 
in defending the Committee’s scientific claims on the other. In a similar fashion, its 
other members provided the Committee connections to other relevant social 
worlds. Its chair, Cees Veerman, had a long experience as a politician and former 
minister for the Dutch Christian Democrat party, and knows his way in the Dutch 
political arena. Van Oord was CEO of an internationally leading company in 
dredging and marine engineering, connecting the water industry as well. 
 Not only the Committee members themselves functioned as boundary workers, 
so did the staff of the Committee’s supporting secretariat. The high quality secretariat 
consisted of eight senior civil servants with diverse specialties and experience in 
serving other advisory committees on controversial subjects. Several of these civil 
servants functioned as what they themselves termed ‘liaisons’ to their parent 
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departments, in this case the Directorates-General on Spatial Planning, Water, 
Agriculture and the executive organisation Rijkswaterstaat. These liaison officers 
had the task to connect to current or emerging policy programmes. They also 
functioned as informal exchange routes between the Committee and the involved 
departments, allowing for the reciprocal anticipation to possible recommendations 
and to particular departmental positions.
Organising internal deliberation
Having explained the organisation of the first moment of transformation, I now 
turn to discuss how the Committee redefined the scope of its assignment in the first 
meetings. Even though the report fitted the Committee’s broad mandate to a large 
extent, it did differ on some important aspects. First, the committee redefined the 
coast, enabling it to include the Netherlands as a whole. Second, while the mandate 
requested for “the formulation of sustainable policy strategies for the coast” and to 
give advice on “[t]he desirability of a range of policies” (Deltacommissie, 2008, p. 
103, emphasis added), the committee chose to present a univocal strategic vision 
together with an outline of policies. However, these policies were to indicate 
directions and are not “a cut-and-dried blueprint” (p. 19). The proposed engineering 
solutions were presented as no-regret, allowing for adaptation later on. Interviews 
suggest that redefining the assignment was considered possible, as state committees 
have a certain freedom to do so, but also needed, as you would otherwise get stuck 
in the impasses of those that commissioned the advice in the first place. Redefining 
the assignment, the interviews suggest, opens up the possibility to go beyond 
existing views in water management. The challenge is then how far an advisory 
committee can go and under what conditions boundaries may be redrawn (interview, 
secretariat member, 2011). This challenge of finding what is acceptable holds for 
scientific matters, but for constitutional, fiscal, political, engineering or any other 
important issue for involved social worlds as well.
 The Committee decided to present an integral, interdisciplinary vision on a 
broadly conceived Dutch ‘coastal system’: the delta. Important is the positioning of 
the final advice vis-à-vis the existing visions of Dutch water management, as well as 
anticipating of the salience of the Committee’s report. According to Veerman, in 
advising politics “one should not come up with rock-hard solutions”, but rather 
provide a univocal, not too complicated vision and leave room for further political 
bargaining (cited in Anonymous, 2008b, my translation). Essential for its 
acceptance, the advice is not to be owned by the Committee’s members only, but 
also by the departmental people who would have to work with it later on.
 Furthermore, the Committee tinkered with the character of the advice. “From 
the problem analysis and especially the study into the state-of-the-art of knowledge 
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on sea level rise and storms follows how clear and far-reaching the problem is. [...] 
is it to be a ‘problem-advice’ or a ‘chances-advice’[?]” (internal proposal for an 
annotated table of contents of the report, 15 January 2008, quoted in Van Twist et 
al., 2013, p. 43, my translation). Clearly, the committee decided not to go for a 
doomsday report, but offer a chances strategy to cope with climatic change, if only 
the route mapped by the Committee would be followed: “The challenge [...] is not 
primarily a threat; it also offers new prospects.” (Deltacommissie, 2008, p. 7).
 In the initial phase of the advisory process, investments were made in identity 
building and the creation of a team spirit, for instance by social events such as 
organising Committee meetings at the chairman’s farm or a plane flight over the 
delta to imbue members with the importance of the issue at hand. Reaching a 
shared belief over the goal of the committee was pivotal to create a workable division 
of labour across all boundaries. At one of the first meetings, the members could 
express their views on the scope of the committee and the challenges the Netherlands 
faced. All members found one another in the objective to guarantee the prosperity 
and safety of the Netherlands against the most extreme events in the long term, and 
in the diagnosis that the problem in reaching that goal was not so much of technical 
or financial nature, but rather institutional. This narrative yielded both consensus 
over the knowledge claims that would be constructed and over the conditions 
under which an extreme climate scenario was going to be used. “One, scientific 
soundness was beyond doubt. Two, very important was that members shared the 
goal of the Committee. Then there is not so much a contradiction [between science 
and politics] anymore.” (interview, secretariat member, 2011).
 The Committee met about once a month, sometimes for more than one day to 
discuss matters. The Committee secretariat worked with what they termed a 
knowledge agenda, basically a spreadsheet with open scientific questions, answers 
and routes to obtain that knowledge. This agenda was a systematic approach in 
indexing the state-of-the-art knowledge on climate, water management, nature, 
spatial planning, recreation, agriculture, etc. The secretariat then gathered the 
available information with the experts working on relevant projects at the 
departments or at knowledge institutes such as Deltares. Also, roughly a dozen 
research reports were commissioned to consultancy firms, knowledge institutes 
and an international group of prominent climate scientists. The secretariat officers 
then wrote memos for the members concluding on that material. Initially, several 
sub-committees existed on topics like climate scenarios or administrative-juridical 
issues. A large amount of scientific knowledge and expertise was available, making 
it the Committee’s central task to assess the existing knowledge base and to select 
the most useful parts thereof - a point I turn to next. 
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Managing boundaries internally
In constructing a science-based policy vision, the boundaries between science and 
policy were blurred more than in an ‘ordinary’ scientific assessment committee. To 
create a front-stage image of legitimacy and credibility of the Committee’s claims, 
the Committee had to choose its scientific facts in a way that would be supported by 
the scientific community. Any image of selective shopping in science to support a 
pre-given political agenda was to be avoided. To paraphrase some of my interviewees, 
knowledge had to be undisputed and the Committee had to work with leading 
experts, not belonging to a single school. Simultaneously, the Committee had clear 
objectives, as discussed before. In order to create a workable situation, the 
participants of the scientific assessment had to be aware of and agree on these 
objectives. Hence, “a discussion point [was] to what extent the committee shares 
the assessment that the results of the research by Vellinga c.s. into upper limit 
scenarios define the nature of the advice” (internal proposal for an annotated table 
of contents of the report, 15 January 2008, quoted in Van Twist et al., 2013, p. 43, my 
translation). In this delicate process the managing of boundaries is important, in 
casu: under what conditions can scientific claims be associated to a policy 
recommendation? To explain this process, consider the example of the Committee’s 
high-end sea level rise scenario (for details see appendix 3 of the report and Katsman 
et al., 2011), the result of a study chaired by Vellinga, involving the KNMI and IPCC 
affiliated climate scientists. The transformation of climate change can be traced to 
three moments. 
 First, was the decision to commission a high-end scenario study a scientific or 
political one? The answer is both: it is a hybrid. On the one hand, the Committee 
had scientific arguments to do so, and used them to deconstruct the IPCC and 
KNMI claims into its various elements. As an IPCC scientist, Committee member 
Kabat knew very well that the IPCC or KNMI figures are compromise – or hybrid 
– figures. Publications in the climate journals after the last IPCC07 assessment gave 
reason for a scientific update of the IPCC figures, and hence the possibility to start 
a processes of extension in order to associate them to ‘new facts’. These figures had 
to be downscaled for the Dutch regional situation. Moreover, reasoning from 
hydraulic engineering science, a good image of extreme situations was useful. 
When building delta infrastructure, it is well defendable to design it on worst-case 
conditions, rather than on average conditions. On the other hand, the Committee 
also had political arguments for the high end scenario: the Committee wanted to 
guarantee the safety of the delta even when the darkest scenarios became reality 
(Fresco & Veerman, 2008). Also, creating a sense of urgency was a motive. The 
Committee wanted to show that even though the Dutch are safe now and threats 
are not acute, it was urgent to get to work now. 
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The presentation of the high-end figures in the report reflects a second moment of 
transformation. This was a process of reduction. Here, for instance, decisions had 
to be made on how to deal with the gravitation effect, an ongoing scientific 
discussion. Incorporating it in the projection would yield a range of roughly 0 to 1,3 
meters sea level rise in 2100, instead of 0,65 to 1,3 meters. Based on arguments that 
the scientific debate was not settled (footnote 14 of the report), it was decided to 
disregard the gravitation effect in the main text and to amend the figures in the 
report with footnotes and discuss it in the appendix. Science offered different valid 
representations of figures, making it the central issue:  “Okay, we want a clear message. 
How much does the scientifically correct statement ‘between 0 and 1,30’ or ‘maximum 
of 1,3?’ help” (interview, secretariat member, 2011). The Committee was sensitive to 
merge in these figures the political rationality of presenting a clear-cut message: 1,3 
meters should be considered as upper limit and this extreme situation could be 
handled. An uncertainty range of 0 to 1,3 meters was less salient for the policy debate.
 A third moment of transformation was the episode of what words to use to 
present these figures. While this can be thought of rhetorical packaging, it is also a 
process of reducing statements accompanying claims. According to a substantial 
part of the scientific climate community, one could regard these figures as plausible 
upper limits, but not as a likely scenario. The report is nuanced and clear about that 
(p. 27). Those nuances are simplified in the summary and the press release of the 
report. Less words were used in summaries and short media statements. The central 
claim of the press release was that “regional sea level rise of 0.65 to 1.3 m by 2100, 
and of  2 to 4 m by 2200 should be taken into account. More than assumed until 
now.” (press release Delta Committee, 2008, my translation).
 A controversy on the high-end scenario flared up in the media later on, and 
even members of the commissioned high-end report were critical, blaming 
Veerman to overstep the negotiated boundaries (Van Rijswoud, 2012). International 
members were quoted by journalists saying that the presentation of the Delta 
Committee was “not fair” (Von Storch quoted in Schreuder, 2008) and the KNMI 
head of global climate research wrote that “scientific nuance was subordinate for 
a moment” (Hazeleger, 2008, my translation). Both Veerman himself, as well 
as climate scientist and member Kabat, made an effort in responding to the 
controversy, the latter stating that “maybe in the presentation not all nuances have 
come across, but the report states everything in the correct wording” (Kabat quoted 
in Anonymous, 2008a). However, the dispute focused on the interpretation of the 
figures, rather than on the figures themselves. What the high-end scenario example 
makes clear, is that in the delicate practices of tailoring the assignment and 
presenting the figures, the Committee merged the rationalities and norms of both 
the scientific and political social worlds in a framing acceptable to all.
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In some cases, working on a boundary object can focus on the level of a word. 
Consider the example of the Delta Dikes, one of the report’s recommendations (p. 
48). For various reasons the Committee members agreed upon the objective to 
decrease the probabilities of uncontrolled flooding when a dike bursts. The concept 
of “breach-free dikes” was considered a promising concept. These dikes are so wide 
or so strong that they are virtually unbreachable, resistant to overtopping and 
provide all kinds of opportunities to combine them with infrastructure or property 
development on top of these dikes. This triggered all kinds of substantial discussions 
in the Committee on related concepts like multi-layer safety. However, from a 
scientific perspective the ‘unbreachable’ framing was unacceptable. Stive, professor 
in coastal engineering, resisted. Scientifically, a breach-free dike does not exist, as 
there always will be a residual risk of collapse. Still, all members agreed that a dike 
that almost cannot break was in essence a good idea. What followed was a debate 
on the wording of the concept, which was eventually settled by the chair proposing 
‘Delta Dikes’, an emblematic word in Dutch water policies. In this way the boundary 
object was acceptable for all, fitting the policy needs of a clear and promising 
concept and fitting the scientific rationality warranting credibility. 
Organising closure
The Delta Dikes case can be considered exemplary for the way decisions were made 
in the committee. The gathered reservoir of relevant knowledge, ideas and 
considerations had to be digested and assembled to form the comprehensive vision 
of the Committee. The routine procedure of reaching closure on topics was to 
incrementally build up the report by pieces of text written by the secretariat. Most 
of these pieces were drafted by one of the secretariat’s civil servants who was a 
non-expert in water management, contributing to their readability. These pieces 
were then input for the Committee’s deliberations. This contributed to the gradual 
building up of fragments from which slowly but surely a clear line began to emerge 
in their meetings. In this process members commented and amended the texts 
until consensus was reached. The general impression from the interviews is that, 
despite the intensiveness of the discussions, this evolved in good harmony. The 
aforementioned investments in creating a shared belief and ownership of the issue 
at hand and a team spirit contributed to this process. Also, water safety is a very 
uniting rather than controversial subject in the Netherlands.
 Enlightening for the understanding of the routines of Committee decision 
making is to look at the exception that proves the rule. In some cases consensus was 
not reached easily and an agreement had to be laboriously negotiated. One example 
of such a precarious issue was whether the Committee would recommend the 
appointment of a governmental officer and how much power this officer would be 
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attributed. A dispute rose whether the officer should be a government commissioner, 
a position supported by the chairman. Another member, mainly entrusted with the 
administrative section of the report (Warbroek, 2008), opposed and favoured an 
officer with mere coordinating tasks. After bargaining in a smaller group, the final 
version of the report recommends a Delta Director, with footnote 62 referring to 
the constitutional term of the government commissioner. In this situation, the 
importance of consensus and the power of individual members have come to the 
fore. Decisions “are never literally reached by voting […] but always by consensus” 
(interview, committee member, 2011). If a disagreeing member would have used the 
legal right to publish a minority position, that would have created a weakness in the 
authority of the report. “The [chair] was fully aware of that, we didn’t have to tell 
that to anyone” (interview, secretariat member, 2011).
3.4.3 External positioning: building on epistemic and political legitimacy
Practices of interaction and exchange
Simultaneous with the internal production of the advice, several practices can be 
observed by which the Committee engaged in an ongoing interaction with several 
social worlds stabilising the legitimacy of its claims and for the conditions under 
which it presented those claims. Under the motto of “towing the net through the 
sea as widely as possible” (Veerman cited in Anonymous, 2008b, my translation), 
both formal as well as informal exchange routes were set up, partly by one of the 
secretariat’s officials dedicated with ‘acquaintances management’.
 The Committee upholds a front-stage linear image in the report (p. 18, but also 
in various media utterances), claiming that its members were successively informed 
with issues the report had to deal with, that they subsequently made their own 
independent analysis of the situation at hand and then had their recommendations 
reviewed by the scientific community. Hence, according to the image presented, 
impartial experts listened to what the problem was and then gave a scientifically 
grounded answer to resolve the problem. The back-stage practices, however, nuance 
this linearity into an image of a two-way road. In fact, the committee continuously, 
yet informally, interacted with politics, from parties to Provincial Councils, policy, 
both with programme teams and high-ranking officials, expertise, the knowledge 
institutes, and the water industry. Throughout these contacts, preliminary Committee 
ideas were exchanged and commented upon. This was not only confirmed in 
interviews, but is also reflected in the gradual trickling down of recommendations 
in the press or the quick and orchestrated cabinet response only nine days after the 
presentation of the report (in what is called the ‘Eerbeek sessions’). The latter is also 
a signal of the deep interwovenness of all actors in the water field, especially 
between the state and the committee (Van Twist et al., 2013, p. 53).
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 The effects of the two-way interaction were twofold. First, through these 
practices of interaction, the Committee became sensitive to popular ideas that it 
had to address, to no-go areas in the involved social worlds, and to how boundaries 
might be crossed. In some cases, proposed ideas could readily be used. In other 
cases the Committee engaged in a balancing act in order to distance itself from 
popular plans. For example, late 2007, the concept of constructing artificial 
tulip-shaped islands in front of the Dutch coast was a hot idea, supported by 
Veerman himself, his Christian-Democrat party, the Dutch industry and the 
Innovation Platform chaired by the Prime Minister. The Dutch parliament even 
accepted the Christian-Democrat Atsma’s motion in order to investigate the 
feasibility of these islands. Coastal engineer Stive, and many coastal engineers with 
him, had serious doubts and thought it was a bad idea (see also Van Rijswoud, 2012, 
p. 102). Not only did the Committee had to settle internally whether islands would 
fit the end of providing safety against sea level rise. Also, the coalition surrounding 
the concept was so large that it forced the Committee to invest a substantial effort 
to credibly and acceptably not advice these islands, but beach nourishments instead. 
This was extra sensitive, as it could potentially lead to positioning Veerman and the 
prime minister Balkenende, two prominent Christian-Democrats, flatly opposed to 
one another. Appendix 5 of the report is dedicated to explain scientifically why the 
Committee does so, aligning its position en passant with Deltares and prominent 
coastal engineering professors. Based on archival research, Van Twist et al. (2013, p. 
30) claim that in negotiations between Veerman and Balkenende in April 2008 the 
Innovation Platform had already abandoned the idea of artificial islands as a means 
to strengthen coastal safety.
 Second, through these practices of interaction, the Committee built on the 
societal and political robustness of its recommendations. By incorporating dominant 
ideas and concepts of social worlds or rejecting them with strong lines of 
argumentation, the report became recognisable to a broad range of actors while 
strengthening the legitimacy of its claims. This constant dialogue gradually 
produced a form of co-ownership of the Committee’s conclusions by those that had 
to work with these conclusions later on. The aforementioned balancing acts appear 
across all boundaries and were an ongoing practice. Ideas crystallising out were 
presented to administrators, politicians and societal organisations in order to probe 
their acceptability and usefulness, if included in the report, and to work on the 
receptivity of Committee ideas. Combined with the front stage rhetorical packaging 
of an advisory process in which all could contribute ideas, this shielded the 
Committee from attacks that it intentionally or unintentionally neglected issues, 
which in turn would erode the perceived legitimacy of the report. 
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Enrolling reputed science 
Expert authority is not solely a matter of internal boundary work in committee 
meetings, but also a process of recruiting sources of credibility. Claiming a firm 
scientific basis and the support of IPCC and flood management experts (p. 10, but 
on many pages) by pointing to committee membership or a dozen commissioned 
reports alone, is not sufficient for building and maintaining an image of legitimate 
scientific work. Rather, to become resilient to other scientific claims in the aftermath 
of the report’s publication, it is important to maintain the support of credibility 
sponsors. If the supporting scientific institutes like KNMI or Deltares would publicly 
express their doubts on the validity of the Committee’s claims, or if mistakes were 
revealed, the advice could become controversial, losing its performativity as a 
boundary object. 
 First, and similar to practices described across other social worlds before, the 
report was scrutinised by a range of critical experts before its presentation. This 
process akin to peer review was supposed to reveal mistakes and blind spots. 
Second, the Committee engaged in practices of aligning science and expert 
institutes with its conclusions. For example, the Committee engaged in discussions 
with KNMI on how to position the Committee’s climate scenario vis-à-vis the four 
KNMI ‘06 scenarios, which was important for the KNMI. “We could obviously not 
afford it if the KNMI would say ‘we think it is rubbish’. The KNMI could obviously 
not say that, because they participated” (interview, secretariat member, 2011). 
Closure was found on presenting it as a plausible high-end scenario. Through these 
practices, the Committee’s advice was tailored to meet scientific norms and to 
uphold the front stage image that it was not just the Committee advising, but indeed 
a whole network of renown experts. However, the fact that the meteorological 
institute was a part of the ministry of public works was felt to prohibit the institute 
to protect its scientific integrity, when the high end scenario became controversial 
later on and the ministry was in the process of realising the Delta Programme 
(interview, KNMI scientist, 2013).
3.5  Discussing the Committee as a boundary organisation 
These findings are relevant for the theory of boundary organisations and for the 
understanding how serviceable truths are constructed in these institutional 
settings. The literature on their functioning focuses to a large extent on the internal 
organisation of these bodies and how to institutionally redesign them to increase 
the credibility, salience and legitimacy of their output (Cash et al., 2003; Guston, 
2005; Lentsch & Weingart, 2011b). I observed mechanisms for enabling internal 
deliberation, boundary management, mediation and ultimately the translation of 
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the report in a visual and understandable format also found by Cash et al. (2003) 
and White et al. (2008). Indeed, my findings confirm that recruiting Committee 
members from all sides of the boundary is important (Guston, 2001) and that 
members must be sensitive to the needs of both science and policy (Jasanoff, 1990). 
Yet, following Miller (2001), I saw that over-homogenising science or politics is not 
a productive assumption. For instance for science, I showed that e.g. climate and 
engineering science are not self-evidently connected and may have different norms 
and rationalities. In the same line, the committee serves multiple audiences of 
politicians, civil servants and industry, etc. In the same vein, a discussion whether 
the Delta Committee was either a ‘scientific’ or ‘interest’ committee (e.g. Schulz et 
al., 2013) misses the point that that those categories themselves are constantly 
renegotiated.
 The focus on the internal practices and organisation explains, however, only 
part of a boundary organisation’s effectiveness. In this case, the Committee’s 
effectiveness in producing its report was also to be found back stage, in the efforts 
positioning of the advice within the dominant discourses of the involved social 
worlds. The importance and limitations of positioning are also highlighted by 
Bijker et al. (2009, p. 146) in their study into the advisory practices of the Dutch 
Health Council. Upholding an image of salience, credibility and legitimacy is by no 
means self-evident, especially not for the transformations of climate change and 
adaptation strategies the Committee presented. It required the Committee to 
actively interact with many actors from all social worlds during the advisory 
process. In a constant exchange process, the Committee gradually recruited 
support for its ideas, became sensitive to scientific and political no-go areas, and 
collected dominant ideas it had to relate to. Positioning means on the one hand 
attuning the advisory report to the problems framings of policy makers, the 
dominant narratives in Dutch water management and earlier advisory reports 
produced by a strong and water-centric science-policy interface. On the other hand, 
positioning means negotiating the substance and presentation of the report with 
actors and their positions in the field, in order to enrol them to back the Committee’s 
vision and to credibly speak for a network of important actors. Gradually building, 
testing and positioning the advice was pivotal in maintaining support after its 
publication. The historically grown constellation in which the Committee operated 
thus empowered the writing of this report, but also constrained the Committee 
what it could advise.
 Gieryn (1995) emphasised boundary work as a rhetorical game and is 
sometimes criticised for being too voluntaristic. This gives rise to an image of a 
shrewd entrepreneur taking advantage of flexible boundaries and redrawing them 
to fit his or her strategy, as if agents do not build on antecedent practices, rules and 
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representations  (Bijker et al., 2009, p. 145; Gieryn, 1995, p. 406; Halffman, 2003, 
pp. 55-57). Here I showed the importance and delicacy of wording claims by a 
boundary organisation to become responsive to the rationalities of involved social 
worlds. I also showed the importance of the grown context for the committee. 
However, to connect the microprocesses of boundary management with the 
structurating elements of discursive constellations reflecting institutionalised 
relations between science and politics is far from easy. At least this chapter showed 
the value of opening up the black box of boundary organisations in order to not 
only focus on discursive output, but to follow the work process of tailoring claims 
as well. I showed how deconstructing and reconstructing climate change meant 
commissioning a report by a group of international experts and the negotiation of 
support for the conditions under which the research results could be used. Also, 
I showed how not advising an artificial island required the investments of gathering 
and explaining a whole body of literature in an appendix of the report. Focussing 
solely on output of the Committee (Schulz et al., 2013; Verduijn et al., 2012), risks 
creating an overly Machiavellian image of the Committee’s chair drafting a report 
along a clear and pre-existing strategic agenda in an ergodic world.
 My findings confirm the importance of iterative practices of boundary 
organisations in gradually building on the robustness of their constructions (Lemos 
& Morehouse, 2005; White et al., 2010). The ongoing consultation with stakeholders 
works in two ways. It enables the Committee to become sensitive to ideas and 
critiques, and gradually build on its support. As most of the literature on boundary 
organisations focuses on standing bodies (Bijker et al., 2009; Clark et al., 2011; 
Lentsch & Weingart, 2011b) and stable exchanges between science and policy, my 
findings may be particular for short-term, ad hoc boundary organisations. Due to 
the short life span of this Committee, the iterative practices may be more volatile 
than the institutionalised patterns of standing boundary organisations, such as 
exchange fora or standardised procedures. On the other hand, I showed that both 
the Committee members and the civil servants working for the Committee’s 
secretary had substantial experience in advisory practices. These experiences 
opened up routes for exchange, yet also made it flexible. Possibly, the importance of 
building an infrastructure with members to organise exchange and to position the 
Committee vis-à-vis authoritative actors is more important for ad hoc committees 
than for standing bodies that have built up authority over the years. On the other 
hand, the task of these organisations, providing serviceable truths, remains the 
same. It would be interesting to further explore whether these two types differ, and 
what lessons can be drawn with relation to their effectiveness.
 Finally, the literature on boundary organisations stresses the importance of 
clear lines of accountability to either side of the boundary. For instance, Guston 
83
THE DELTA COMMITTEE: CONSTRUCTING A VISION OF A CLIMATE PROOF DELTA
(2005) suggests open voting rules for members to express agreement, in order to 
increase information and transparency for decision-makers. Bijker et al. (2009) 
disagree with too much transparency as it interferes with a protected deliberation 
space and the exploration of different meanings. My findings suggest a minority 
position would seriously hamper the effectiveness of the report, and consensus was 
preferred above voting at all times. While maintaining accountability, or in my 
terms legitimacy, in the construction and transformation of claims is important, 
the criteria under which a process is evaluated as such differs across contexts. 
Perhaps these differences are related to the consensual style of the Netherlands in 
contrast to the adversarial style of the US. An interesting line of research would be 
to study how lines of accountability of boundary organisations work out in different 
political cultures and civic epistemologies.
3.6  Conclusions on transformations
September 2008, the Delta Committee advised the Dutch government based on a 
worst-case climate scenario. Through a set of interrelated practices, the wicked 
problem on which the Committee was to advise was tamed, knowledge about climate 
change constructed, and the legitimacy of the Committee’s claims stabilised. In the 
previous sections I discussed how, in a first moment of transformation, the 
Committee’s assignment got redefined. The redefinition meant presenting a univocal 
vision for long-term adaptation under worst case climate conditions instead of 
advising a range of policy options. Through this redefinition, the Committee 
altered the conditions under which it would and could use climate change. The 
Committee had negotiated with the involved social worlds that the Committee 
would not use a spread of climate change projections that reflected the most likely 
climatic futures. Rather, the Committee would present a vision of maintaining an 
attractive Dutch delta even under the darkest climate scenario. I showed how the 
Committee carefully had to manage boundaries by discussing this advisory 
objective with both the members as well as with those actors of different social 
worlds that would contribute to the advice. Subsequently, claims were constructed 
about how climate change required fundamental institutional reorganisation and 
about the development of a new agenda for strategic policy development for the 
Dutch dealing with their delta.
 In three moments of transformation the concept of future climate change was 
deconstructed and reconstructed. Climate change got transformed in that process. 
Constructing a univocal advice coupled to a climate change as a worst case scenario 
first required the deconstruction of the representations of climate change in 
scenarios. Because of the conditions under which the new representation of climate 
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change was going to be used, a reduction of other climate scenarios was possible. 
The process of deconstructing climate change opened the possibility to engage in a 
process of extension in order to couple new scientific research results of accelerating 
climate change. In two subsequent moments of transformation I observed how 
elements, e.g. the gravitation effect, wide margins, and elaborate scientific nuances, 
were reduced when the claim was presented. The claims were coupled to a 
substantive rhetorical packaging. Not only did the committee tailor its advisory 
claims in an evocative narrative, it also used the report and various appendices to 
position the report alongside other claims.
 I showed how transformations required substantial investments in effort and 
resources to stabilise them as legitimate and meaningful representations of climate 
change. I observed a series of simultaneous and interrelated practices that were 
important to understand transforming and advising serviceable truths. My findings 
suggest that constructing advisory claims was a delicate process of merging facts 
and values taking place within the Committee, but is also a process of simultaneously 
positioning and negotiating with multiple social worlds. Central to the merging 
process is the tailoring and wording of claims in such a way that they become 
responsive to the rationalities and criteria of all involved social worlds. This means 
that claims should simultaneously meet the validity and reliability criteria of the 
sciences, are sufficiently clear to the political actors, connect a range of policy 
programmes and are acceptable for various stakeholders.
 I consider the Committee effective in the sense that an important part of its 
advice was adopted. Water governance was largely reordered alongside the lines 
suggested by the Committee. A Delta commissioner was installed, a fund organised, 
a law accepted and a Delta Programme launched that had to elaborate on the 
Committee’s recommendations. As I explained, the search for a collective answer 
to what climate change meant for the Netherlands changed when the broader 
national Adaptation programme was effectively replaced by the Delta programmes. 
Indeed, the delta fund and the strong position of the commissioner were arguably 
watered down when they were ultimately decided upon (Van Twist et al., 2013; 
Vink et al., 2013), as the Committee’s advice could not prevent the issue to get re-
politicised. While I do not want to embark on a discussion of all events after the 
Committee advised its report (but see Van Rijswoud, 2012; Van Twist et al., 2013; 
Vink et al., 2013), I do reflect how claims were received, as valuable lessons can be 
learned on the temporality of stabilised claims. 
 The extreme scenario became controversial after the report was published. 
In that debate members of the commissioned high-end report were critical, blaming 
Veerman of overstepping the negotiated boundaries. While Committee members 
tried to repair any omission in presenting the report, several important actors, such 
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as contributors to the high-end study, publicly withdrew support. In combination 
with an increased climate scepticism and a changed political constellation, the 
Delta Programme announced not to base itself on any extreme scenario, but the 
KNMI scenarios instead. Even stronger, the first Delta Programme distanced itself 
from climate change projections altogether in favour of a strategy based on 
observations and measurements (Vink et al., 2013). Hence, the stability of 
knowledge claims should always be understood as a temporary achievement.
Figure 4.1.  The study area of Droge Voeten 2050.
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Regional water management:  
advising adaptation in an entrenched 
science-policy interface2
4.1  Adapting regional flood risk management 
Climate change is believed to put existing procedures for knowledge production 
and consumption under pressure (Lemos et al., 2012; O’Brien, 2012, 2013; Swart et 
al., 2014). Because of its assumed complexity, all-pervasiveness, uncertainty and 
political sensitivity, climate change adaptation is thought to invoke changes in 
governance arrangements (Termeer et al., 2011) in general, and in science-policy 
interfaces in particular (Leroy et al., 2010a; O’Brien, 2012). Building decisions solely 
on historical antecedents with knowledge produced in the confined spaces of single 
disciplines is thought to be no longer viable given the non-linear, opaque and 
uncertain nature of climatic changes. Leroy et al. conclude, after reviewing the 
social scientific literature on climate change, that “societal participation, mutual 
learning and opening up pre-existing organisational and institutional boundaries 
are among the key words here to ensure a more responsible, more legitimate and 
more effective science-policy interface” (2010a, p. 28). Hence, climate change poses 
potentially new demands for existing institutions of knowledge production and 
knowledge processing. This chapter will delve into the details how the existing 
institutions of water management respond.
 The production or integration of new forms of knowledge in the field of water 
management is rife with challenges (Disco, 2002; Edelenbos et al., 2011; Inderberg 
& Eikeland, 2009; Rayner et al., 2005; Van der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach, 2005). 
The observed reluctance to change in order to accommodate new types of knowledge or 
allow for new forms of knowledge production is often especially related to the 
strong institutionalisation of the field. These institutionalised patterns to deal with 
knowledge may foster relations between the state and particular forms of expertise 
(Edelenbos et al., 2011), may disregard other types of (climate) knowledge (Rayner 
2 Part of this chapter was published as Boezeman, D., Vink, M., Leroy, P. & Halffman, W. (2014). 
Participation under a spell of instrumentalization? Reflections on action research in an entrenched 
climate adaptation policy process. Critical Policy Studies 8(4), 407-426, and as Boezeman, D., Vink, 
M.J.,  & Leroy, P. (2015). Understanding institutionalised ways of knowing climate risks: reflections on 
action research for participatory knowledge production. In: Van Buuren, A., Eshuis, J. & Van Vliet, 
M. (eds.), Action Research for Climate Change Adaptation: Developing and Applying Knowledge for 
Governance (pp. 76-93). London: Routledge.
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et al., 2005), close down risk appraisal (Rayner, 2007; Stirling, 2008), and make 
changes slow (Van der Brugge et al., 2005). Its longstanding tradition, its history of 
dealing with new demands, and its strongly institutionalised character make water 
management a particular interesting case to study how pre-existing institutions 
respond to new demands.
 In the Netherlands, water management in general, and water risk governance in 
particular, are among the most established regimes, dominated by well institutionalised 
agencies, and largely formalised competencies and procedures (Bourblanc, Crabbé, 
Liefferink & Wiering, 2013; Kuks, 2009). The chapter will analyse a project named ‘Droge 
Voeten 2050’, in which the production of an advisory report to deal with the consequences 
of climate change in order to keep regional water safety up to desired standards is the 
core task for an intergovernmental group of civil servants. Climate change was said to be 
among the key triggers to revisit regional flood risk management in the north-eastern 
part of the Netherlands, where the man-made drainage system has been posing 
challenges to the local population for ages. This particular context makes Droge Voeten 
2050 a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg, 2006) to observe how pre-existing and strongly 
institutionalised policy fields – in this case, institutions dealing with almost perpetual 
flooding risks – process and transform knowledge claims about climate change.
 The central questions guiding this chapter threefold. How is knowledge about 
climate impacts constructed and stabilised in the strongly institutionalised field of 
regional water management? How does knowledge about climate change get 
transformed in that process? And to what extent does climate adaptation change 
the practices of knowledge production? Besides climatic change, this project team 
is also to specifically deal with demands of organising their assessment in a more 
participatory way.  I first and foremost focus on the production of knowledge claims 
about climate change. Nonetheless, this chapter will discuss these participatory 
demands as well, as they influenced the articulation of a doable advisory project, 
the construction of knowledge claims, and the negotiation of credibility and 
usefulness of these claims among different audiences.
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the occasion for this advisory 
project, and provide a description of the strongly institutionalised field of regional 
water management, as well as the region and its stakes. Sections three to five provide 
an in-depth analysis of the construction process of knowledge claims in this project. 
It deals with the redevelopment of the advisory assignment into a doable project 
aligning the demands of multiple social worlds, the construction of knowledge 
within a grown infrastructure, and the stabilisation of claims in negotiation with 
science, politics and the law. The sixth section discusses the transformations of 
knowledge claims. The last section reflects on these observations in the relation 
mainstreaming climate change in well-established regimes.
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4.2  New demands for flood risk management
4.2.1 Mainstreaming climate adaptation in regional flood risk management
On January 6, 2012, a dike near Woltersum, Northern Netherlands, was about to 
collapse. Water and sand flowed through the dike, threatening its stability. A 
combination of intensive rainfall and a north-western storm on the Wadden Sea 
hampered the discharge of water. Water in the boezem systems reached peak levels. 
About a thousand inhabitants were evacuated. The January 2012 event fits in a 
series of recent high waters in this part of the Netherlands: 1993, 1995, and 1998. In 
1998, the situation was serious: near the city of Groningen water flowed over dikes, 
a dike near Winschoten almost collapsed, and three polders were intentionally 
inundated to prevent the flooding of built-up areas. Still, property damage in the 
inundated areas had cost tens of millions of euro. Inundation especially damaged 
Gasunie’s gas infrastructure, a railway track, a plant owned by salt mining company 
Nedmag, and agricultural land, and led to damage claims worth several million 
euro (Anonymous, 1999a, 1999b).
 The events of the 1990s provoked a policy response called HOWA (“Hoog 
Water: een visie op waterhuishouding in de 21e eeuw” (Stuurgroep Water 2000+, 
2001, 2003)), a project initiated in 1999. To prevent floods in the future, HOWA1 
had tackled this problem with resolve. In 2001, its experts had produced a plan 
containing drastic interventions, worth 200 million euro. Despite the collective 
sense of urgency, the approach had backfired. HOWA’s policy strategy led to 
controversy and resistance, in which property rights and the allocation of costs and 
benefits, as well as the decision-making process itself, were at stake. Law suits had 
been filed against the state, influential stakeholders such as the farmers organisation 
lobbied against the plans, and policies needed to be amended in HOWA2 
(Stuurgroep Water 2000+, 2003). This led to costly policy delays and perceptions of 
reduced effectiveness.
 A decade later, the provinces of Groningen and Drenthe announced a follow-up 
project, HOWA3 which would later be named Dry Feet 2050 (DV2050), meant to 
[S]tudy whether and what additional policies are needed against water nuisance coming from 
the boezem to live up to the safety norms … desired in 2025. Those policies need to contribute 
in 2050 and 2100 to the safety, and must therefore be sustainable, ‘no regret policies.’ … 
besides a study on climate adaptation policies, we want to update safety norms based on the 
latest spatial development [and] soil subsidence due to natural gas drilling.
(Schuurman & Van der Wijk, 2011, Letter to Provincial Council Groningen, 21 January, 
my translation) 
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 The study area included the catchments of the Noorderzijlvest and Hunze & 
Aa’s water boards, both located partly in the province of Groningen and partly in 
Drenthe (Figure 4.1). Although the overall goal was in line with previous projects 
and initiatives, two things stood out. First, climate change was the new substantive 
element in comparison to HOWA 1 and 2. Second, when the project group started 
in 2011, it wanted to develop its risk assessment and climate adaptation policies in 
a more participatory way. Even though participation fits a general trend of Dutch 
water management (Huitema, Van de Kerkhof, Ovaa & Bos-Gorter, 2009; Van 
Buuren, Klijn & Edelenbos, 2012; Van den Brink, 2009) and is advocated for in the 
governance of climate change adaptation (Few, Brown & Tompkins, 2007), in this 
case it meant a clear deviation from the former technocratic and top-down HOWA 
projects. With participation of a wide set of regional actors, the project group hoped 
to widen the scope of the problem framing and the range of measures considered, 
while strengthening the democratic support for future policies.
 The emergence of new demands for Dutch water governance is a prolific 
scholarly field. Especially the entrance of new demands, such as the ecological 
(Disco, 2002), spatial (De Vries & Wolsink, 2009; Wiering & Arts, 2006) or 
participatory demands (Huitema et al., 2009; Van Buuren et al., 2012; Van den 
Brink, 2009), and new ideas, such as integrated water resources management 
(Mostert, 2006; Verkerk & Van Buuren, 2013) or new flood risk approaches (Van 
den Hurk, Mastenbroek & Meijerink, 2014), have received substantial attention. 
Climate change is a more recent demand for water management (Van den Brink, 
Termeer & Meijerink, 2011; Vink et al., 2013). However and first, most of these 
studies focus on policy and decision making (for notable exceptions see Edelenbos 
et al., 2011; Wesselink, Vriend, Barneveld, Krol & Bijker, 2009), leaving the 
production and processing of knowledge relating to these new demands 
underexposed and focusing on knowledge (non-)use (Kirchhoff, Lemos & Engle, 
2013; Rayner et al., 2005). Second, even though Dutch water governance is amply 
studied, most scholarly attention is reserved for studies on coastal (Bijker, 2007; 
Meijerink, 2005) or river (Wiering & Arts, 2006; Wiering & Immink, 2006) 
management. Regional flood risk management, dealing with the 14.000 kilometres 
of regional barriers alongside smaller water courses, receives far less attention.
 Therefore, before reconstructing the production of knowledge in this project, 
it is important to understand the developments in Dutch regional flood risk 
management. DV2050 is to be done within a highly standardised system in which 
Dutch regional water managers assess the flood risks of their water system (for 
overviews see Kuks, 2009; OECD, 2014). These standard operating procedures 
render a particular understanding of climate change possible while simultaneously 
putting restrictions on the process of producing knowledge on climate impacts, as 
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the later sections will show. A whole set of conventions, procedures and tools has 
been developed to facilitate the production and use of knowledge on flood risks. 
The system regulates competencies, roles, sets of tasks, and programmes. Particular 
aspects of the process, such as the need to set and meet safety norms, are formalised 
under Dutch water law. Importantly, even though the policies resulting from 
HOWA yielded resistance, generally the issues flood risk management seeks to 
address, and the ways in which it does, are considered highly legitimate in the 
Netherlands. While there are ongoing discussions on what the role of different 
governmental agencies in water governance should be, such as questions on the 
abandonment of the water boards as functional, decentralised and specialised 
governmental bodies (Havekes, 2009), the idea that the government is central in 
providing flood protection is non disputed in the Netherlands (Van den Hurk et al., 
2014, p. 420).  The formalisation of procedures on the one hand, and its legitimacy 
on the other, give flood risk management practices stability. The next section 
discusses the development of procedures and competencies in regional water 
management.
4.2.2 A process of normalisation in regional water management
Dutch regional water safety governance has been witnessing a rather recent process 
of normalisation (Kuks, 2009; OECD, 2014; Verkerk & Van Buuren, 2013). The 
regional barriers and notably the boezem levees did not have flood norms until 
recently. Norms for regional barriers were formalised in a provincial decree of 
Groningen in 2005. When the minister of Public Works was informed by the 
Technical Advisory committee Water safety (TAW) in 1993 that 23 % of all boezem 
levees in the western part of the Netherlands were unsafe, the provinces and water 
boards were asked to improve the safety of the levees and assess the safety of those 
that had not yet been investigated. In the Fourth Memorandum on the Water 
Management (1998) the minister decided the provinces and water boards had to 
develop testable safety norms for the regional water barriers (see also text box 4.1).
 From then on, a standardised administrative instrumentarium was developed 
to facilitate the needs of the involved governments, as articulated by the coordinating 
organisations for water boards (UvW) and provinces (IPO) (UvW & IPO, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the idiosyncrasies of different floods, levees or water courses, this 
instrumentarium was, in James Scott’s (1998) terms, to make all regional water 
systems synoptically ‘legible’ for the state. Regional flood barriers would be made 
administrable, accountable and commensurable in order to facilitate the comprehensive 
planning of flood safety. Hence, it was to enable “on the national level a univocal 
view on the protection of territories against flooding” (STOWA, 2007, p. VIII). 
For a large part, the instrumentation mimicked that of the primary (coastal and 
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river) barriers to further strengthen commensurability. In 1999, the so-called 
IPO-method was published to set norms based on the amount of economic value 
behind the levee. STOWA, a boundary organisation in the water sector, started a 
regional barriers programme to develop a toolbox with procedures for collecting 
information on these dikes, and standard ways of testing the pressure on barriers 
and their stability (STOWA, 2007, 2010). Important aspects of the regional flood 
risk governance regime are formalised in law.
 The process of normalisation co-developed with the merging of smaller water 
boards in 1995 and 2000 into larger ones, in order to enable a professionalisation 
process to carry out this complex work (Havekes, 2009; Kuks, 2009). The size and 
funds resulting from mergers that formed Noorderzijlvest enabled this water board 
to hire hydrologists and adopting hydrological computer models (interview, project 
leader HOWA Noorderzijlvest, 2012). 
 Despite all stability, the formalised competencies of actors in regional water 
management yield an area of tension between water boards and provinces. The 
National Government Accords on Water (2003, 2008 and 2011) and a Regional 
Text box 4.1.  Setting and testing regional flood safety norms
Because of the complexity of understanding flood risks, the system is constructed 
around the simpler and quantifiably notion of the threshold probability 
(overschrijdingskans): the chance that a water level in the boezem exceeds the 
Design High Water Level (Maatgevende Hoogwaterstand) that a barrier must 
safely contain. This is the safety norm. Hence, a norm of 1/100 or T100 aims 
to signify that the probability of occurrence of a water level higher than the 
design water level is once every 100 years. Note that this is not the probability 
of flooding, which is a combination of both the threshold probability and the 
chance a flood defence fails.
However, since probabilities of flooding are not quantitatively testable in 
practice, due to a lack of knowledge about the strengths of barriers among other 
reasons, threshold probabilities are used instead of flooding probabilities (Van 
Eijsbergen, Poot & Van de Geer, 2007, p. 35). This safety norm, together with the 
set of regional water barriers for which the norm applies, has to be formalised 
in provincial decrees. Information on the properties of levees, norms and design 
water levels is recorded in formal decrees, administrative registers and other 
documents and need to be cyclically re-assessed. This system is formalised in 
the 2009 Water Act.
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(Groningen and Drenthe) Government Accord on Water (2005) specified 
agreements on how to organise the process to get and keep the regional water 
systems in ‘good order’ in 2015 and beyond. Following the 2001 report of the 
National Advisory Committee Water Safety 21st century, this accord had an explicit 
framing in terms of climate change, suggesting that the problems already there 
would get worse in the future. The province is the designated authority that can set 
the height of the safety norms for its region. The water board is then, as the manager 
of the catchment area, responsible to develop policies to meet these norms and to 
finance these policies through the water board taxes. The province is to supervise 
the water board. These competencies had clashed in the HOWA project in 2001, 
resulting in an erosion of trust. I come back to the relevance of these tensions for 
the construction of knowledge in section 4.3.2.
4.2.3 The region and its stakes
The study deals with the catchment areas of the water boards Noorderzijlvest and 
Hunze & Aa’s (see figure 4.1), respectively 144.000 ha with 375.000 inhabitants and 
207.000 ha with 420.000 inhabitants in size. The catchment area is divided in 
several boezem systems, which are interconnected networks of water courses and 
storage lakes. These boezems receive water from the adjacent polders and brooks in 
the south, temporarily store that water and transport it to either the Wadden Sea, 
Eames or Dollard in the north. Water is pumped from the polders into the boezem 
to maintain a certain water level there, mainly to facilitate agricultural needs. 
Excess Boezem water is either pumped into the sea or discharged by sluices during 
low tide.
 The area behind the boezem is protected from flooding by levees and storage 
areas. A large part of these levees are designated as ‘regional water barriers’. Noor-
derzijlvest has about 450 km and Hunze and Aa’s 550 km of regional barriers. To 
temporarily store water, the boezem is connected to lakes, wet nature reserves or 
emergency polders. Also, floods are mitigated because parts of the catchment, so 
called boezem lands, do not have levees and inundate during peak discharge 
periods. According to the hydrologists of the water boards, inhabitants accept 
occasional inundation of these areas as this was business-as-usual for centuries. 
 Traditionally, some actors have a strong influence on Dutch water management. 
Farmers have a very strong position within the water boards, but more recent 
institutional changes aim to strengthen the position of ecological stakes, industries 
and inhabitants within regional water management (Kuks, 2009). Still, water 
boards are organised around the interest-payment-influence principle, meaning 
that those stakeholders that have the largest interest in water management pay the 
most and have the largest influence. Without flood protection economic activities 
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in the region are not possible. Protecting the area from flooding is considered 
crucial by land owners with invested activities, such as farmers and (gas) industries 
that have vital infrastructure there. In addition, policy makers are dependent on 
large land owners (mainly nature organisations and farmers) to realise space- 
consuming policies such as retention areas. Hence, organising ‘participation’ would 
take place within a web of interdependencies between governments and influential 
representative societal and market organisations. All project members were well 
aware that, with or without the organisation of a deliberate participatory process, 
some actors would heavily influence policy.
 The institutional landscape of the region’s water management can therefore be 
characterised as entrenched. Entrenched means here, on the one hand, that Dutch 
water management is strongly institutionalised, specifying rules, roles, organisations, 
data, tasks, assessment procedures, and operational modes for appropriate decision 
making (Bourblanc et al., 2013; Kuks, 2009; Van Buuren et al., 2012). On the other 
hand, entrenchment refers to the ongoing interdependencies and the latent 
competence struggle between organisations, in this particular case two of the water 
boards and the province. Simultaneously, regional public authorities have to face 
considerable changes that complicate their work and put pressure on the policy 
making heuristics they used traditionally: a changing natural environment because 
of climate change and gas mining, the ‘normalisation’ process restricting manoeuvring 
space, and the simultaneous demands for more and new forms of participation. 
These pressures increased tensions between actors such as the province and the 
water board, and put traditional task conceptions and roles under pressure. It is 
within these pressures, well-recognised interdependencies, and an experienced 
sense of failure of old approaches by the water authorities that the advisory group 
had to operate.
 The following three sections discuss the construction and stabilisation of 
knowledge claims about climate change. The next section describes how the wicked 
problem to be addressed by the advisory assignment was tamed and redeveloped 
into a doable advisory project. I discuss the demands that had to be aligned in that 
process. Section 4.4 analyses the construction of ‘relevant’ knowledge claims about 
climate change within the web protocols, instruments, data sets and rationales of 
different social worlds. I discuss how the legitimacy of the knowledge claims was 
stabilised, in negotiation with politics, science, society and the law. The triptych 
ends in section 4.5 by discussing the process of transforming knowledge into 
 recommendations for decision making.
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4.3  Articulating a doable advisory project
4.3.1 What knowledge, for which impacts?
Early 2011, the intergovernmental project group, consisting of eight civil servants of 
the water boards Noorderzijlvest and Hunze & Aa’s and of the provinces Groningen 
and Drenthe, was considering its advisory challenge. As explained, this group was 
given the task to make an assessment of the risks of climate change and soil 
subsidence in 2050, to propose new safety norms given the ambition to increase 
flood safety as decided by the provincial council in 2005, and to propose policies to 
meet those safety norms by 2025.
 The project group found itself confronted with a number of serious substantial 
and organisational challenges. Not only was the group asked to provide an 
assessment of the climate and its relevant impacts for a number of years, 2025, 2050 
and 2100, the group was also to come up with policies for the water system that were 
acceptable for the region and would live up to a certain safety level, which at that 
time was still to be decided. In addition, the group was asked to assess to what 
extent the policies had to be done purely for reasons of soil subsidence, as the costs 
of those policies would be financed by a fund that compensates for the consequences 
of drilling for natural gas (Committee on Soil Subsidence). Furthermore, a claim 
had to be made how the proposed policies influenced the water safety on the 
Lauwers Lake and the decision on when to build a big pumping station to discharge 
superfluous water to the Wadden Sea (see figure 4.1). Because both the boezem 
systems in Groningen and Friesland discharge on that lake, this process was to be done 
in coordination with another water authority, Wetterskip Fryslân. As a consequence, 
computer models needed to be integrated.
 Besides these substantive questions, the project group was also confronted 
with a set of organisational demands. First, the project was to be done in a more 
participatory way. Second, as political decision making on both flood safety norms 
and interventions in the water system had to result from this project, the group 
needed to follow all procedural steps needed to develop (land use) policy proposals 
in such a way that they would be politically, societally and legally acceptable. Third, 
even though the eight civil servants formed one project group, the four governments 
all had their agendas, ambitions and other policy trajectories that needed to be 
synchronised, which would prove to yield some fierce struggles over competencies.
Hence, the potential wickedness of the assignment had to be tamed. Articulating a 
doable advisory project in this amalgam of substantial and organisational demands 
resulted in several episodes of boundary work. This boundary work was to settle on 
what roles all of the possibly involved actors of relevant social worlds had to play, 
what tasks they would have to do, and what issues this project would dedicate its 
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resources to – its budget of around 800.000 euro to cover additional costs and the 
hours of the involved civil servants. The social world of hydrological engineering is 
central here. Developing a doable project and constructing acceptable knowledge 
claims meant aligning the demands from the social worlds of climate and 
hydrological science, politics, law, nature protection and agriculture. The following 
two sections sketches what I refer to as a first moment of transformation.  In a 
process of reduction, a project was developed that would dedicate its resources to a 
very particular understanding of climate effects (section 4.3.2) and a particular way 
of organising knowledge production (section 4.3.3).
4.3.2 Delimiting the substantial scope of the study
The substantial project scope was transformed in three steps. The first reduction 
step actually preceded the emergence of this project and is heavily influenced by the 
fragmented bureaucratic institutionalisation of water management. In the 
Netherlands, water management is cut up into different aspects, for instance on 
flooding from the sea, flooding from regional systems, shortage of water or water 
quality. Each of these aspects is governed in a sub-domain with its own division of 
responsibilities between governmental layers, generic policies, goals, assessment 
procedures and organisational units within bureaucracies (OECD, 2014). The 
project was a direct result of the aforementioned National Government Accords on 
Water and its transposition in the provincial environmental acts to periodically 
re-assess the safety of the regional water barriers, of which a new round was 
initiated in 2008. On top of that, two hydrological quick scan studies for Noorder-
zijlvest (Verhoeven, 2009) and Hunze & Aa’s (Van der Vat & Verhoeven, 2010) 
revealed that both water systems did not meet the then current safety norms as 
decided upon by the provinces. Hence, instead of starting from a perspective of 
how climate change may affect the northern region in general, or the water system 
in particular, this project was to focus on water nuisance from boezem floods. 
Climate effects on e.g. water shortages in the summer, on flash flood in polders after 
a short peak precipitation event, or on the quality of the water in the boezem system 
were considered irrelevant, put outside the scope and hence reduced from the 
project. When the project group tinkered which effects to study, discussions were 
settled by the argument that these effects were already studied in other water 
projects, such as the ‘regional drought study north Netherlands’. 
 The particular cognitive focus of the project was also reflected in the process of 
naming the study. Initially, the project was titled ‘HOWA3’ in the letters to 
Provincial Councils. In the first project meeting that name was argued to evoke too 
many associations with sea flood risks which are covered by other policy domains, 
was too emotionally charged and not broad enough. The working title ‘Watersys-
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teembeheer 2050’ (water system management 2050) was proposed. Although this 
name avoided associations with coastal floods, it suggested that the climate impacts 
on the water system as a whole were to be assessed. That was considered too broad. 
Finally, ‘Droge Voeten 2050’ (Dry Feet 2050, DV2050) was adopted. This rhetorical 
packaging was not only less broad, but also emphasised the goals to be reached in 
2050: a non-controversial continuation of a situation in which the governments 
provided dry feet for their inhabitants. Adapting towards accepting less safety, 
whether because of climate change or not, was not considered a conceivable option.
 A second and related reduction step was the narrowing of flood risk management 
into ‘meeting the flood safety norms’. To better understand this reduction of the 
substantive scope, I briefly return to the highly formalised and codified institution 
of regional water safety management introduced in 4.2.2). This project was 
embedded from the start in a hydrological quantity problem framing, following the 
problems studied in the earlier HOWA1 and 2 projects by a similar, partly the same, 
group of hydrologists. As explained in text box 4.1, the system is constructed 
around the quantifiable notion of the threshold probability: the chance that water 
levels will be higher than the Design High Water level in the boezem. In theory, 
climate change may increase the probability of flooding in multiple ways. Not only 
can more precipitation and higher sea levels lead to higher water levels on the 
boezem, but also the probability of dike failure may increase. Longer, wetter winter 
circumstances are said to increase seepage and saturation of levees, and drought 
periods may damage the peat dikes (Van Vliet, De Bruin & Zwanenburg, 2012) 
which are present in the catchment area under study (Noorderzijlvest, 2006). 
However, the probability of dike failure was assumed to remain constant. The 
consequences of climate change on dike stability would not be studied. Because of 
the complicatedness to assess dike stability, the agreements in the National 
Government Accords on Water stipulated that only the threshold probability had to 
be studied if the levees are sufficiently stable. Hence, the only relevant climate 
effects were those that affect probabilistic peak levels on the boezem.
 In a third step the substantive scope of different tasks was determined. 
Following the hydrological quantity problem framing, the work of the project 
group was broken up in three tasks. One, to produce knowledge on the economic 
value of the land use in the region in order to advice a desirable flood safety norm. 
Two, to produce knowledge on the probabilities that certain water levels will occur, 
given climate change and soil subsidence. Three, to produce knowledge on 
‘acceptable’ packages of interventions in the water system in order to realise peak 
levels that meet the safety norms. Hence, the hydrological framing of the issue 
allowed processes of extension in which different elements could be recombined to 
assemble the knowledge claim. These tasks were at stake in a fierce battle over 
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competencies, especially among the Province of Groningen and the water board 
Noorderzijlvest.
 The respective roles and tasks of these two government bodies had been 
redefined in the 2011 National Government Accords on Water, yet both actors still 
struggled over its exact interpretation. Noorderzijlvest’s project members stated 
that the province used the board as an auxiliary technical agency for its decisions on 
water management: ‘[Noorderzijlvest] can and wants to have space to push integrated 
water management in the project, whereas the province thinks of  Noorderzijlvest as 
the supplier of technical knowledge” (interview, project member Noorderzijlvest, 
2011). The province was well aware of this divergence with Noorderzijlvest, yet 
seeing its causes in “… the changing role of the water board Noorderzijlvest with 
which they are struggling internally” (interview, project leader, 2011). A similar 
struggle had partly overshadowed the DV2020 predecessor project, HOWA, in 
2001. In brief: the province had set a uniform safety norm for its entire territory 
that was higher than the IPO-method suggested, and Noorderzijlvest felt that it had 
to meet higher targets than it deemed desirable itself (interview, project leader 
HOWA Noorderzijlvest, 2012). This caused controversy, irritation, higher costs, 
and an erosion of trust. During the project meetings, project members repeatedly 
referred to HOWA, as they experienced the DV2050 process as an unpleasant 
repetition of previous events. During these struggles over competencies the actors 
threatened the other to use various means of power at their disposal, e.g. by not 
contributing financially to parts of the project, up to withdrawing from the DV2050 
project altogether.
 The contest over competencies was settled by deciding that the water boards 
would lead the tasks on hydrological flood risk assessment and on the development 
of packages of policies. The provinces would lead the task on norms. Here the 
formalised roles of the water boards and the provinces in Dutch water law are 
reproduced. Competencies were hardly ever shared. For instance, the province of 
Drenthe objected that Noorderzijlvest would study the possibilities of a new water 
regime for a large wet nature reserve ‘De Onlanden’, reopened in 2012. The civil 
servants of Drenthe thought such a study was politically controversial, because a 
consensus was negotiated with a wide range of stakeholders on its current water 
regime (project meeting, 14 May 2012). A new study might destabilise that 
consensus and the political support of stakeholders for the nature reserve. This 
objection was warded off by the project members of Noorderzijlvest, on the ground 
that there would be no ‘taboo’ subjects and the water board had the right to do 
research into policies it thought suitable.
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4.3.3 Tailoring participatory demands into the project
The DV2050 was to develop policies in a more participatory way. Those demands 
had to be transformed in a workable organisational format for the project. While 
Dutch water managers face a pressure to increase public participation in water 
affairs (Huitema et al., 2009; Van den Brink, 2009), here two particular reasons are 
important. First, the project’s predecessor HOWA had faced serious obstruction 
power from people in the region. HOWA’s ‘confront and nuance’ strategy of tech-
nocratically developing policies and then presenting that to the region was 
considered outdated. Second, the water board Noorderzijlvest wanted to include 
both upstream stakeholder participation in its policy process and broaden the 
scope of what it felt was a mono-sectoral approach in water management. The 
project members of Noorderzijlvest wanted to break with the role of the water 
board purely focusing on hydrological-technical matters and strengthen its position 
to develop its own integrated water management. The group as a whole struggled to 
realise a shared conception and action scheme on how to organise participation. 
Traditions and ambitions of the involved water boards and provinces differed.
 The participation trajectory developed along two lines. The first is the merging 
of participation into the organisational model of the project group with its three 
aforementioned tasks. Here a difference arises in stakeholders participation on the 
level of the DV2050 project group as a whole and stakeholder participation in the 
sub-projects in which knowledge on acceptable packages of policy interventions in 
the water system were studied. In part this division reflects legal responsibilities 
and ownership of parts of the project: the two water boards are responsible for 
policies to meet norms in their region, the province for setting safety norms and 
coordinating the entire project. On the level of the project group participated the 
organisations termed ‘prioritary stakeholders’. These are the branch organisation of 
the farmers LTO Noord, the umbrella organisations for nature and environmental 
groups Milieufederatie, the organisation of the municipalities, and the Committee 
on Soil Subsidence. Based on a stakeholder assessment, the project group invited 
those stakeholder groups it perceived to have the highest stakes and possess 
important resources: these stakeholders owned land, represented influential 
groups, or were to co-finance policies. The project members were well aware of the 
interdependencies and the importance of influential actors to realise interventions 
in the water system. An early version of the project plan summarised the lessons of 
the failed precursor HOWA as: “LTO Noord and Milieufederatie are important to 
obtain acceptance [for flood safety policies]”. All ‘other’ stakeholders were only 
informed via the communication channels of the governments. Even though 
especially Noorderzijlvest made attempts to broaden the set of participating 
stakeholders, the water board did not succeed in getting them involved. During 
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various stakeholder sessions, stakeholders did not articulate a sense of urgency that 
something needed to be done or changed.
 The second line along which participation was organised, was the strict divide 
between processes belonging to flood risk assessment and flood risk management. 
In all parts of the project the technical and participatory trajectories were clearly 
separated (Burkunk, 2012; Noorderzijlvest, 2012). The technical trajectory was ex-
pert-dominated. A hydrological assessment would be determining the size of the 
problem, e.g. how much retention capacity to create given climate change, given the 
proposed safety norms by the province. The stakeholders could participate within 
the clearly demarcated and narrowed scope described in 4.3.2: what packages of 
interventions are best taken to meet the safety norms, given the consequences of 
climate change and soil subsidence? Thus, the ‘problem’ was given, and stakeholders 
were expected to contribute to policies they thought acceptable, e.g. storing water 
longer in polders and nature areas, raising dikes, creating inundation polders, 
building a large discharge pump, and so on. One issue was clearly beyond the 
project’s scope: the safety norms. The province would not share decision 
competencies in this task and decide upon them solely, without allowing any 
participation in relation to norm-setting. Besides articulating their preference for 
policy options, the ‘prioritary’ stakeholders could raise indicators on which the 
policy assessment would be based. Hence, only the aforementioned third task of 
designing acceptable policies was opened for participation.
 Stakeholders tried to broaden the scope of DV2050. Stakeholders raised other 
likely effects of climate change, such as drought, water quality, or summer flash 
floods (a.o. during the DV2050 kick-off event on 23 September 2012 and the 
 Noorderzijlvest workshop of 28 March 2013). These arguments were sometimes 
ignored, sometimes countered by stating that these effects were beyond the scope of 
DV2050. In October 2013, a coalition of all regional nature organisations used their 
formal consultation rights to write an appeal to broaden the scope of the assessment 
of DV2050 to also include climate effects on drought and water quality to better 
assess integrated solutions involving nature. The farmer’s organisation used that 
right as well and requested a study into the effects of climate adaptation policies on 
agriculture, next to environmental impact assessments, hydrological assessments 
and cost-benefit analyses. This did not yield a fundamental reorganisation of the 
line of working as specified before. Interestingly however, stakeholders did not question 
the legitimacy of current ways of operating in flood risk management. In a survey 
done among the invited participants of the Noorderzijlvest stakeholder workshops 
(23 participants, response rate 83%) suggested that only 22% saw a role for stake - 
holders to actively co-develop policies, the 78% majority saw their role as advisory 
at most.
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 To conclude, during the first moment of transformation, a potentially wicked 
issue with various demands had to be transformed into a tractable issue with sets of 
identifiable tasks to make this advisory project doable. Just as pre-existing institu-
tionalised hydrological operating procedures and pre-existing web of interdepend-
encies were important to in the development of the substantive scope of DV2050 
and the tasks to be carried out, it also largely delineated the room of manoeuvre for 
any participatory innovation, with regard to both its organisation and its substantive 
scope. As a consequence, DV2050’s participatory aspects differed only slightly from 
previous projects. Stakeholders were now involved earlier in the process, and they 
could contribute their visions and information. However, the priority stakeholders 
– the farmers and nature preservationists – had always been strongly involved and 
influential. Therefore, I observed a reproduction of the pre-existing neo-corporatist 
pattern in Dutch water management (Bourblanc et al., 2013), in which experts 
strongly influence the space for participation (Halffman, 2009). The delineation of 
relevant stakeholders or the substantive scope of water management is not easy to 
change (Van Assche, Duineveld, Beunen & Teampau, 2011). Climate change was 
not comprehensively studied. Rather, climate change was considered relevant when 
it fitted pre-existing patterns of operating. Participation can be considered an extra 
element to this project, without it leading to any redefinition or modification of 
knowledge production or decision making, a pattern in water management also 
found by Van Buuren et al. (2012). 
4.4  Constructing climate knowledge in DV2050  
4.4.1 Constructing knowledge
Having tamed the wicked problems to be addressed by DV2050 in a doable advisory 
process with a set of delineated tasks, the project group dedicated its time to gather 
knowledge and commission expert reports. I refer to this period as the second 
moment of transformation in which knowledge claims potentially relevant to the 
DV2050 project were constructed. Table 4.1 presents an overview of all advisory 
reports and expert studies produced in the DV2050 project. Essentially, three types 
of knowledge claims were constructed in the three aforementioned tasks: the 
potential economic damage of flooding, the chances of occurrence of certain water 
levels and acceptable policy interventions. Most quantitative claims of climate 
change were constructed in the second task, while more qualitative claims were 
constructed in the third. In the processes of constructing knowledge claims 
different elements were aligned in order to stabilise a particular understanding of 
climate impacts. Selecting the relevant assessment procedures, climate effects and 
data were central to that process. 
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All project members were well aware that while knowledge claims would yield 
substantial investments in flood safety, assumptions and models had to be used that 
sometimes provide different results. Table 4.2 gives the calculated water levels with 
threshold probabilities for a measuring station in Hunze & Aa’s Eemskanaal- 
Dollarboezem. In a nutshell, a water level higher than +1,50 NAP means the need 
for substantial interventions in the water system. According to some studies, drastic 
interventions were needed, according to others they were not. Hence, the assessment 
question guiding the project members is not only ‘how is it to be done?’, but 
also ‘how are claims protected from falling apart?’ In practice, the latter meant 
negotiating acceptable ways of operating among the involved social worlds. Hence 
the legitimacy of the knowledge claims had to be stabilised. The next section 
discusses the construction of claims in anticipation of the standard operating 
procedures of the social world of hydrological science. I then discuss the production 
of knowledge in anticipation on the demand from the legal and political social 
worlds.
4.4.2  How to quantify climate change? Inserting climate change into the risk 
assessment system
The construction of sophisticated knowledge claims was made possible by the 
historically grown infrastructure stabilising relations between standardised procedures, 
computer models, specialised organisations, and standardised data, yet also enabled 
Noorderzijlvest Hunze & Aa’s
Advisory report DV2050 – catchment 
area Noorderzijlvest (Waterschap 
Noorderzijlvest, Provincie Groningen & 
Provincie Drenthe, 2014)
Advisory report DV2050 – Catchment area 
Hunze & Aa’s (Waterschap Hunze & Aa’s, 
Provincie Groningen & Provincie Drenthe, 
2014)
Policies study Noorderzijlvest - Arcadis (De 
Weme, Boer, Bosch & De Hulster, 2014)
Statistical assessment water levels - HKV 
(Versteeg & Jungermann, 2013)
Environmental Impact Assessment policy 
proposals Noorderzijlvest - HaskoningDHV 
(Bos, Van Veen, Kamkuiper & Groen, 2014)
Cost assessment dike enhancement - 
HaskoningDHV (Hordijk, 2013)
Quick scan Noorderzijlvest - Deltares 
(Verhoeven, 2009)
Quick scan Hunze & Aa’s - Deltares  
(Van der Vat & Verhoeven, 2010)
Table 4.1.   Overview of final advisory reports and background studies of the 
DV2050 project.
Proposal study new flood safety norms for the entire region - HKV (Nederpel & Jungermann, 2013)
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quite a particular way of knowing, with limited manoeuvrability. As discussed in 
4.2.2, to enable the assessment of risks, a range of tools and guidelines had been 
developed in the past, which in turn structured the work of the project group. 
Harmonisation projects of IPO and STOWA aimed to standardise methods for 
norm setting and testing. These risk assessment procedures reduce the complexity 
for the project group, provide relative certainty, and stipulate legitimate ways of 
operating. For instance, the sub-group responsible for a proposal to update safety 
norms works conform the 1999 IPO methodology. This methodology orders 
potential economic damage due to inundation into safety classes with corresponding 
norms ranging from 1:10 years for low potential damage to 1:1000 years for high 
potential areas. The sub-group subsequently selected a reputed expert consultancy 
to gather relevant data, make calculations and write a report with concept norms. 
This process was rather straightforward.
 The interpretation of the climate and its possible changes was made possible 
with the hydrological model SOBEK of the water boards in combination with a 
statistical extreme value study. The project plan of the water board, responsible for 
risk assessment, illustrated the shared beliefs of the soundness of that approach by 
stating that “[t]here is no alternative for calculation models. An event occurring 
1:100 years cannot be grasped in the practical experience of field staff [and] practical 
knowledge is insufficient to make good policies” (Noorderzijlvest, 2012, p. 4, my 
translation). Hence, as Scott (1998) observed, practical knowledge was replaced by 
formal, general, abstract knowledge deducible from universal principles. SOBEK is 
a computer model of the boezem system for simulating hydrological situations. 
These models are loaded with information on canals, their dimensions, retention 
areas, sluices and pumps to discharge on the sea, etc. In earlier studies, time and 
Water levels Zuidbroek (m + NAP)
2025 2025 2050 2100
Return period (year) 100 1000 1000 1000
HKV stochastic analysis (2013) 1,24 1,32 1,37 1,51
Quick scan study (2010) 1,27 2,03 2,26 2,81
HOWA1 RWS stochastic analysis (2001) 1,46 2,66 N/A N/A
Table 4.2.   Different water levels calculated for the Eemskanaal-Dollardboezem.
NB: HOWA calculations were done without retention areas (because these were realised later).
The design high water level in Eemskanaal-dollarboezem is +1,50m NAP 
Source: Versteeg and Jungermann (2013, pp. 26, 29, 30) and Van der Vat and Verhoeven (2010, p. 13).  
My translation.
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substantial financial resources have been invested to refine and verify the model. 
Given different hydrological pressures on the boezem with accompanied frequencies 
of occurrence, SOBEK calculated peak water levels in different locations of the 
water system.
 During the second moment of transformation, quantifying climate change 
into useful numbers was important. This was done in two steps. The impact of 
climate change was first reduced to the changes of pressure on the water system. 
To calculate these pressures, different methods circulate. A time series method, a 
design precipitation event, or a stochastic model were different methods suggested 
by the STOWA guidelines. In HOWA and the quick scan for Hunze and Aa’s a 
combination of the former two was used. In DV2050 and the quick scan for Noor-
derzijlvest stochastic methods were used. As illustrated by table 4.2, differences in 
calculated water levels can be very large, up to 1,3 meters. Which method was the 
group to select? Hydrological experts of Deltares themselves struggled with these 
differences: “the assumptions, approach and following results in the frequency 
analyses in HOWA and the Quick Scan 2009 differ to quite a large extent. This 
complicated a comparison of the results of both studies. It is important to … 
develop a consistent and accepted method applicable for Noorderzijlvest.” (Van 
Heeringen & Heynert, 2010, p. 10). Still, the consensus in the social world of 
hydrology was that the stochastic method “is currently the accepted method” (ibid, 
p.2). To shield off the erosion of expertise’s authority to make relevant claims about 
nature given these large differences, these claims went accompanied with additional 
work and rhetorical packaging. In these studies, extensive analyses were provided 
of why these different assessments gave different results and how plausible 
underlying assumptions are, given the state of the art (see e.g. HKV, 2013, p 26-28). 
Also, non-scientific arguments were used to claim the legitimacy for operating in 
the past. For instance, that the broad steering group of HOWA, which by the way 
did not consist of statistical or hydrological experts, “had decided that the model 
system was a suitable instrument to plan the future design of both water boards” 
(Van Heeringen & Heynert, 2010, p. 5).
 In a second step, the phenomenon of climate change itself was reduced in 
DV2050 by selecting relevant parameters for the stochastic study. The discussion on 
climate change concentrates around the topic of which stochastic variables are 
relevant and how they were affected by climate change. This step is split in two 
parts. In DV2050 the group first calculated high water levels for the current climate, 
for which a reference year is selected. If these levels exceed the proposed norms, it 
would then formulate policies to be realised in 2025 to make sure norms are met 
under the current climate. In the second part, some stochastic variables were 
adjusted to test whether these policies also meet the norms in the climate of 2050. 
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Initial groundwater levels, precipitation and storm tides were used to make 
calculations. The data used for the stochastic variables are laid down in a 
‘memorandum of preconditions’, a starting point for all knowledge to be used in the 
project, which is approved by the administrative steering group. 
 Despite the described process of reduction was rather straightforward, I also 
observed two rather subtle processes of modification. The first was revisiting the 
interrelatedness of observations through the lens of climate change. Thus far, 
stochastic variables for extremes were considered independent. However, the water 
boards participated in a KNMI and Deltares pilot project to determine whether 
storms and heavy rain were related, what their correlation was, and how this could 
change under future climate change. Previous studies already suggested that this 
might not be likely. More importantly, during the January 2012 storm, a period of 
temporary high water levels on sea and periods of heavy precipitation coincided. 
The event strengthened the sense of vulnerability at the water boards. At the same 
time, KNMI was in search of climate projects to deliver ‘tailor-made solutions’, and 
a project was developed in which 800 years of weather was generated in order to do 
a statistical analysis of coincidence factors and changes therein because of climate 
change. The hydrologists in the project group anticipated whether ‘assuming 
coincidence’ would be the new and accepted way of operating in doing flood risk 
assessments.
 This coincidence project would fuel an interesting process of modifying the 
current claims on flood risks. However, the outcome of the research project of 
Deltares and KNMI was very uncertain, especially on whether that project would 
yield statistical material DV2050 can work with. Also, the anticipation of whether 
the delivery of these results would fit the time frame if DV2050 was problematic. 
After all, these results were needed before calculations on hydrological effects could 
start. The group decided to engage in this study, but would also have a clear 
‘fall-back option’ in case science would not deliver. That this decision reflects a 
responsiveness to the rationalities of both science and politics, is illustrated by the 
following quotes from the project group:
…But that is the nice thing about that [coincidence, DB] workshop. The moment that all 
experts, and those are all there together then, decide that there is a dependence or not, 
or that it is so uncertain that it’s not worth the effort to do research into it, we can say 
with confidence to the outside world: ‘we base ourselves on a standard stochastic 
analysis, because we can go on looking, but nothing has scientifically been proven.
Hydrologist 1 during project meeting, 2012 (my translation).
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Another immediately added:
And we can handle it partly in the explanation, right? You know that it is uncertain and 
you can describe that. You say that we now come with a policy package that is the 
minimum, and that it will likely be more. We must start at the beginning anyway, but 
this is definitely how you can handle it administratively. So: how bad is the fall-back 
option? You can deal with it.
Hydrologist 2 during project meeting, 2012 (my translation).
When the DV2050 report had to be finalised, the KNMI/Deltares coincidence 
study was not. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis for Hunze & Aa’s that calculated 
the size of the coincidence factor (Versteeg & Jungermann, 2013), concluded that 
there was indeed an effect, and used it in the calculations of water levels. The study 
of Noorderzijlvest refers to the coincidence study without specifically using 
quantitative outcomes, mainly because most of its boezems are regulated with 
pumps while only the Lauwers Lake discharges through sluices. However, the point 
is here that by tinkering with future climate change, the changes of flooding in the 
current climate were modified. They were now constructed with the same elements, 
stochastic variables, yet now with a correlation factor between high tided and 
extreme precipitation. 
 The second process of modification concerns revisiting the stochastic variables 
themselves through a lens of climate change. Modification was done with quite 
some flexibility. The stochastic variables were based on time series data of measuring 
stations. For some variables standardised figures are used, such as statistics for 
extreme precipitation events determined by KNMI and HKV in 2004 (STOWA, 
2004) or the figures of the KNMI scenarios (Van den Hurk et al., 2006). Some of the 
stochastic variables had to be constructed using statistical tools and time series data 
of local measuring stations. Storm tides are a notable one. The construction of the 
stochastic variable was modified using climate change as a lens. Storm tides were 
statistically adjusted for climate change in the past – sea level rise – to better reflect 
the current probability of occurrence of enduring high sea levels hindering water 
discharge (Versteeg & Jungermann, 2013, pp. 3-4). 
 However, the selection of figures to construct the variables varied. The HKV 
study for Hunze & Aa’s used the upper limits of only the extreme W+ climate KNMI 
scenario, while Arcadis study for Noorderzijlvest used the W study (De Weme et al., 
2014). Groundwater levels were adjusted for soil subsidence, yet “not with the 
climate corrected variant, which could have been neater” (email correspondence 
hydrological expert, 15 may 2014). Finally, the discharge on the boezem depends on 
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whether or not the capacity of polder pumps to the boezem would be enlarged 
because of climate change, which was the then current line of policy, or whether a 
new no-pump (‘plas-dras’) regime will be decided for extreme circumstances. 
Larger pumps meant more water, while a no-pump regime meant less water 
discharged into the boezem. These assumptions vary throughout the different 
studies: polder pumps were expected to increase in the futures of the quick scan 
(Van der Vat & Verhoeven, 2010, p. 9), while they did not in the DV2050 study 
(Versteeg & Jungermann, 2013, p. 30).
 In contrast to much of the codified steps in assessing flood risks, the 
microprocesses of modification that yield climate adjusted flood risk stochastic 
variables are much less routinised. Nevertheless, the previous paragraph suggests 
that it was in some cases quite arbitrary. Still, the calculated effects of climate 
change were quite small (roughly 5 cm in 2050 in Hunze and Aa’s, table 4.2, and in 
Noorderzijlvest, table 4.3), especially in comparison to the differences resulting 
from the choice in assessment methods.
Taken together, the institutionalised risk assessment procedures enabled place- 
based quantitative knowledge production on threshold probabilities within a 
limited time frame. Clearly, the threshold probability was not purely ‘natural’, it 
was also ‘social’. The appropriate way of doing was influenced by the consensus 
in the social world of hydrology and by the legally obligatory procedures. These 
two factors determined to a large extent what was to be done and constrained 
manoeuvra bility. For a large part, the assessment of climate impacts happens 
within a quantitative water safety problem framing. Other climate impacts possibly 
relevant for this framing are not quantitatively considered, e.g. on dike failure. 
What stood out was a process of reduction of climate change via selecting elements 
and inserting those in the assessment regime. However, due to tinkering with 
climate change, I also observed a process of modification in which parameters were 
adjusted: claims about current water levels were transformed. Current levels were 
Policy package Electraboezem
(3rd compartment) 
Fivelingoboezem
Package A 0.01 -0,07
Package B 0.03 -0,07
Package C 0.06 -0,07
Table 4.3.   Effect of climate change and soil subsidence on the maximum water 
level (T100) in the Noorderzijlvest region for 2050.
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now constructed with past sea level rise and with assuming coincidence of storm 
tides with heavy precipitation. Hence, not only was climate change transformed 
into relevant claims on future effects on the water system, climate change also 
transformed the way the hydrological past was interpreted to calculate current 
probabilities of flooding.
4.4.3 Producing knowledge in anticipation of legal and political demands
The previous section focused specifically on the assessment of climate impacts and 
the way this was hydrologically acceptable. In the task to prepare an advice on 
acceptable policy interventions in the water system, the DV2050 project members 
anticipated on a wider set of demands from various social worlds. I highlight legal 
and political demands here.
 Knowledge claims about policy alternatives had to be legally acceptable. If 
administrative decisions would follow from the DV2050 project, all procedures 
had to be followed as stipulated by planning law. On the one hand, this meant that 
various timeframes had to be aligned, because an Environmental Impact Assessment 
had to be done and the procedures for formal participation had to be followed. On 
the other hand, the project group anticipated on a potential legal case at the Council 
of State by involving and hiring reputed organisations to do the studies. The group 
involved reputed knowledge institutes such as Deltares and KNMI, but also the 
larger water engineering consultancy firms. With several transparent steps in the 
project, such as getting a ‘memorandum of preconditions’ approved by the 
administrative steering group, the group clearly anticipated on claims later on that 
something important had not been included and that they had deliberately 
overlooked that. With these actions, the project group aims to shield knowledge 
claims from possible disputes in court. Earlier, law suits had been filed against 
HOWA policies claiming the knowledge base was unsound (see also text box 4.2). 
However, as projects members knew, the Council of State rarely judges knowledge 
claims themselves, but reviews whether procedures are expected to lead to grounded 
conclusions.  
 The second set of demands were political. Because of the imminent context of 
decision making, experimental activities that had a serious risk of delaying the 
project were deemed undesirable and needed ‘fall-back options’, as I have explained 
with the example of the coincidence study. The project’s strict time frame of making 
decisions in 2014 in order to get the boezem in ‘good order’ and meet the flood 
safety norms in 2025 was important here. All administrators had committed 
themselves to that objective. Furthermore, agreement had to be negotiated on what 
variants of policies would be studied and on what criteria these variants would be 
assessed. For the provincial administrators it was important that a story could be 
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Text box 4.2.   Evaluating truth claims in court – verdicts by the Council of 
State in HOWA cases
The Council of State is the highest general administrative court in the Netherlands 
and decides on appeals lodged by members of the public against decisions 
made by the a governmental body. In 2007, a large scale study, including both 
research of the law and empirical research, evaluated the approaches followed by 
Dutch administrative courts to establish the facts in legal appeals (Barkhuysen 
et al., 2007). The researchers concluded that even though one may expect active 
administrative courts, given their independent responsibility to actively establish 
the facts and given their wide discretion in choosing investigatory powers granted 
by the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), in practice courts adopt a passive 
approach and make very limited use of options available to examine relevant facts. 
Consequently, the researchers conclude, when judgment is given on whether a 
decision was based on the truth, administrative courts base their consideration 
on two elements. First, judges weigh arguments adduced by the parties. Second, 
judges assess whether one could reasonably expect that the administrative process 
followed was suitable to establish the facts credibly. Judges hardly ever base their 
decisions on their own examination of the facts, despite the investigatory powers 
granted to them. In most cases, the decisions by the court are in favour of the 
administrative authorities.
Following the decisions that resulted from HOWA, half a dozen legal cases were 
started. In most of these cases the knowledge claims on which decisions were based 
were disputed. Both the knowledge claims themselves as well the impartiality of 
the research were contested. Especially the decisions to designate emergency 
water retention areas to prevent flooding in Hunze and Aa’s catchment area led 
to appeals by (groups of) inhabitants, such as the Ulsderpolder (200801564/1 
and 200900996/1/R1)), Onner- and Oostpolder (200803861/1), or Kuurbos 
(201000602/1/R1 and 201001424/1/R1). Inhabitants disputed both the knowledge 
base showing ‘usefulness and necessity’ of the emergency polders – reports were 
said to contain mistakes and wrong assumptions, or were said to be inconclusive 
or sloppy. The research was claimed to be biased. All appeals were dismissed. 
The court ruled that the appellants did not motivate or substantiate their claims 
enough, “for instance with an expert report”, that the research reports under 
consideration contained mistakes. It ruled that the defences of the administrative 
authorities contained more sound reasoning and were based on credible sources. 
Hence, the judges concluded, the administrative authorities were right to base 
their decisions on the research and advisory reports under consideration.
110
CHAPTER FOUR
told that the region was safe. The water boards on the other hand had to finance 
policies, and stressed the affordability of any set of policies. The nature organisations 
argued that an undesirable policy variant from an agricultural perspective had to 
be on the table.
 The policy study by Noorderzijlvest, where the statistical studies showed the 
necessity of policies in contrast to the study for Hunze & Aa’s, gathered very detailed 
knowledge on differences in costs of all variants. This knowledge could later 
function as ammunition in negotiations. For instance, it calculated the costs of 
different ways to meet the safety norms: one desirable from the perspective of the 
province, one from the perspective of the water board, and one compromise variant. 
Knowledge was also constructed on a situation with soil subsidence and without, in 
order to substantiate a financial claim with the Committee on Soil Subsidence. In 
the stakeholder participation sessions, actors could provide input on the criteria on 
which policies would be evaluated. However, during the stakeholder sessions actors 
could play in map tables with different combinations of policies in order to meet the 
safety norm. They were provided with one other criterion: costs. Hence, hydrological 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency were central in developing knowledge. All other 
criteria were secondary, even though they were qualitatively explored in the 
environmental impact assessment. Other climate effects than those in the hydro- 
logical study, e.g. drought, water quality, etcetera, do not play a serious role in the 
Text box 4.2.   Continued
In conclusion, the courts never collected additional material other than what 
was presented to them by the parties involved, nor did they hear experts other 
than those involved in the research reports already. The courts never ruled that 
the reports by large research or consultancy institutes, such as Delft Hydaulics / 
Deltares, Arcadis, or Haskoning, assessing the extreme water levels in the boezem 
systems and effective policies to cope with those levels were not credible. This 
added to the expectation by DV2050 policy makers that approaches to assess 
flood risks in the past were likely to hold in future legal cases as well.
In retrospect, the questioning of the ‘usefulness and necessity’ of the emergency 
polders was not unsubstantiated. The DV2050 advisory report for Hunze and 
Aa’s (Waterschap Hunze & Aa’s et al., 2014) concluded, on the basis of HKV’s 
assessment report of extreme water levels (Versteeg & Jungermann, 2013), that 
more than enough retention areas had been developed in the period following 
HOWA. It advised to cancel Zuiderwuppen as an emergency retention area.
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EIA (Bos et al., 2014). Taken together, both the ways in which knowledge was 
produced, as well as the substance of the knowledge claims were influenced by 
both legal and political demands.
4.5  Constructing the claims in the advisory report
I consider the final phase of the DV2050 project an important last moment of 
transformation. In this last phase, both a readable narrative claiming the need 
for climate change adaptation was made, as well as a set of climate adaptation 
 recommendations. These claims were presented in the final advisory report. In this 
moment of transformation, all policy variants, open discussions and produced 
knowledge were reduced to recommendations on a single policy alternative to 
which provincial and water board politics could say yes or no. This policy alternative 
comprehended a detailed set of safety norms together with a the variant to combine 
water retention with nature reserves. In an intensive process of negotiation among 
the political administrators of the provinces and the water boards, and the 
‘prioritary stakeholders’ adaptive actions had been cut up in what can be termed 
‘decidable units’. These ‘decidable units’ are decisions on which consensus had been 
agreed among powerful actors. All elements on which no decision had been reached 
were dissociated from the DV2050 project and postponed into the future. For 
example, no claims about adaptive policies for the Lauwers Lake were made. I first 
provide two examples of such ‘decidable units’ and then discuss the interplay 
between knowledge produced back stage and knowledge claims presented front 
stage in the advisory report.
 The first decidable unit is the proposal on safety norms. The rather unusual 
proposal was to set different safety norms for the height and the stability of the 
levees. The advice for Hunze & Aa’s (Waterschap Hunze & Aa’s et al., 2014) claimed 
that the statistical studies had showed that no additional interventions in the water 
system were needed in 2025. Therefore, the previously decided emergency retention 
area Zuiderwuppen could be cancelled. Moreover, even under the most extreme 
climate scenario nothing had to be done, unless very pessimistic assumptions on 
coincidence of storm tides and precipitation were made. This claim went accompanied 
with a rhetorical packaging that “this statistical analysis is the best thus far” and that 
the second opinion by the reputed knowledge institute Deltares had concluded that 
“this study was very thorough” (ibid, p 18-19, my translation).
 However, as explained, this statistical study only provided knowledge for the 
threshold probability of the design high water levels. The 2012 near flooding of the 
Ems Canal, and the earthquake events in the region a year later, had raised questions 
whether the stability of water barriers could be assumed. A Deltares study (Korff, 
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Visschedijk, Landwehr, Verweij & Meijers, 2014) commissioned by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs suggested it could not. The DV2050 study on the investment costs 
of meeting the stability standards associated with high flood safety norms suggested 
an investment of 154-164 million euro for Hunze & Aas (Hordijk, 2013), while 
another study with a new testing method suggested no additional investments were 
needed. The province wanted to set higher safety norms in the region. The water 
board opposed them as it was still uncertain whether higher safety norms for 
stability were ‘realisable and affordable’. Agreement was reached on advising a 
complicated dissociation between safety norms for ‘height’ and for ‘stability’. 
Hence, for some barriers a decision was made that they may overflow every 1000 
years, but may collapse every 100 years. A reassessment was announced for 2021, 
yet only when on the “national level an advanced method would be set that can 
function for the official testing of regional water barriers” (Waterschap Hunze & 
Aa’s et al., 2014, p. 21).
 A second example of a decidable unit was the decision on the freeboard 
(waakhoogte) for the levees in the rural areas in the Noorderzijlvest catchment. 
DV2050 advised a preferred set of policies to realise flood safety norms, comprising 
of realising retention in nature areas and the heightening of several kilometres of 
dikes. Still, Noorderzijlvest had the opinion that the costs resulting from the 
province’s proposal for flood norms was too high. However, the province stood by 
its position that it would set a ‘minimum safety’ higher than the IPO standard. A 
political solution was negotiated by the setting of the freeboard (waakhoogte). The 
freeboard is a mark-up on top of the design high water level and is an important 
concept water managers use to deal with uncertainties. The extra centimetres of the 
freeboard are to compensate for erosion through overtopping, for model 
uncertainty, for gradients in the water course, for damaged dikes because of 
grazing, or for safe dike inspections during high waters. The province wanted a 
uniform freeboard of 50 cm throughout the province. With a freeboard of 50 cm, 
many dikes would not be meeting the norms and high investment costs were 
needed. If the water board could make a convincing case that such a high freeboard 
was not necessary, the province would settle for the higher safety norms yet lower 
freeboard. In a process of extension, a substantial argumentation was coupled to 
the claims that 30 cm was enough: 30 cm was claimed to be in line with recommen-
dations by knowledge institute Deltares and 30 cm was also used in the Frysian 
boezem the advisory report (Waterschap Noorderzijlvest et al., 2014, p. 24). For 
other parts in the region 50 cm was advised.
 As could be observed in the presentation of claims in the final advisory report, 
the produced body of knowledge is narrowed down and only presented insofar 
elements were considered relevant to make a convincing claim. For instance, a lot 
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of attention in the DV2050 project had been paid to the question of whether or not 
norms would be met statistically. However, all numbers about water levels remained 
in the background reports. The final report only explained that studies had been 
done, what these studies assessed, that reputed sources (Deltares, STOWA, large 
consultancy firms) and methods had been used, and that those studies were of high 
quality. The coincidence study with KNMI and Deltares is hardly mentioned.
 However, the conclusion that what stays back stage is irrelevant and only the 
claims in the report matter is a misunderstanding. By exploring different routes in 
knowledge production and by negotiating the acceptability of claims with the 
different social worlds of science, the robustness of these claims are strengthened to 
protect it from legal, scientific, or political disputes later on. In the same vein, the 
DV2050 project group tested for sensitivities and no-go areas among powerful 
stakeholders when developing the advisory report. Hence, these claims are not just 
statements on paper. These claims derive their strength from being backed by a 
whole network of accepted modelling procedures, authorised assumptions, reputed 
agencies, and negotiated compromises, which will remain backstage until mobilised 
when needed.
4.6  Discussing the transformation of climate knowledge claims
When the DV2050 study was announced, its assignment was to consider climate 
change impacts, as it was said that this had not been done in the preceding HOWA 
studies. In HOWA 1 and 2 (Stuurgroep Water 2000+, 2001, 2003) claims about 
climate change were exploratory and qualitative. In DV2050, quantitative and 
probabilistic claims were made whether a set of particular adaptation policies could 
accommodate climate change. Rather than presenting claims about a range of 
possible climate futures, quantitative claims were made on the effects of climate 
change on peak water levels in the boezem. This section discusses how climate 
change was transformed in the advisory process.
 In the context of a strongly institutionalised science-policy interface, recognised 
interdependencies among powerful actors, a struggle over decision competencies, 
and the pressure of imminent decision making, the transformation of knowledge 
claims was predominantly one of reduction and, within a strictly demarcated 
frame, of extension. The concept of climate change was tamed in such a way that it 
was transformed into a non-interfering factor to the process of hydrological flood 
risk assessments. Climate change here was only quantitatively relevant insofar as it 
fitted the sedimented conceptualisation of flood risk: the threshold probability that 
the boezem water level will exceed the design high water level. Hence, the relevant 
climate impacts were those on peak water levels. Other possible climate change 
114
CHAPTER FOUR
effects, on drought, on summer peak precipitation, on water quality, but also on 
dike failure, were not considered and no claims were made about them. Climate 
change needed to be ‘probabilitised’ and was ultimately reduced to a single number. 
Out of the various possible climate futures developed by the KNMI, a single 
scenario was selected. The constructed threshold probabilities was then to be 
compared to the standard in order to decide whether interventions in the system 
were needed. Another process of reduction can also be observed in presenting 
advisory claims on climate impacts. I observed that elements were dissociated and 
presented in ‘decidable units’. The norm proposal differentiating for height and 
stability is one example, the dissociation of advising adaptation policies for the 
Lauwers Lake another.
 Within this framework I also observed extension. The claims about meeting 
the threshold probability used to be constructed solely with measurements in the 
past. Now they were coupled to standardised projections of the future. Remarkably, 
there was quite some variation in the construction of claims whether norms will be 
met in the future. The most extreme KNMI climate projections were coupled in the 
case of Hunze and Aa’s, while a more moderate projection was used for Noorderzi-
jlvest. Also other assumptions needed to construct claims varied. For example, 
assumptions whether polder pumps would be enlarged or whether ground water 
levels would change due to climate change differed for the Noorderzijlvest and 
Hunze & Aa’s catchments. I thus observed flexibility in constructing threshold 
probabilities.
 The claims went accompanied with a rhetorical packaging in order to meet the 
demands of audiences in multiple social worlds. Two variants were the most 
prominent. The first was the rhetorical packaging of hydrological claims with 
arguments that, despite that claims might be imperfect or incomplete, the current 
studies were the best so far, that methods followed were well within the current 
orthodoxy of hydrology, and that reputed bodies supported these claims. In the 
representations of climate change the group drew on sources of epistemic authority, 
precluding any contests over credibility in court or elsewhere. The second was the 
packaging of those elements that are dissociated from the advisory report and 
scheduled into the future. Here the group had to invest in explanations in order to 
justify why something is not advised. They never argued that these dissociations 
were the result of negotiations among powerful actors, yet rather that knowledge 
was too uncertain to build an advice on and that more studies were needed.
 Finally, I observed very subtle changes of knowledge claims through a process 
of modification. The elements with which the claims are constructed were modified. 
The concept of future climate change functioned as a lens through which the past 
was reinterpreted. Claims about the current probability of occurrence of water 
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levels transformed, as these were now constructed with data corrected for past sea 
level rise, and a factor covering the coincidence of storm tides with heavy 
precipitation. Rayner et al. (2005) observed a lot of reluctance with water managers 
to incorporate climate change in assessments and decision-making processes due 
to institutional reasons, such as a large built infrastructure, regulatory constraints, 
mismatch of temporal scales among processes and organisational conservatism. 
This case presented an image of keeping a lot of climatic changes out, while climate 
subtly transformed assessment procedures as well.
4.7  Conclusions
In conclusion, in this case the assessment of flood risks remains a practice 
dominated by hydrology. No entrances of new types of experts were observed in 
this project. One exception is the coincidence project, in which meteorological and 
hydrological scientists cooperate with the water boards. The project group 
anticipates on an uncertain outcome of this pilot project by not making DV2050 
dependent upon it. This is not to say that knowledge from different disciplines is not 
used. Standardised knowledge from different disciplines, from climate science to 
demography, is gathered and compiled in the ‘memorandum of preconditions’. That 
knowledge is then fit into the hydrological assessment machinery. With regard to 
increased participation, the conclusion is similar. By drawing upon a clear distinction 
between risk assessment and risk management, stakeholders were kept out of the 
assessment of the problem and were only invited to participate on possible solutions. 
 The network of procedures, data, standardised climate change factors, and 
computer instruments enables actors to grasp the complex functioning of the water 
system both in history, at present, and in the future. The domain of regional water 
management is characterised by an established infrastructure that allows for the 
evaluation of quantitative effects of suggested policies, while stabilising relations 
among social worlds, allowing exchange and facilitate joint work. The procedures 
for how to legitimately feed climate change in to these models are codified. The 
question of whether climate change needs probabilities (Dessai & Hulme, 2004) 
was answered implicitly yet positively by actors. What is or is not the problem, or 
what can or cannot be calculated as effects of climate change, is constrained by 
these modelling procedures. Learning about climate change beyond that framing, 
e.g. about comprehensive effects of climate change on the water system, normative 
objectives of water management, or governance strategies, was precluded. Changing 
the ‘given’ problem frame can be done in theory, but needs an enormous amount 
of work to do that in a hydrologically legitimate way. Or, in the words of Rayner 
(2003, p. 168):
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Almost inevitably, where new techniques of public participation are implemented in a 
political culture of science- and evidence-based expertise, they are forced to permit 
science to set the stage. […] Technical perspectives often frame the debate as hard- 
edged, binding constraints on decisions, while social and cultural perspectives enter 
the stage as malleable perceptions and preferences to be corrected by promoting public 
understanding of science.
Several scholars (Argyris, 2004; Hoppe, 2011; Phillips, 2011) suggest that, besides 
entrenched institutional contexts, power politics delimit the space for deliberation. 
In this case the struggle over competencies and a strongly institutionalised 
science-policy interface make it very difficult for changes to materialise or ‘deep’ 
learning to be realised (Chilvers, 2013). This is strengthened by the context of 
imminent decision making. On the other hand, I observed that also knowledge was 
produced about costs of policies, with the particular aim to use it in political 
negotiations. The fact that this is a strongly institutionalised context not only 
provides certainty on what tasks to carry out, yet also what interdependencies are 
and who are the actors to politically bargain with (Vink et al., 2015). As mentioned, 
the DV2050 project also resulted out of the legal obligation to reassess the water 
system and formulate policies to get it in ‘good order’. Developing stakeholder 
participation in the close context of decision making diminishes the possibilities of 
opening up the process for out of the box searching, visioning, or designing (Hage, 
Leroy & Petersen, 2010; Stirling, 2008). With the decision deadline approaching 
and time pressure rising, also in this case it became increasingly hard to pursue any 
experiments with new forms of participation.
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Figure 5.1.  Location of the cities of Rotterdam, Utrecht and Arnhem.
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Stabilising urban adaptation to  
global warming? 3
5.1  Heated debates
The fact that the urban climate differs from that of the countryside is evident to 
anyone enjoying a walk on a warm summer night or a chilly winter evening. 
Systematic scholarly work on the urban climate dates back to the writings of 
Londoner Luke Howard in the early part of the nineteenth century. Remarkably, 
however, the use of knowledge from the discipline of urban meteorology in the 
design of urban settlements is considered to be a failure (Eliasson, 2000; Hebbert & 
Jankovic, 2013; Hebbert & Mackillop, 2013; Kleerekoper, Van Esch & Salcedo, 2012; 
Lenzholzer & Brown, 2013). Despite the urban climate research community’s 
abundant ambitions to support the policy process with its expertise, productive 
science-policy relations did not institutionalise except for some notable examples 
in Germany and South East Asia.
 In tandem with the increasing awareness for climate change adaptation the 
urban climate also regained attention in urban climate adaptation strategies 
(Bulkeley, 2013; Carter, 2011; Den Exter, Lenhart & Kern, 2014). Global temperatures 
are projected to rise in the coming century and weather extremes such as heat 
waves are predicted to occur more frequent, intense and longer. Consequently, 
debates among policy makers are focusing around the issue of how to maintain 
urban regions as attractive, productive and safe places in the future. These debates 
evolve in a direct relation with the governance of heat risks, an emerging policy 
field in Europe in the wake of the 2003 and 2006 heat waves which resulted in peaks 
in morbidity and mortality, and a sharp controversy across the continent 
(Boezeman, Ganzevoort, Lier & Louwers, 2014; Kovats & Hajat, 2008; Lass, Haas, 
Hinkel & Jaeger, 2011). The central question in these debates is whether and how 
urban warming should be a legitimate object for governance, and, if so, whether it 
should be a matter of social cohesion policy (Klinenberg, 2003; Poumadère, Mays, 
Le Mer & Blong, 2005), town planning (Hebbert & Mackillop, 2013), public health 
3 Part of this chapter was published as Boezeman, D. & Kooij, H.J. (2015). Heated debates: the 
transformation of urban warming into an object of governance in the Netherlands. In: Beunen, R., 
Van Assche, K., & Duineveld, M. (eds.), Evolutionary Governance Theory: theory and applications 
(pp. 185-203). New York: Springer.
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(Kovats & Hajat, 2008), or any other field of collective organisation. Hence, as what 
Corburn (2009) terms ‘localisation’, the transformation of global environmental 
change into meaning for local affairs goes hand in hand with a process of 
simultaneously stabilising both epistemic and political legitimacy for particular 
ways of local knowing and dealing with global climate change (Jasanoff, 2010a).
 This chapter aims to understand the construction of climate adaptation 
knowledge in the process of constructing new issues of governance, by focusing on 
the (re-)emerging issue of urban warming in the Netherlands in the context of rising 
attention for climate change adaptation. Historically, the water-centred discourse 
in the Netherlands has been strong, and the emergence of new issues of governance, 
such as urban warming, provides an interesting case to study how the transformation 
of knowledge claims about climate change are related to the formation of new stable 
issues of governance. Around these issues, new networks of cooperation and 
exchange may emerge between hitherto rather disconnected elements. In this particular 
case, disconnected social worlds, such as urban planning, urban meteorology, 
public health and politics, may form new productive relations around the issue of 
urban warming, through which these social worlds themselves change as well.
 Attention for the question of whether to adapt to urban warming surfaced in 
the Dutch discourse on climate change adaptation around 2007. The semblances of 
the phenomenon, however, changed rapidly and co-existed: ‘urban warming’, ‘heat 
stress’, ‘urban heat islands’, ‘urban climate’, and ‘urban heat risks’. This chapter 
shows how these different concepts signify different things in different discourses, 
and may connect different social worlds and sets of knowledge. Hence, keeping all 
these terms in play is important to understand the microprocesses  through which 
knowledge gets articulated, negotiated, gain legitimacy, and restructure practices. 
For the sake of writing a coherent narrative I use ‘urban warming’ as an umbrella 
term to discuss knowledge production on temperature related effects while 
disregarding other urban climatic issues such as (peak) precipitation or storms. The 
research question guiding this chapter is twofold. First, how can we understand the 
construction and transformation processes of urban warming as an issue of 
governance and what knowledge is produced for this issue? And second, through 
which processes does the issue and its knowledge claims transform, become stabilised, 
or gets destabilised?
 As the community involved in climate change and urban heat effects is 
relatively small in the Netherlands, I discuss the emergence of the issue using three 
subcases: Rotterdam, Arnhem, and Utrecht (for their geographical locations, see 
figure 5.1). On the one hand, I selected these cities as illustrations because of their 
active involvement in the construction of urban warming knowledge. In the former 
two cities, municipal civil servants got involved in research projects on the effects 
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of urban warming due to climatic changes around 2008. For a substantial period of 
time, these cities were among the only Dutch cities that considered heat effects and 
were indicated as being the forerunners by actors involved. In contrast, in Utrecht 
an environmental NGO aimed to construct knowledge to support its effort to push 
urban warming on the municipal policy agenda. On the other hand, these cities are 
interesting as their respective research projects on urban warming emerged in 
quite different settings with different associated practices within which urban 
warming as a relevant issue of governance for the city was articulated and 
constituted. This enables a comparison of the effects of different constellations on 
the process of (de-)stabilising urban warming as an issue to produce knowledge for.
 In the following sections, I elaborate upon the production of knowledge for 
urban warming. The first section outlines the emergence of urban warming as a 
phenomenon in the international scientific discourse, its weak institutionalisation 
in the Netherlands, and the surfacing of urban warming in the Dutch climate 
change discourse. To understand the attempts to stabilise the issue of urban 
warming, I evoke the cases of the Dutch cities Rotterdam, Arnhem and Utrecht in 
sections four and five. Due to their particular constellations, the involvement of 
social worlds, and approaches of stabilising the issue of urban warming, the 
particular construction and transformation of knowledge claims within these three 
cities differ considerably. Following these transformations enables the reconstruction 
of stabilising knowledge claims in a context of eroding legitimacy for an emerging 
issue of governance, the topic of section six. 
5.2   The construction and transformation of urban warming  
as a governance issue
5.2.1 Scientific discourse: compensation for urban interference 
The emergence of urban climates as an issue of scholarly interest can be traced to 
the work of Luke Howard and his publications on the Climate of London in 1833. 
Subsequently, urban climatology developed into an interdisciplinary field involving 
meteorology, physical geography, construction science and medical epidemiology 
(Hebbert & Jankovic, 2013; Hebbert & Mackillop, 2013). In the 20th century, urban 
climatology developed into a scientific discourse with standardised methods of 
assessing urban climates, institutionalised in newly set up branches of the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) or independent organisations as the International 
Association for Urban Climate, dedicated conferences, and associations with 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation, the International Federation 
of Housing and Planning, and the United Nations Environmental Programme. 
A constant and important theme within the scientific discourse of urban climatology 
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was the ambition to influence policy processes and transfer knowledge to improve 
the (re-)development of towns. Renowned meteorological scholars, such as Helmut 
Landsberg and Timothy Oke, continually attempted to address planning communities 
by translating findings, developing toolboxes, and inciting colleagues to do the 
same (for an excellent discussion of urban climatology’s efforts see Hebbert & 
Mackillop, 2013). Those ambitions have, however, failed to institutionalise as a 
notable part of urban planning practices, except for some exceptions in mainly 
Germany and Asia (Hebbert & Mackillop, 2013; Lenzholzer & Brown, 2013). In 
Germany, attention for urban climates and air quality was integrated in planning 
law in an early stage, the Institute of German Engineers developed a VDI standard 
to do urban climate assessments, cities like Stuttgart and Munich employ urban 
climatologists, and German urban planning documents regularly cite urban 
climate studies. However, the Netherlands is a prime example of this institutio-
nalisation failure (see next section). 
 In the Netherlands, urban climates and urban meteorology are not at all considered 
to be urgent topics in scientific discourses (interview, urban meteorologist, 2013) or 
for planning practices (interview, landscape architect, 2013). Only in 2007, a first 
urban climate group was established within a meteorological department in the 
Netherlands, in this case at Wageningen University. For a long time, the only 
scientific study conducted into the urban heat island effect in the Netherlands was 
by Loek Conrads in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Conrads, 1975; Conrads & Van 
Der Hage, 1971).
 I consider the late 1960s as a first moment of transformation of knowledge 
claims on urban warming, which was about claiming the ‘existence’ of the 
phenomenon in the Netherlands. The phenomenon was discovered and scientifically 
proven for the first time. In the subsequent period, however, the issue did not 
receive much attention, except for a study by Roodenburg (1983) quantifying 
Rotterdam’s heat island to improve local weather forecasting for economic purposes. 
A nationwide monitoring system for urban temperatures, or a comprehensive system 
to monitor heat related health effects did not materialise. 
 Particularly illuminating for the way the heat island issue was approached by 
the social world of meteorology in the Netherlands, is the publication by a group 
of scientists working at the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute KNMI 
(Brandsma, Können & Wessels, 2003). In their study, urban heat was framed as an 
interfering factor for the proper construction of global and regional temperature 
time series data sets for climate change research. This had consequences for 
constructing new knowledge on urban warming. Using statistical techniques and a 
benchmark weather station in a rural area, the expanding urban settlements near 
the institute’s main measuring station ‘De Bilt’ are found to significantly 
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“contaminate the long-term temperature variability of such stations” (Brandsma et 
al., 2003, p. 829, emphasis added). The study concluded with a discussion of the 
desirability of a factor correcting for the urban heat advection to “systematically [...] 
homogenise long-term daily to hourly temperature time series” (ibid, p 844). 
Following this particular understanding of the effects of human settlements on 
temperature, the KNMI and WMO developed protocols to secure synoptic ways of 
observing weather data and rendering the comparison of data possible (KNMI, 
2000). The KNMI, just like meteorological offices in other countries, located its 
weather stations on the one hand in strictly open areas to avoid interference of built 
up areas in its measurements, and on the other hand to representative locations to 
obtain measurements for the entire territory it had to cover. Also, weather stations 
have been sited near strategic locations such as military bases or airports. So instead 
of emerging as a phenomenon itself, urban warming was reduced to exclude it from 
another phenomenon with a rich tradition, that of reliable global and regional 
temperature data sets. 
5.2.2 Limited institutionalisation 
In terms of institutionalisation, the attention for the urban climate can be 
characterised as almost an institutional void within policy and planning. Dutch 
law does not formalise a specific policy process for dealing with urban climate, nor 
does it warrant knowledge production on the effects of city design upon the urban 
microclimate, in contrast to flood or environmental policies. The Dutch Building 
Decree does not specify regulations for thermal indicators inside or outside 
buildings. The specifications most closely related are those for insulation or energy 
standards. In planning law there are no generic goals or norms for urban 
temperature, other than a broad objective of a ‘good spatial planning’ which means 
that different functions have to be weighed in order to avoid nuisance of functions. 
Political objectives and goals for spatial development are formulated in national, 
provincial or municipal strategic visions (structuurvisie) and in municipal zoning 
plans (bestemmingsplan). Often these objectives are rather broad and vague, e.g. 
sustainable development or liveability, without further specification of what these 
terms do and do not mean. The input of knowledge in the development of these 
spatial plans is not standardised, rather diverse and generally not well attuned 
(Kuijpers-Linde, De Groot & Koomen, 2011), mainly via ‘building blocks’ per 
theme, ad hoc commissioned research reports, expert meetings and an obligatory 
Environmental Impact Assessment or sustainability exploration. The attention for 
heat related effects is low with urban planners at social housing associations 
(Roders, Straub & Visscher, 2013) and municipalities (Runhaar, Mees, Wardekker, 
Van der Sluijs & Driessen, 2012).
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An exception is the field of public health. The National Heat Plan (Ministry of VWS 
et al., 2007) was adopted in 2007 and is the centre piece of heat risk governance by 
the public health sector followed by a guideline on how to act (RIVM, 2012). The 
direct occasion and justification of adopting such a plan was the emerging discourse 
on climate change adaptation. In 2005 the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
instigated the project ‘Improving public health responses to extreme events’ 
(EuroHEAT), following the 2004 declaration of the European ministers for Health 
and the Environment that “the climate is already changing and that the intensity 
and frequency of extreme weather events, such as floods, heat-waves and cold spells, 
may change in the future. Recent extreme weather events caused serious health and 
social problems in Europe, particularly in urban areas.” (cited in WHO, 2008, p. 5). 
Statistics Netherlands estimated heat-related deaths in the Netherlands to be 
between 1400 and 2200 during the 2003 heat wave (Garssen, Harmsen & De Beer, 
2005). Central to EuroHEAT was to make an assessment of the scientific evidence 
on health impacts of extreme weather, a climate information decision support tool 
and suggest public health policies.
 Meanwhile in the Netherlands, the two heat waves of 2003 and 2006, the media 
attention for the heat-related deaths of two able-bodied participants of a large 
Dutch walking event ‘Vierdaagse’, the hospitalisation of another few dozen walkers, 
and the subsequent cancellation of the walking event were central at the 2006 
conference ‘Hitte de baas’ (in English: ‘Mastering heat’) organised by Ministry of 
Public Health, the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) 
and the Dutch Red Cross. Probably the most important conclusion of that 
conference was not that heat yielded health effects, but rather that the government 
was to take a responsibility for these risks. Following that conference, the ministry 
initiated the National Heat Plan, a promise it also made to the WHO. 
 The National Heat Plan framed the heat problem as an issue for a selected 
group of vulnerable, mostly elderly, people, which is thought to be growing due to 
an ageing population and being increasingly exposed to extreme heat because of 
climatic change. Its main policies are a warning system when (projected) temperatures 
reach threshold levels, triggering a communication campaign via the national and 
community health agencies, a system copied from France (Ministry of VWS et al., 
2007, p. 16). These public health organisations are then to provide simple recom-
mendations to elderly and the health and social care sector on how to cope with 
heat, such as on the importance of drinking enough water, avoiding physical strain, 
or staying in the shade. However, attention to evaluate the plan’s effectiveness is 
moderate, and some assess its implementation as slow (Kunst & Britstra, 2013).
 The heat plan’s analysis of what makes groups vulnerable is limited. The 
specificities of the Dutch approach may be better understood by briefly looking at 
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other countries. Klinenberg (2003), for example, pinpoints the root of the Chicago 
heat wave vulnerability in a decline of social networks, especially in poor areas with 
population decline, and a failing local government to provide community services. 
In France, more attention is given to the socio-economic conditions making 
particular individuals and communities vulnerable after heat risks became the 
iconic here-and-now problem of dangerous climate change (Poumadère et al., 
2005). Therefore, policies elsewhere include making inventories and call-lists of 
people at risk, creating cooled spaces, and investing in community cohesion. Even 
though the Dutch heat plan briefly mentions isolated people and the possibility to 
mobilise volunteering organisations to take care of individuals at risk, social aspects 
are clearly underdeveloped. Furthermore, the plan does not deal with the 
specificities of the urban climate.
 Taken together, urban warming neither existed as a phenomenon of scientific 
interest nor of governance in the Netherlands. In consequence, the practices to 
construct and consume urban heat risk knowledge are very weakly institutional-
ised. First, besides a set of rather general and open criteria to evaluate knowledge 
claims in urban planning and public health, a set of regulations specifying 
requirements to assess urban heat risk effects was absent when projects on urban 
warming adaptation emerged. Second, a standard knowledge infrastructure to 
cognitively monitor, evaluate, or model urban climates and their effects did not 
materialise, even though elements thereof existed dispersedly. Third, a consensus 
on which (governmental) actors had to have a role in these matters was very much 
in evolution and instable. Hence, the production of knowledge claims was weakly 
structured, adding to the volatility of this issue of governance.
5.2.3 Rising attention for urban warming  in the wake of climate change 
Urban warming re-entered the Dutch scene on the ‘bandwagon’ of climate change 
adaptation around 2007. This time, its surfacing came with substantially more 
attention from both the scientific and policy community. At the time, the Dutch 
climate adaptation discourse was highly water-centric, and mainly dealt with flood 
risk issues (Health Council, 2009; Swart et al., 2009; The Netherlands Court of 
Audit, 2012). Under the influence of political attention for long-term issues, the 
development of new national research programmes, and the development of a 
national comprehensive climate adaptation strategy (VROM et al., 2007), the 
adaptation discourse took off and efforts to go beyond flooding were proliferating. 
In terms of new national climate adaptation policy development, a new sub- 
programme on development and restructuring (Deelprogramma Nieuwbouw en 
Herstructurering) was set up to prepare new policies for spatial adaptation as part 
of the Delta Programme in 2010. Mainly functioning as a platform to exchange 
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ideas and best practices, the recommendations resulting from this programme 
were vague and voluntary. The programme advised that local actors would do a 
voluntary ‘climate stress test’ and would mainstream climate adaptation in 
collaborative planning in order to be ‘as climate proof as possible’ in 2050 (Coalities 
Klimaatbestendige Stad, 2013).
 The period shortly after 2007 can be understood as a second moment of 
transformation. The issue of urban warming was redefined from a phenomenon 
one aimed to isolate in scientific measurement, into a phenomenon the Dutch 
potentially needed to adapt to. The surfacing of urban warming as a potential 
governance issue went hand in hand with two processes. The first was discussing 
climate change ever more beyond an issue of adaptation next to mitigation, and a 
subsequent search for climate vulnerabilities and new risks the Dutch had to adapt 
to. Second, an active policy-oriented scientific community aimed to raise awareness 
for the effects of climate change in and put these issues on the agendas of planning 
communities. Together, this offered a financial opportunity structure for researchers 
and urban planners to engage in new projects on the topic.
 For example, two ‘definition’ and ‘dialog’ projects were installed by the national 
climate adaptation research programmes Climate Changes Spatial Planning and 
Knowledge for Climate which aimed at developing a knowledge agenda for research 
on climate change impacts and cities. In addition, a two day symposium ‘Hot places 
– cool spaces’ on urban adaptation and heat related effects was organised in 
Amsterdam October 2007, involving scientists from Germany and the UK to 
discuss research and policy options. In addition, a small number of other projects 
were funded in which various methods such as remote sensing, (mobile) measuring, 
amateur measurements, and modelling (see 5.3 for the discussion of those projects). 
Also in the Dutch scientific social world of public health the attention for heat 
related health effects was rising (see table 5.1).
 Two nationally commissioned state-of-the-art reports on knowledge on heat, 
Dutch cities and options for adaptation (Döpp, 2011; Salcedo Rahola, Van Oppen & 
Mulder, 2009) are illuminating to understand the quite particular framing of urban 
warming and conclusions on the needs for further knowledge production. On the 
one hand, quantifying urban heat islands and temperature effects on human beings 
are the central bodies of knowledge. On the other hand, these studies presented 
bodies of knowledge it deemed useful for effective climate adaptation. In Salcedo 
Rahola et al. (2009, p. 19) adaptation to urban warming meant mitigating the urban 
heat island, being an issue for town planners and building developers. That report 
presented policies that could be taken to strengthen the planner’s grip in the urban 
thermostat. In Döpp the issue is warily extended to include behavioural adaptation 
options as well, even though “not much scientific knowledge is available on effective 
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policies” (2011, p. 41). Urban warming is here presented as an issue for “spatial 
planning, energy, health care, and construction” (2011, p. 59). 
 During these projects, urban warming was increasingly debated, yet without 
crystallisation of whether urban warming was a problem and, if so, who was to 
address it. While urban warming was beginning to gain ground as a legitimate 
issue within the Dutch discourse of climate adaptation to produce new knowledge 
claims for, urban warming was not stabilised as an legitimate issue for governance. 
To understand the attempts and negotiations to stabilise knowledge claims on 
urban warming, I now turn to the projects in Rotterdam, Arnhem and Utrecht.
5.3  Adaptation to urban heat islands
 
5.3.1 Three cities engaging in three construction trajectories
Rotterdam and Arnhem were particularly active. Rotterdam’s approach was firmly 
embedded in an economic development and city branding narrative, or a “promo-
tion-oriented framing” (Biesbroek, Termeer, Klostermann & Kabat, 2014; De Boer 
et al., 2010; Root, van der Krabben & Spit, 2014; Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, Spit, 
Salet & Runhaar, 2014). The Rotterdam Climate Proof programme aimed to make 
Rotterdam a leading water and climate knowledge city, a ‘showcase for urban delta 
technology’ to be exported, and to profile Rotterdam as a safe, innovative and 
renewing delta city and harbour. With this approach the city aimed to position 
itself among the C40 cities, a prestigious network of global cities addressing climate 
change. Quickly after the Rotterdam Climate Proof programme was approved by 
the Rotterdam Council early 2008, the city was awarded the status of ‘hot spot’ for 
urban adaptation research in the national research programme Knowledge for 
Climate (KfC) (2008-2014). In concrete terms, it meant Rotterdam was awarded a 5 
million euro subsidy for co-financing applied adaptation research projects in the 
municipality, making Rotterdam’s total research budget around 10 million euro for 
5 years. Evolving from its successful water plan, Rotterdam’s strategy was water 
dominated at that time, as was clear on the start up meeting in 2008. Being granted 
these financial means by KfC meant that Rotterdam had to broaden its 
water-oriented focus to include other urban climate change risks as well. 
 In Arnhem, the project on the urban climate adaptation emerged within the 
civil service of the municipality. The Interreg IVB project Future Cities (2008-2013), 
a consortium consisting of Dutch, German, French, Belgian and English 
governments, got a European Regional Development Fund grant of 5,5 million 
euro, of which Arnhem received half a million. Its initiation had two causes, largely 
interrelated and partly coincidental. First and foremost, the European funds offered 
the opportunity to engage in a large scale project on adaptation. Having participated 
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in the Interreg Urban Water project, civil servants were looking for a follow up on 
climate change, yet not a water related project as “at some moment in time that is 
not subsidisable anymore” (interview, project leader, 2013). A second reason was 
the preoccupation of the city region authority with air quality and liveability, an 
issue receiving substantial political attention in the Netherlands when several 
major construction projects had been annulled on air quality grounds by the 
Council of State in 2004 and after. The city region wanted to invest the air quality 
funding it was granted by the national government in research on the effect of 
green infrastructure on the regional air quality. Because of the relation between 
policies alleviating bad air quality and urban heat, both issues could be merged into 
a single project. 
 In the third city, Utrecht, climate adaptation was not a policy priority for the 
municipality around 2010, even though the construction of a new residential area 
Rijnenburg was considered a hot spot in the Climate changes Spatial Planning 
research programme around 2008. More importantly, according to civil servants 
(interviews, 2013) the then current city’s alderwoman of the Green party had 
deliberately made climate mitigation her priority, while she considered adaptation 
as a distraction of that policy agenda. Sustainability policy is organised around the 
themes energy, green-blue infrastructure, and air quality. The latter was a politically 
and socially controversial topic in the city, causing two alderman to resign office 
and a municipal programme to improve the urban air quality worth one billion 
euro in 2008. The lack of priority to climate change adaptation was considered one 
of the reasons for a local environmental NGO, the Natuur & Milieufederatie 
Utrecht (NMU), to start a project ‘heat in the city’ to raise awareness for the issue 
of climate effects on the city and to push the issue on the political and policy 
agendas of the city of Utrecht. In 2009 this NGO was granted a 123 thousand euro 
SMOM subsidy to do a research project on urban warming which started in 2010 
and ran until 2013. SMOM is a fund of the governmental agency AgentschapNL 
stimulating non-profit organisations to engage in “innovative, societal and solution 
oriented sustainability projects”.
 The context and organisational embedding in which these projects originated 
had direct consequences for the stabilisation of urban warming as a legitimate issue 
of governance and on the transformation of knowledge claims about climate change 
(see table 5.2 for an overview of notable research projects in these cities). Rotterdam 
followed a ‘dedicated’ approach to climate adaptation (Uittenbroek et al., 2014). 
This meant that, backed by substantial political support, the municipality of 
Rotterdam had set up a new municipal climate adaptation unit and followed a 
 science-oriented approach, financed by and firmly embedded in the emerging 
academic adaptation community. This unit had multiple civil servants in its staff 
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and was to develop the Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy (Rotterdam, 2013), the first 
comprehensive adaptation strategy in the Netherlands. 
 The approach in Arnhem, on the other hand, never had a scientific objective 
per se. Arnhem’s approach can be characterised as one of coupling adaptation with 
current planning processes, which follows a more bureaucratic logic without 
explicit attention from local politics. Arnhem developed a new ‘Comprehensive 
Vision’ (structuurvisie) for urban planning in the city. When the leader of that 
project recognised ‘heat’ as something adding to the Vision’s novelty, the involved 
civil servants decided from the start of both projects that they would aim to embed 
heat in that new city vision. In Utrecht the production of heat related knowledge 
evolved in the context of an advocacy project of an NGO to build political and 
societal support for urban heat adaptation.
 In these three urban adaptation projects several social worlds intersected, 
municipal politics, several academic disciplines, policy fields such as urban 
planning and public health, and the environmental movement. The dominant 
techniques used to stabilise urban warming as a legitimate issue of governance - 
scientific objectification in Rotterdam, embedding in policy institutions in Arnhem, 
and building public support in Utrecht - differed. The demands, restrictions and 
ways of operating of all these social worlds influenced the framing of urban 
warming as a tractable issue, the construction of particular knowledge claims, and 
the stabilisation and destabilisation of these claims as legitimate. I now turn to 
specificities of the construction trajectories in the three cities, to illuminate how the 
issue and the knowledge claims further transformed.
5.3.2 Urban warming as part of scientific discourse
In Rotterdam, research on adaptation to warming was organised in roughly two 
phases, also called tranches of KfC. Its first phase, March 2009 until March 2011, 
was to be ‘demand led’, meaning that the city could frame what the research 
questions were. Under the name ‘Heat stress in Rotterdam’, research was done by a 
small group of the Dutch applied research organisation TNO, Wageningen 
University/Alterra, Deltares, Foundation for Building Research Rotterdam SBR, 
Gemeentewerken Rotterdam, and GGD Rotterdam-Rijnmond (Public Health 
Agency Rotterdam-Rijnmond), chaired by the project leader of the city of 
Rotterdam. Although the municipality officially steered the consortium in the first 
phase, its orientation was predominantly scientific. This implied a further 
solidification of the issue of urban warming by adding data on impacts, as well as 
an increased stabilisation of the object within scientific discourse. No clear 
normative positions were attached to the issue and for those at the municipal 
adaptation unit, urban warming was an add-on issue for the city. According to the 
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Rotterdam project leader, the researchers had far more knowledge on the subject 
matter of urban warming than the municipal civil servants: “For 99%, the direction 
of the research and questions were determined by the people participating in 
research”, she assesses and then adds: “it is my belief their discipline has been 
crucial for the framing [of the project]” (interview, project leader Rotterdam, 2013). 
In the case of Rotterdam framing was done mainly by those who were able to 
measure, model and quantify temperatures and their effects. In addition, some 
literature studies were done to compile a list of impacts focusing on public health 
and nuisance (Daanen et al., 2010; Nijhuis, 2011), and later also on air quality 
(Willers, 2012). The supposedly ‘demand-led’ phase was de facto supply led, not 
only as the researchers were said to have the lead in knowledge over the civil 
servants, but also because of the absence of serious demands or constraints by 
particular policy fields or local politics on the project.
 Interestingly, it led to different techniques to measure and model the spatial 
distribution of temperature in the city, while the temporal dimension of climate 
change was largely disregarded. The issue of ‘warming cities due to climate change’ 
became increasingly defined as a here-and-now ‘urban heat island’, with projects 
focusing on its quantification and visualisation in maps. Here, pre-existing 
techniques of using satellite data to measure a ‘surface heat island’ and the urban 
meteorological toolkit to quantify temperature difference within the urban borders 
were imported. These developments increased the stabilisation of the object of 
urban warming. By quantifying and mapping the urban heat island, the 
phenomenon did not remain only an scientific concept, it became more real through 
a topological existence. This effect was even stronger in the second KfC phase which 
was supposed to be ‘supply led’ (2010-2014), meaning that a scientific consortium 
was first in formulating an urban adaptation research agenda. According to the 
scientific consortium leader, it implied a focus on developing fundamental knowledge 
on heat, as that terrain was considered far less scientifically explored than other 
urban climate effects (interview, project leader Rotterdam, 2013). For instance, 
knowledge production focused on quantifying the heat reducing effects of materials 
in much detail, or developing location specific urban climate models. While adding 
to the scientific objectification of the issue, it increasingly alienated the phenomenon 
from the governance discourse in Rotterdam in which the questions why and how 
the urban warming mattered were far more important.
 Within the Future Cities consortium, Arnhem coordinated climate research 
into heat effects. However, from the start, the civil servants did not want to do 
scientific research per se. Rather, they wanted to do applicable research, or, “to put 
it bluntly, wanted to see ‘what is known?’, cut and paste, and let’s go ahead and do 
that” (interview, project leader Arnhem, 2012). The city started with a threefold 
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question. How strong are the city’s urban heat islands, what does that mean, and, if 
it is bad, what can you do about it? Civil servants worked closely together with a so 
called ‘knowledge broker’ of Alterra, an institute of Wageningen University 
focusing on applied research and consultancy work. Interestingly in this instance, 
the international partners offered access to new types of knowledge and techniques 
used in the German urban climate community: climatopes (Lenzholzer & Brown, 
2013; Ren et al., 2012; more on climatopes below).
5.3.3 Transforming urban warming into an issue of governance
A third moment of transformation occurred when in both Rotterdam and Arnhem 
the debate became more focussed on whether it was worthwhile to adapt to urban 
warming and what policies were natural and effective counterparts in that process. 
Increasingly discussions started to go beyond the urban heat island as a nice 
scientific artefact into debates on the particular meaning of it as an object of 
governance. Important to observe here is that the continuous engagement of 
scientists in the governance processes had naturalised the urban heat island as a 
phenomenon. The existence of the urban heat island as a matter of fact was never 
much disputed, but more so whether it also became a matter of concern. I 
understand this third moment of transformation predominantly as a process of 
extension. New elements were associated to align the issue with opportunities in 
and demands of other social worlds.
 In Rotterdam, the science-dominated approach chosen resulted in tensions in 
the project teams with strict demarcations of the boundary between science and 
policy: “When I asked for meanings [of numbers or effects], they said: you are the 
policy maker. We deliver the facts and you do the translation to practice.” (interview, 
project leader Rotterdam, 2013). In Arnhem, it led to an approach of pragmatically 
using material that was already collected. As an object of governance, urban heating 
became subject to a wider discussion than it was during the phases in which science 
was dominating the discussions in the project. Various governance actors articulated 
different problem framings of the risks of urban heating, and different normative 
positions on whether these risks would actually pose a problem. Discussions 
focused on who should respond to those risks and, if there should actually be a 
government responsibility, or whether it should be a public health matter or a task 
for urban planners (for a scientific study defining governance  responsibilities in 
Rotterdam and Arnhem, see Mees et al., 2014).
 Together with the articulation of urban warming as an issue of governance, the 
phenomenon of urban warming was extended by coupling particular normative 
positions and aligning the issue with existing policy fields. Through this coupling, 
the framing of urban warming shifted in both Rotterdam and Arnhem. These 
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frame shifts can be understood as processes of aligning urban warming with 
existing policy institutions on the one hand, and political and societal pressures on 
the other. This had consequences for the substantial scope of knowledge production, 
as well as for the for the relation between scientists and civil servants. In Rotterdam, 
the alarming framing of the object as ‘heat stress’ shifted to the more moderate 
‘urban climate’. As knowledge on the topic developed in the first phase, it became 
apparent that ‘heat stress’ was not compatible with the promotion-oriented framing 
of Rotterdam’s adaptation strategy. Increasingly, internal discussing were about 
“what message do you want to spread, what policy do you want to make? To prevent 
heat stress? No! To make and keep the city more attractive. […] The entire 
philosophy in Rotterdam to do something about climate change was that ‘climate 
offers opportunities!’” (interview, project leader Rotterdam, 2013). While there was 
substantial political support for water related climate adaptation, it was not clear 
how urban warming could fit the political agenda of branding of Rotterdam as the 
innovative and attractive city.
 In Rotterdam, knowledge production and the drafting of a comprehensive 
adaptation strategy was done in a newly climate adaptation project unit, with 
several civil servants working mainly on climate adaptation. This unit needed to 
enrol policy domains in order to get elements of that strategy implemented, and felt 
an increasing need to demonstrate the relevance of its claims about urban warming 
to actors inside and outside the Rotterdam government. It compiled extensive lists 
of what the urban climate might mean for different municipal policy fields (see 
Buijs & Streng, 2013, pp. 33-36). The main domains were the green department, 
urban development and public health. In order to institutionalise attention to heat 
in those fields, efforts were made to operationalise heat to integrate it in Rotterdam’s 
sustainability assessment, societal cost-benefit analyses and other formal planning 
procedures. Covenants with housing corporations were considered. In addition, 
lists were made of potential heat reducing materials and measures, which then had 
to be entered into the standardised urban design catalogue ‘Rotterdamse Stijl’. 
Despite the fact that the civil servants became leading in defining what types of 
knowledge they needed, scientific evidence and quantification of effects were key to 
the strategy to mobilise support for the heat issue. “We wanted broad support for 
policies. Often it is the case that the more knowledge you present, the more support 
you can get.” (interview, theme coordinator Urban Climate Rotterdam, 2013).
 Hence, during this third moment of transformation, stabilisation of the issue 
was pursued through substantiating and demonstrating the added value of heat 
adaptation by extending the issue with ever more evidence on impacts, costs and 
potential policies, especially because political and societal pressure was growing. A 
thick report (Buijs & Streng, 2013) was drafted by the adaptation unit reviewing 
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relevant scientific literature on urban warming, its effects and routes of adaptation.
However, some domains proved far easier to enrol than others: “when we showed 
that greening policies had potential, the response was “then it is no problem, we 
already do much about greening policy and climate is an extra argument to green 
the city. […] When the result was that we had to adapt skyscrapers, that you could 
no longer do high rise development, then things would have been different.” 
(interview, project leader Rotterdam, 2013). So even though the concept of ‘sky view 
factor’ is important in the urban heat island concept, a relation to the urban 
development department was much more difficult to establish than with the green 
department that quickly recognised a shared interest, effectively reducing the 
element of the sky view factor. Green policies can be established as ‘no-regret’ while 
intervening in the urban morphology is a ‘regret’ option. It also led to a further 
collection of knowledge into what the heat reducing potential of different greening 
policies was. Interestingly, as I outlined above, the stabilisation of the issue in terms 
of institutionalisation also created new problems, which had to be countered in 
order to avoid destabilisation. In the next section, I turn to the public reception of 
the object of urban heating in Rotterdam. 
In the meantime in Arnhem
In the case of Arnhem, however, urban warming did receive bureaucratic and 
political support in a very early stage after the Future Cities project was initiated. 
Urban warming was quickly accepted by the new Alderman as something nice, new 
and interesting for the liveability of the city of Arnhem. Hence, there was a strong 
political commitment to use heat as an argument in the city promotion objectives 
of Arnhem. The ‘heat proof city’ was adopted as one of the six themes in the city’s 
‘Energy Made in Arnhem’ programme (2011-2014) and incorporated in the 
Comprehensive Vision 2020-2040 (structuurvisie) (Arnhem, 2012).
 The third moment of transformation in Arnhem was one characterised by 
what I term the ‘spatialising’ of climate change. ‘Spatialisation’ was a process of 
modification and extension. Urban warming as an urban heat island, with its 
spatial distribution of temperatures across the city, fitted the planning and zoning 
logic of drafting a comprehensive vision. While a project on measuring temperature 
differences within the urban perimeter demonstrated the heat island “as something 
real, just like in Rotterdam!” (interview, project leader 2012), it was especially the 
technique of the ‘climatopes’ imported from Germany that formed the basis for 
constructing the issue of urban warming in Arnhem. Based on existing climatic, 
topographic, and land-use data, climatopes represent different microclimates in 
built up areas, such as industrial sites, inner city locations, garden towns, or open 
land locations (figure 5.2 shows Arnhem’s climatope map). These maps not only 
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Figure 5.2.   Climatope map of Arnhem (Burghardt, Katzschner, Kupski,  
Ren & Spit, 2010, p. 7).
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made the urban heat island visible, presenting it as a fact, it also offered a starting 
point for zoning and zoning-based policies to develop more liveable futures. Note 
that the maps do not specify temperatures in quantitative terms nor that they relate 
to temporal climate change. Hence, in this construction process the relevant scales 
of urban warming were modified using spatial rather than temporal scales. Rather 
than dealing with temporal climate change, the knowledge claims were made on 
urban temperature variation.  
 To make the urban climate governable in Arnhem, the urban climate had to be 
further transformed into having spatial consequences. ‘Spatialisation’ was also a 
process of extension.  The project group started to invest time into making an ‘heat 
attention map’ (see figure 5.3). In this map, normative positions needed to be 
articulated, e.g. which locations had priority over others to adapt, as well as what 
measures could be taken in different locations. For the latter, a connection was 
made with a body of engineering knowledge developed in the context of the Delta 
Programme, by developing factsheets of policies coupled to the suggestions for the 
different sub-areas. These factsheets provided those actors interested in taking 
physical measures to adapt to heat with information, e.g. effects of green policies or 
of removing physical blockages.
 These maps provide ‘attention’ and ‘suggestions’, and hence non-binding 
information to urban development organisations, and that is approximately the 
extent to which urban warming was institutionalised in Arnhem. The maps are to 
mobilise anyone who wants to do something about it. There are no clearly delineated 
objectives in the future planning of the city, nor does it make recommendations 
(the original name of the map). Despite the fact that civil servants tinkered with 
whether to approach the issue as one of ‘liveability’, ‘public health’, or any other 
way, taking up the topic was only possible if its rhetorical packaging was mild: the 
urban climate was to remain a “cuddly” issue that wouldn’t interfere with other 
planning objectives nor with the branded image of the city as liveable shopping 
town (multiple interviews, 2013). In its policy communications Arnhem formulated 
an ambition to keep the city a ‘pleasant place to be’, backing this ambition with 
qualitative and mild knowledge claims that liveability , labour productivity, air 
quality and public health might deteriorate due to global warming (Arnhem, 2012, 
pp. 52-54). While following the approach of coupling the issue with existing and 
ongoing processes in planning yielded quick acceptance within central institutions 
of planning, it also created an issue without much urgency to adapt to. 
5.3.4 Backing adaptation to urban warming with societal support
In the ‘Heat in the city’ project of the Natuur & Milieufederatie Utrecht (NMU) 
several social worlds intersected: the environmental movement, municipal urban 
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Figure 5.3.   Arnhem’s heat attention map (Arnhem, 2012, p. 52, my translation).
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planning, local politics, and urban meteorology. The NMU worked together with 
two other local environmental NGOs and had regular meetings with researchers at 
Wageningen University, the meteorological organisation KNMI and civil servants 
at the municipality of Utrecht. The NMU tried to involve other municipalities in 
the region, but these declined to participate in the project. The research consisted of 
three parts; a citizen science (Irwin, 1995) research project on the lived experience 
of inhabitants done by these inhabitants themselves, measurements using a mobile 
weather station and time series measurements with weather stations. Next to 
research, the project also comprised the redevelopment of three stony urban squares 
into green zones in order to demonstrate how adaptation could occur.
 Raising awareness with citizens and local politics was at the heart of every 
activity of the NGO’s project, and hence for the framing of the project’s scope. 
Negotiating the involvement of municipal planners to do a demonstration greening 
project also had a clear effect on the framing of the project. The initial policy 
document stated that air quality would also be a part of the project, because of its 
anticipated relation with warming, air quality effects and green policies. For the 
municipality this was too sensitive a political topic, as discussed in 5.3.1. Hence, 
civil servants had not much eagerness to publish quantitative reports on the positive 
effects of green policies or claims that Utrecht’s air quality would deteriorate due to 
climate change (interview, senior green officer Utrecht, 2013). The logic of the social 
world of politics put clear restrictions on the articulation of a doable project. 
Agreement was negotiated on framing the project so as to include heat only, and not 
these ‘indirect’ air quality effects. 
 The role of the scientific researchers in the project was to make measurements 
with the mobile weather station, for the project installed urban weather stations 
and doing an amateur weather project. All these activities fitted the ongoing 
practices of the newly set up urban climate group based at Wageningen University, 
as was clear from the Rotterdam and Arnhem case. The role of the KNMI was to 
make a protocol for citizen measurements, do an instruction meeting for and 
review the reports. The support of those scientific organisations is used in the 
subsidy proposal stating that a “good structure and valid execution is important 
and secured by the participation of a.o. WUR [Wageningen University, DB] and 
KNMI” (project proposal, my translation).
 However, scientific research nor policy development had a primacy in this 
project. Rather, advocacy was from the start central to the project and discussed 
with actors of involved social worlds: science and municipal urban planning 
(interview, project leader NMU, 2013). Advocacy is important for understanding 
the particular construction of knowledge in this project. For example, when 
developing a measuring route across the city had to be tailored to scientific needs to 
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make valid spatial temperature measurements (interview, urban meteorologist, 
2013), and on the other hand would open up connections to follow-up advocacy 
projects of the NMU, such as doing a secondary school education project on urban 
warming, doing the re-greening project of a warm and stony square as negotiated 
with the municipality, or coupling the lived experience of the people participating 
in the citizen science onto the map displaying the urban heat island:
I now have a proposal for two streets in Utrecht for redevelopment, fitting in his 
[Wageningen researcher, DB] cargo bike route. I have passed these on to MCU and IVN 
to assess the presence of an active resident association and the presence of a secondary 
school in the neighbourhood.
(internal memo NMU, my translation)
The NMU considered the project a big success: more volunteering citizens than the 
project could handle, both local and national media attention, a scientifically 
supported claim that Utrecht indeed had an urban heat island, together with the 
inhabitants survey indicating that citizens indeed experienced it as a problem. 
However, developing that claim involved boundary work to merge different 
rationales of social worlds together. An example of the conflicting  rationales of the 
scientists and the NMU occurred when the first cargo bike measurements were to 
be done. In the preparatory meetings, discussions among the actors involved on 
when and how to do these measurements. The actors agreed on under what weather 
conditions and during what time of the day the measurements had to be done in 
order to yield valid and comparable results to other cases. For the NMU, because of 
the importance of raising awareness, eye catching events and media campaign with 
the press and local politicians were prepared to turn the measurements into a 
focusing event. Alongside with doing cargo bike measurements, the NGO wanted 
to inform its participating citizens to start measuring the indoor temperature and 
their experience of it in order to make the connection between the urban heat 
island and the lived temperature of inhabitants of Utrecht.
 However, the 2011 summer was mild and a suitable measuring day did not 
occur for a long time. The moment a possible day occurred, scientists immediately 
started measuring without communicating that with the project members of the 
NMU. Time was limited to get their useful data. However, the NMU considered it 
a failure (interview, project leader NMU, 2013), as now the citizen measurements 
could not start at the same time and it was not possible anymore to use the cargo 
bike measurements as a media event to communicate the heat claims to a broader 
audience. The conflicting needs of the scientists (get data) and the NMU (making a 
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claim) were said to be at the root, as well as a lack of investing enough in the shared 
understanding of what were important success criteria for all parties involved. 
A year later a new round of measurements was done. 
 The result of the project were knowledge claims that Utrecht had indeed an 
heat island effect, and importantly, that many inhabitants of Utrecht thought this 
was a serious issue and greening the city could be a win-win adaptation solution 
(Berg, 2013). Success in putting the issue on the municipal policy agenda was very 
limited. In part these claims were accepted as extra arguments for the, already 
existing, municipal green plan (interview, senior green officer Utrecht, 2013). For 
another part the legitimacy of these knowledge claims were disputed by municipal 
civil servants, as they considered the claim-maker “not independent enough and 
too much focused on PR” and because “those citizens that were involved were 
already environmentalists” (interview, municipal planning officer, 2013).
5.4  Redefining Rotterdam urban heat island as an object of risk?
In 2011, the topic of urban heating became controversial in Rotterdam. The project 
received a substantial amount of (national) media attention. However, after 
publication of the summary report “heat stress in Rotterdam” (Nijhuis, 2011), some 
influential media - and a notable Dutch climate sceptic journalist - framed the issue 
as “tons for a nonsense study” (AD newspaper & Elsevier magazine). Presenting the 
results of the scientific project backfired, not only because those journalists claimed 
that the project ‘discovered’ something well known since Luke Howard, but also 
because it now imported the climate change sceptic discourse to the project. It 
triggered attacks from the opposition in the Rotterdam council, making it a 
sensitive political topic for the city’s administration. From then on, it increased the 
need “to account for why we have eight tons in this research programme. What 
does it deliver? This is a constant pressure.” (interview, theme coordinator Urban 
Climate, 2013). Next to this political pressure, the societal pressure in ‘no-nonsense 
city’ Rotterdam, strongly framed policies in terms of costs and benefits. The catch 
phrase “How much adaptation do I get for my euro?” uttered by a Rotterdam civil 
servant to the Climate Proof Cities consortium aptly illustrated that. These events 
eroded the legitimacy of the issue civil servants were working on, threatening their 
commitment.
 Here I observe a fourth moment of transformation which was about a redefinition 
of the normative elements of the phenomenon. The discussions in the media and 
council endangered the stabilisation of the issue within governance. They needed to 
be countered to avoid destabilisation, also partly because of the financial and 
emotional investments made into the object of heat stress. For the project team 
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there was one possible ally who could increase the stabilisation of the object, the 
social world of public health and the Community Health Service (GGD) Rijnmond. 
However, public health was not only an lifebuoy, it was also troublesome due to the 
possible negative image of the city. Rotterdam as a city with serious heat related 
health risks was obviously a real problem for the branding Rotterdam as an 
attractive city. Public health yielded a dilemma: framing urban warming as a health 
risk was considered unattractive, yet on the other hand “coupling the issue with 
health is necessary for legitimising the problem. […] You need the municipal health 
agency to demonstrate [the problem] and to generate a critical mass to take action.” 
(interview, project leader Heat Stress in Rotterdam, 2013).  
 Next to the negative image of the city, public health on itself was also a difficult 
issue for governance:
The problem with heat stress is that it is not very clear whether it is a problem. It gets 
warm, that is clear. It has health effects on people, also clear. But we also have people 
dying because of traffic, or obesitas. When do you put it on the political agenda?. […] An 
administrator wants to know: how many [deaths] in Rotterdam […] and how much 
worse does it get if we do nothing? 
(interview, project leader Rotterdam, 2013).
Indeed, heat was an issue for Public Health Agency Rotterdam-Rijnmond (GGD), 
who informed vulnerable people and their caretakers to take action during heat 
waves, in line with the national heat plan. The Agency considered heat important, 
demonstrated by installing a dedicated working group, but not urgent. The policy 
priorities of the Rotterdam agency are based on a standardised measure of health 
loss, Disability Adjusted Life Years, of different health risks, the degree to which the 
agency could actually achieve a result with its efforts, and the amount of public 
unrest of a theme. “We keep track of the topic for which people call or complain. 
Not that many people call about heat.” (Interview, official GGD, 2013). Still, in the 
‘Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy’ 2013, the object of urban warming got strongly 
aligned to the typical ‘vulnerability’ discourse of climate change adaptation. 
Redefining the object as a risk, did offer the opportunity to extend the issue with 
new elements, and construct associations with vulnerable groups and vulnerable 
infrastructure, as the central map from the strategy makes clear (figure 3). 
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Figure 5.4.   Heat as an object of risk (Rotterdam, 2013, pp. 64-65).
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To conclude, stabilising urban warming though the techniques of scientific objecti-
fication ran into its limits here. While connecting the object of the urban climate to 
other scientific discourses, climate change and public health, added to the 
solidification of the phenomenon as ‘real’ with multiple facets, it also opened it up 
for controversy. First, it meant articulating the project in the climate sceptic 
discourse, one very unattractive to politicians. Second, it interfered with branding 
Rotterdam as the innovative and attractive city. These controversies continually 
destabilised the issue of urban warming.
5.5  Discussing transformations
The various transformations of urban warming can be productively understood by 
relating the process of framing the issue as a tractable issue, producing knowledge 
for that issue, and stabilising both the issue and the knowledge claims as legitimate 
within their contexts. The different guises of the object as ‘urban warming’, ‘heat 
stress’, ‘urban heat islands’, ‘urban climate’ and ‘urban heat risks’, can be 
conceptualised as attempts to stabilise the phenomenon within different discourses. 
In the analysis of the construction of knowledge claims about urban warming, 
I drew on three cases in the cities of Rotterdam, Arnhem and Utrecht. By studying 
the different social worlds intersecting in the process of constructing, negotiating 
and stabilising knowledge claims about urban warming, I traced how knowledge 
claims on that issue transformed in a context of a constant threat of eroding 
legitimacy for this emerging issue of governance.
 I observed four moments of transformation in the processes of stabilising the 
issue of urban warming. The first moment was its surfacing within the Dutch 
meteorological discourse in the 1960s. Within a scientific discourse centring 
around commensurable time series data on average temperatures, urban warming 
was considered interfering noise factor for constructing reliable temperature series 
by the Dutch meteorological office. Knowledge claims focused on a particular 
reduction of the phenomenon, namely on the particular correction factor needed to 
validly correct temperature time series data for urban interference.
 The re-emergence of urban warming on the bandwagon of climate change 
adaptation in 2007 can be considered a second moment of transformation. In a 
water-dominated adaptation discourse, urban warming and its effects were 
redefined into new potential urban risks to adapt to. This offered new financial 
opportunities to enter in heat related studies. In a process of extension, the issue 
was solidified and substantiated during projects in Rotterdam and Arnhem which 
were initially dominated by scientists. Via different measuring techniques 
knowledge was produced on whether parts of the cities were indeed warmer than 
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the country side and literature studies were done compiling impacts of warming. 
The approach of scientific objectification and the engagement of scientists in the 
realm of governance naturalised important elements of the issue. However, disputes 
were not so much about whether urban warming or the urban heat island were 
matters of fact, but whether they were also matters of concern. In all three cities, 
although to different extents, the legitimacy of urban warming as a significant topic 
to work on was under pressure. In Utrecht, the claim that urban warming was a 
problem and that it had citizens experiencing it as such was disputed by municipal 
urban planning. In Rotterdam and Arnhem, the paths of transformation started to 
diverge in consequence of efforts to deal with the phenomenon in governance.
 In what I term as the third moment of transformation, efforts were done to 
develop stable couplings to other domains that could enable adaptation. The 
constellation in which the projects emerged in Arnhem and Rotterdam, as well as 
the role of scientists therein, proved important for the particular paths of 
transformation. In Arnhem, the project developed in close relation with the urban 
planning department. This led to a ‘spatialisation’ of urban warming induced by 
climate change. In a process of modification, temporal scales were transformed into 
spatial ones, and the urban heat island effect was integrated into concrete spatial 
visions (e.g. the structuurvisie). The phenomenon was extended by connecting to 
spatial recommendations. Heat was recognised by the alderman as a novelty and a 
way to improve the branding of the city, and therefore, it was not necessary in 
Arnhem to further substantiate the issue by adding ever more scientific facts to 
increase its stabilisation. Scientific knowledge was quickly being applied with the 
help of a knowledge broker. However, despite of the easy acceptance, no real impact 
has been observed in policies and measures. Knowledge claims were presented in a 
mild rhetorical packaging. The issue remained a pet project of the Alderman and a 
select group of urban visionaries. ‘Lifting’ on existing policy processes is sometimes 
advocated as an attractive governance strategy (Uittenbroek et al., 2014) vis-à-vis a 
more dedicated adaption approach. While following a technique of institutionali-
sation yielded quick acceptance within central institutions of planning here, 
without the construction of the problem as ‘urgent’ one risks constructing an issue 
no-one cares to adapt to. 
 Rotterdam’s case demonstrated a more winding road. Urban warming emerged 
in Rotterdam as an ‘extra’ topic within a wider process of developing the first 
Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy within a dedicated adaptation unit of the city. 
The phenomenon was scrutinised by scientists and policy makers in order to 
demonstrate its legitimacy as a governance problem for the city of Rotterdam. 
On the one hand this was needed to maintain working on the issue by the adaptation 
unit, on the other hand it influenced the direction of extending the issue with new 
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knowledge claims. New knowledge was produced for particular questions of policy 
fields, such as more detailed impacts, effectiveness of policies, and costs and benefits 
of measures. However, with the transformation into an issue of governance came 
the complexities and struggles inherent in governance. While the green department 
shared an interest in policies, other domains proved much more difficult to enrol. 
For example, even though the canyon effect is closely coupled to the understanding 
of the heat island, the phenomenon was reduced in Rotterdam in order not to 
interfere with the city’s skyscraper strategy. The institutionalisation of urban 
warming produced controversies with the real danger of backfiring and thus 
destabilising the issue. These problems had to be remedied through increasing the 
legitimacy of the object by associating it with accepted knowledge of stable 
institutions, such as public health. 
 In a fourth moment of transformation, attempts were made to redefine the 
normative elements of the phenomenon and to transform it into an object of risk. 
The redefinition of the issue opened up possibilities to couple new elements ‘at risk’ 
to knowledge claims, in this case current concentrations of vulnerable people and 
infrastructure visualised in a worst case climate of 2050. Naturalisation in the form 
of introducing the issue to the public realm also created turmoil, such as the 
reactions from the climate sceptic discourse. Given the fact that Rotterdam tries to 
stay among the C40 cities and the object of urban climate has to remain legitimate, 
new rounds of (de-)stabilisation are likely to occur. 
5.6  Conclusions
The construction of the phenomenon of urban warming and the production of 
knowledge claims on it can be meaningfully traced to how intersecting social 
worlds negotiated particular and temporary consensus (in the plural) on what was 
at stake and how this could be resolved. In Utrecht this led to knowledge claims 
explicitly dissociated with air quality, yet associated with lay understandings of 
why and how a warmer climate mattered. In Rotterdam it meant producing 
knowledge for adaptation options for urban greening, urban development, public 
health and labour productivity (see Buijs & Streng, 2013; Nijhuis, 2011), while in 
Arnhem knowledge was produced on regulating urban temperatures. Processes of 
co-creation between scientists and civil servants created opportunities to develop 
knowledge fitting the agendas of particular involved policy fields, yet simultaneously 
closed down other transformation pathways. The dominant Dutch discourse 
attributes urban warming to the fields of urban planning, construction and public 
health, while disregarding approaches framing it as a matter of social cohesion or 
social equity (Klinenberg, 2003; Poumadère et al., 2005) and producing new 
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knowledge along the lines of those framings. I observed innovations in knowledge 
production when the legitimacy of particular understandings and lines of work 
were challenged.
 This chapter studied the transformation of knowledge claims about climate 
change in direct relation to the formation of new stable issues of governance. In line 
with Corburn (2009), I observed how ways of governing and ways of knowing were 
co-produced. In my case of knowledge production for adaptation to urban climate 
change effects, negotiations to simultaneously stabilise the epistemic authority and 
the political relevance for the issue were the norm rather than the exception. Urban 
warming showed to be a volatile case, in which the transformations of the 
phenomenon were rapid. Even though urban planning or public health might be 
considered more or less stable institutions, the issue of urban warming itself was 
weakly institutionalised. The issue was not embedded in sets of regulations, 
standardised cognitive infrastructures to understand it, or normative structures 
stabilising legitimate ways of acting. This relative lack of a stable structure added to 
the issue’s volatility.
 As this case makes clear, the constant erosion of legitimacy for this issue as a 
matter of collective concern was important to understand the transformation of 
knowledge claims. On the one hand maintaining legitimacy for an issue was 
important to maintain productive lines of work. On the other hand, coupling the 
issue to particular elements to strengthen the issue as a relevant had consequences 
for the followed construction trajectories. In the following chapter I will explore the 
theoretical consequences of these observations for understanding knowledge 
production.
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Conclusions and general discussion
6.1  Adapting to the new demands of climate change 
Climate change is often named the wicked problem “par excellence” (Jordan et al., 
2010; Termeer et al., 2011). Because of its complexity, inherent uncertainty, political 
sensitiveness and all-pervasiveness, it is claimed, climate change presents such a 
challenge that current governance institutions and their instruments are not able to 
cope with climate change adaptation (Dovers & Hezri, 2010, p. 212; Folke et al., 
2005; Füssel, 2007, p. 268). These characteristics make climate change also a 
challenging issue for science (Beck, 2009; Kirchhoff, Lemos & Dessai, 2013). In the 
testing times for climate science (Jasanoff, 2010b) progress needs to be made in a 
context where climate science is politicised and controversies loom. While 
constructed as a global phenomenon (Miller, 2001), the impacts are felt locally. 
‘Downscaling’ global climate change to the local level is not only scientifically 
challenging (Corburn, 2009; Wilby & Wigley, 1997), but also a thorny endeavour of 
re-embedding the emerged conceptualisation of global climatic alterations in local 
systems of meaning (Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2010a). Despite the challenges climate 
change adaptation may yield, slowly but surely ever more adaptation projects are 
emerging (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011; IPCC, 2014, p. 8; Massey, Biesbroek, Huitema 
& Jordan, 2014).
 Scientific knowledge has played, and continues to play, a pivotal role in the 
discovery, explanation and solution to the challenges of climate change. At the 
same time, climate change is said to put existing science-policy interfaces under 
pressure (Kirchhoff, Lemos & Dessai, 2013; Lemos et al., 2012; Leroy et al., 2010b): 
current knowledge infrastructures are thought to be unable to deal with the wicked 
problem of climate change. Ample scientific publications (Hallegatte, 2009; Lemos 
et al., 2012; Leroy et al., 2010b; Van den Hove, 2007; Wilby & Dessai, 2010), policy 
documents (EC, 2013; VROM et al., 2007) or research programmes (Knowledge 
for Climate, 2009; Swart et al., 2014) argue that new ways to deal with scientific 
knowledge and new strategies for robust adaptation are needed. Much of the 
academic literature on the role of knowledge in adaptation has a normative and 
prescriptive character, suggesting how the extraordinary issue of climate change 
can be managed optimally. There is much less in-depth social scientific knowledge 
about the actual way in which science-policy interfaces respond to the demands of 
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climate change and how they handle the phenomenon of climate change to develop 
the claims aimed to enrich decision making, the empirical topic of this thesis.
 This thesis helps to understand how governance institutions respond to the 
new demands of climate change adaptation and the problematic role of knowledge 
in policy processes. In the climate change adaptation literature, an important 
debate centres around the issue of how governance arrangements respond to the 
new demands of climate change (Termeer et al., 2011) and whether climate change 
leads to social change in the production of knowledge as well (Leroy et al., 2010b). 
Some see (Massey & Huitema, 2013) or plea for (Folke et al., 2005; Füssel, 2007) the 
emergence of a dedicated field for adaptation, with its own goals, resources, 
methodologies, organisations and science policy relations. Others see (Berrang-Ford 
et al., 2011; Smit & Wandel, 2006) or advocate (Klein et al., 2005; Swart & Raes, 
2007) a mainstreaming approach, in which attention for climate change is 
embedded in, and lifting on, ongoing policy programmes.
 In the cases I have studied, climate change adaptation can be characterised as 
a process of incremental and stepwise mainstreaming of climate concerns into 
pre-existing policy fields. I did not observe the emergence and institutionalisation 
of a new dedicated policy domain for adaptation, nor did I see radical changes in 
the way knowledge was handled or governed in the pre-existing policy fields. 
Rather, the wicked issue of climate change was tamed and made tractable for the 
policy field in which it was mainstreamed. In my three cases, Dutch strategic 
national adaptation policy, regional water management and urban development 
policy, I observed that the phenomenon of climate change is made relevant to 
acquire meaning in that particular policy field. In the processes of knowledge 
production that emerged, particular understandings of climate change were 
attuned to the possible actions, policies or decisions for that field. Although the 
exact origins of these climate adaptation processes were hard to disentangle, often 
a political decision or a financial opportunity was at the basis of the study on 
climate change in relation to that policy field. Never was climate change the sole 
reason to engage with a project. A decision by the cabinet to study the long-term 
consequences of climate change for the Dutch coast gave the Delta Committee its 
mandate. A political decision to reassess regional flood safety in the light of climate 
change initiated the Droge Voeten 2050 project. Financial opportunity structures 
offered the possibility to study the meaning of urban warming for urban 
redevelopment.
 In the remainder of this chapter I will synthesise the findings of the previous 
chapters and present three main conclusions of my research. Each of the three 
conclusions is elaborated in its own sub-section. The central questions that guided 
my endeavour were: how are claims about the impacts of climate change constructed in 
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different policy fields, and how do knowledge claims about climate change adaptation 
transform and get stabilised in the direct relation to decision making? 
 In the following section I conclude that the conventional supply-and-demand 
model with its notion of knowledge transfer obscures the understanding of 
the processes of knowledge production for climate adaptation decision making. 
Rather, knowledge transforms in the process of mainstreaming the phenomenon 
into policy. I offer a conceptual apparatus to better understand the process of 
transformation. My second conclusion is that the transformation of knowledge in 
processes of mainstreaming comes at a cost. I will explain why transformation has 
a Janus face. While transformation brings climate change in conversation with 
localised meaning to create concrete adaptation responses, it also closes down and 
becomes blind to particular climate risks. Then I elaborate on my third conclusion 
that knowledge claims transform to fit the opportunities and demands of the 
constellation in which they are mainstreamed. Therefore, thorough attention for 
the context in which knowledge is produced, stabilised and used should be part and 
parcel of studies into effective knowledge for climate change adaptation. The final 
section reflects on the implications of my findings for the governance of knowledge 
in climate change adaptation.
6.2  Knowledge is transformed
The orthodox understanding of the role of knowledge in the policy process, as 
summarized by the IPCC, is too simplistic and obscures a thorough understanding 
of science-policy relations. In thinking in terms of a supply-and-demand model, 
science is the monopolist supplier of truth about climate change and politics the 
value-based receptor dealing with these truths. The dominant perspective is one of 
knowledge transfer, in which packages of knowledge, once produced and put ‘on 
the shelf ’ (Lemos et al., 2012), do not change when put to use in political decision 
making. Indeed, the IPCC fully recognizes the processes of brokering that are 
needed to fit scientific knowledge to the background and needs of users. Yet it 
continues to think in terms of a knowledge gap, while firmly drawing the boundary 
between science and non-science and reconfirming the image of scientists as 
monopolists on climate knowledge production. Knowledge brokers have two tasks 
in effective dialogues between science and the public:
One is to understand the range of perceptions, views, questions, needs, concerns, and 
knowledge in the public and among stakeholders about climate, climate change, and 
climate risks; the other task is to convey the content of scientific knowledge to the 
public, media, and stakeholders. This includes communicating the limitations of such 
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knowledge, the known uncertainties, and the unknowable, as well as the appropriate 
role of science in complex decision processes.
(Jones et al., 2014, p. 212)
The first conclusion of my research is that knowledge claims transform in all my 
three cases. Self sustaining knowledge claims are an exception rather than a rule. 
Facilitating their circulation requires substantial investments.  In the process of 
mainstreaming, I mostly observed deconstructing and reconstructing as the 
central practices in assembling serviceable truths. In the microprocesses of 
co-production statements from different bodies of knowledge need to be aligned, 
meaningful elements delineated, and conflicting interpretations settled. Facts and 
values merge constantly, until it becomes very difficult to disentangle what is from 
what ought (Bijker et al., 2009; Gieryn, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990; Miller, 2001; Shackley 
& Wynne, 1996). So far, this is a conclusion that remains close to what science 
studies have been claiming for quite a while. However, the idiom of co-production 
lacks a clear conceptual frame with usable concepts to analyse transformation. 
Based on the cases studied in this research, I developed a conceptual apparatus to 
understand transformation in more detail. I formulated five concepts to follow how 
knowledge claims transform: reduction, extension, rhetorical packaging, redefinition 
and modification in chapter two. The following sections elaborate on these concepts 
by drawing on my empirical observations.
 Reduction refers to the intentional or unintentional dissociation of elements 
from the construction of climate change. The potential endless elements that might 
comprise the impacts of climate change are narrowed down. Relevant is demarcated 
from irrelevant and feasible from non-feasible. An example of a process of reduction 
is the presentation of the claim on plausible upper limits of sea level rise by the 
Delta Committee. Under particular conditions, the gravitation effect was 
dissociated from the range of potential sea level rise scenarios that represent future 
climate change. Then the broad range of futures in itself disappeared when only the 
scenario of plausible upper limits was presented, for which the Committee had 
adaptive solutions. Through these steps a broad range of plausible sea level rises 
derived from a series of climate scenarios was transformed into a claim in the press 
release that “regional sea level rise of 0.65 to 1.3 m by 2100, and of  2 to 4 m by 2200 
should be taken into account. More than assumed until now.” (press release Delta 
Committee, 2008, my translation). The study into regional water management 
showed that much of the reduction actually preceded the DV2050 project. Climate 
change here was only quantitatively relevant insofar as it fitted the institutionalised 
conceptualisation of flood risk: the threshold probability that the boezem water 
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level will exceed the design high water level. Climate change was ultimately reduced 
to a single number related to the overtopping of levees. Climate impacts on drought 
or on water quality, but also on the risks a dike may fail, were not considered. In 
case of urban warming, I observed that initially in the Netherlands, instead of 
being constructed into a phenomenon in its own right, urban warming was reduced 
into an interfering factor for the construction of reliable global and regional 
temperature data sets.
 Extension is the logical opposite of reduction and refers to the process of 
coupling new elements to the construction of what climate change means for a 
policy field. A first form of extension is substantiating the constructions with more 
or other bodies of evidence. This form could be clearly observed in the urban 
warming case. Scientific objectification was pursued by coupling ever more new 
data, generated by different measuring techniques or by scholarly reviews compiling 
effects. Developing associations with public health impacts in Rotterdam or citizen 
concerns in Utrecht was to enlarge the legitimacy of the issue. I observed that by 
efforts to enrol particular policy domains to get adaptive actions implemented, 
specific knowledge about impacts, costs and policies relevant to those fields was 
coupled. Particular policies were established as natural counterparts to the issue, 
while other potential policies disregarded. A slightly different example of extension 
is broadening the problem scope. Stakeholders in the DV2050 case tried to broaden 
the problem framing to extend the variety of climate impacts on the boezem system 
to be studied, but failed. The Delta Committee broadened the meaning of the coast 
to include the entire Dutch delta, enabling the construction of advice on climate 
adaptation for the Netherlands as a whole.
 Rhetorical packaging denotes the process of clothing claims in substantial 
rhetorical justifications to strengthen the persuasive power of that claim. Examples 
of this packaging are the compelling arguments for why the claim is the most 
trustworthy while other claims are not. This could be observed in all cases. The 
DV2050 advisory report contained ample statements that its claims were, while 
possibly imperfect, the best so far, that trustworthy methods were used and reputed 
organisations were consulted. The Delta Committee also tried to make clear that it 
was not only the Committee that had an opinion, but that the Committee in fact 
spoke for a large scientific and professional community.  Rhetorical packaging also 
occurs when it is important to justify why something is identified, dissociated, and 
possibly postponed to get attention in the future. The Delta Committee is again a 
case in point here, when substantial passages, appendices and conversations were 
mobilized in order not to advice the artificial islands as a viable adaptation option. 
Also in the case of DV2050, some elements were dissociated and scheduled into the 
future. Adaptive decisions were cut up and presented in decidable units on which 
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back-stage agreement was reached by powerful actors. Examples were the question 
of whether dikes were stable to meet higher norms or what adaptive policies for the 
Lauwers Lake were needed. These reductions were then accompanied with a 
packaging that current understandings were too uncertain, more knowledge was 
needed. Follow up studies were announced.
 Redefinition refers to the process of recasting the representation of climate 
change in another category. Through redefinition the core theoretical framework 
alters, changing the web of relations between the elements of a construction. The 
sets of relevant indicators or adaptation options change. Both the case of the Delta 
Committee and of urban warming provide examples of redefinition. As chapter 
three has explained, the Delta Committee had redefined its assignment to develop 
long-term policy strategies with a range of options for the Dutch coast, into one of 
presenting a univocal climate adaptation vision guaranteeing the prosperity and 
safety of the Netherlands as a whole under the most extreme climate conditions in 
2100. This redefinition enabled the construction of both an high-end climate 
scenario, as well as a network of authoritative sources supporting it. The meaning 
of climate change adaptation for the Netherlands transformed as well through the 
subsequent institutionalisation of the Committee’s vision, one that broke with 
‘living with water’ discourses in favour of a strategy of depoliticising the issue and 
reinvigorating centralised bureaucratic decision making. The more comprehensive 
National Adaptation Strategy Adaptatie Ruimte en Klimaat (VROM et al., 2007) 
was terminated in favour of the instalment of a series of Delta Programmes, in 
which meaningful climate change impacts were narrowed into water safety and 
freshwater supply issues. In the case of urban warming several redefinitions 
followed upon one another. Around 2007, I observed how urban warming in the 
Netherland was redefined from a noise variable in the construction of credible and 
commensurable temperature data sets into a climate change phenomenon the 
Dutch might need to adapt to. Initially in a science-dominated context, scientific 
facts were gathered to substantiate a particular reality of the issue. Meanwhile, 
directions for further knowledge development were framed and particular policy 
communities were delineated as having the logical ownership of the issue. Later in 
Rotterdam, urban warming was transformed into an object of risk. The redefinition 
of the issue opened up possibilities to couple new elements ‘at risk’ to knowledge 
claims, in this case current concentrations of vulnerable people and infrastructure 
visualised in a worst case climate of 2050.
 Modification points to changes in the dimensions or in some of the parts of a 
construct. These changes may by very subtle. A first useful example is the process of 
‘spatialisation’ of climate change effects. While first, in a science-dominated 
context, measurements and analyses enabled the visualisation of urban warming as 
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an ‘urban heat island’, it was predominantly in the case of Arnhem that it became 
clear how the temporal scales of climate change were modified into spatial ones. 
The urban heat island could be integrated in the map-based spatial visions, 
connected to concrete spatial recommendations. Through a process of modification, 
the idea of  warmer urban areas over time transformed in favour of a locally spatially 
differentiated understanding of whether, for example, the shopping centre was 
currently warmer than a post-war residential area. The problem of warmer urban 
areas in the future transformed into a here-and-now problem. In the regional water 
management case, I observed that climate change was tamed and reduced into a 
non-interfering factor for current flood risk assessment practices. However, due to 
tinkering about climate change, I also observed a process of modification. The 
concept of future climate change functioned as a lens through which the past got 
reinterpreted. Knowledge claims about the current chance of occurrence of water 
levels transformed, as these were now constructed with data sets corrected for past 
sea level rise and a factor covering the coincidence of storm tides with heavy 
precipitation. The latter was a topic emerging in the scientific community on 
climate change. A project of KNMI, Deltares and Noorderzijlvest was to delve into 
the question of whether climate change would yield more north-westerly storms 
with heavy precipitation. 
 Taken together, in these processes of knowledge production, the wickedness of 
climate change impacts is tamed and transformed into what climate change is for a 
particular policy field and how that field should act upon that understanding on the 
collective’s behalf. The concepts I presented here are interrelated. For example, a 
redefinition is needed to allow a subsequent process of extension of new elements. 
A reduction might require substantial rhetorical packaging in order to shield a 
claim from critiques. Also, extending a construction with new facts or associating 
authoritative sources to support a particular transformation can lend a construction 
credibility.
 The stability of transformations is a temporary achievement. Knowledge claims 
can become controversial, in spite of careful work to shield them. The legitimacy 
and performativity of a claim erodes when elements of the claim become 
controversial. I observed in the cases on the Delta Committee and on urban 
warming how a transformation came under attack and support got withdrawn. The 
extreme scenario became controversial after the Committee’s report was published. 
In that debate, members of the commissioned high-end report were critical, 
blaming Veerman of overstepping the negotiated boundaries. While Committee 
members tried to publicly repair the controversy, several contributors to the 
high-end study publicly withdrew support that far-reaching policy interventions 
were needed given their current understanding of climate change. Facing increased 
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climate scepticism and a changed political constellation, the Delta Programme 
announced not to base itself on any extreme scenario, but the KNMI scenarios 
instead. In Rotterdam the urban warming issue became controversial when 
national media attention framed the issue as “tons for a nonsense study” and the 
climate change sceptic discourse was imported to the project. It triggered attacks 
from the opposition in the Rotterdam council, making it a sensitive political topic 
for the city’s administration. The pressure to demonstrate what a study on urban 
warming would deliver increased. The erosion of legitimacy of constructed claims 
initiated new moments of transformation.
6.3  Transformation comes at a cost
In the process of transformation, climate change is made meaningful for the 
collective concerns of pre-existing policy fields in which it is mainstreamed. While 
climate change may be all-pervasive, complex or deeply uncertain, bringing climate 
change under control of a policy field requires transforming the phenomenon into 
something tractable. As Scott (1998) has cogently argued, the simplification and 
standardization of nature or society into legible and conveniently administrable 
formats is the central problem for both governing and statecraft. The narrowing of 
vision brings certain elements of climate change into sharp focus, while rendering 
careful measuring, monitoring and manipulation possible. The downside of 
transformation is the partial blindness for elements not in the vision. Some aspects 
remain unexplored, intentionally or unintentionally. Hence, the second conclusion 
of my research is that the transformation of climate change into meaningful 
impacts comes at a cost.
 The previous section explained how, in the case of the Delta Committee, climate 
change was transformed into knowledge claims on a viable water safety strategy 
under worst-case conditions and plausible upper limits. On the one hand, the 
Dutch climate adaptation policy agenda transformed from a more comprehensive 
one, into one dominated by flood and drought safety to be explored further in the 
Delta Programmes. On the other hand, to cope with extreme climate change, the 
Committee deemed institutional reorganisation necessary, granting a bureaucratic 
organisation the task of developing national adaptation policy at a distance from 
the budgetary and political cycle. The combination of the two yielded a pooling of 
financial and administrative resources around a very particular understanding of 
what climate change means for the Netherlands: a water risk.
 While the merits of this transformation may be hailed because of the in-depth 
understanding of climate change effects on the Dutch water sector and because of 
the innovative ways to adapt, this Dutch strategy was also severely criticised by the 
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Dutch Court of Audit (The Netherlands Court of Audit, 2012, pp. 33-34). The 
Netherlands Court of Audit claimed that the state remained blind for various risks 
of climate change, leaving out the (scientific) understanding of climate change for 
public health, energy and transportation networks, and recreation. In a follow-up 
on the report, the state secretary announced in the 2013 Climate Agenda (I&M, 
2013) to broaden the scope of adaptation as well as the initiation of a series of risk 
assessments into these other climate change effects. 
 In the case of regional water management, assessing the impacts of climate 
change on the water system ultimately meant a transformation of climate change 
into a single numerical value. The assessment boiled down to answering the 
question with how many extra centimetres the peak water levels would rise under 
conditions of climate change. If the peak water level threshold was exceeded, 
policies were needed, otherwise nothing needed to be done. In the process of 
tinkering with climatic changes, the process of probabilistic assessment improved. 
By correcting some of the stochastic variables for observed climate changes in the 
past and by exploring how stochastic variables were correlated, it was thought that 
the hydrological models were now better able to mirror the natural processes of the 
boezem system.
 However, the only meaningful quantitative impacts of climate change under 
consideration were those that were thought to have effects on dike overtopping. 
Other potential climate effects on flood risks, e.g. the increased probability of dike 
saturation or instability because of droughts, were excluded and assumed constant. 
Hence, DV2050 remained blind for some of the climate effects on the flood risk. 
Furthermore, I observed how potential climate effects other than flood risks, e.g. on 
droughts, on summer flash floods or on water quality, were disregarded in the scope 
of the DV2050 project. Various stakeholders raised these concerns. With the 
argumentation that those effects were to be addressed in other projects, the DV2050 
project invested its time and resources only in calculating one specific effect of 
climate change. While one may claim that some other meaningful effects of climate 
change on the water system remained unknown, such transformations may also 
obscure the production of knowledge on adaptation policies that address the 
consequences of climate change in a more integral manner.
 The story on urban warming allowed insights into how processes of co-creation 
between scientists, civil servants, politicians, knowledge brokers, NGO lobbyists 
and citizens evolved. These co-creation projects created opportunities to develop 
knowledge fitting the agendas of involved social worlds, but simultaneously closed 
down particular understandings of climate change impacts. I observed transforma-
tions of urban warming to meet the restrictions of social worlds on the one hand, 
while trying to interest them to invest in the phenomenon on the other. For example, 
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in Utrecht this meant dissociating urban warming from air quality effects and in 
Rotterdam from the sky view factor. No knowledge was produced on how urban 
warming and air quality were interrelated for Utrecht or how Rotterdam’s high rise 
building strategy would affect the warming of the city.
 In the same vein, redefining the phenomenon as a health risk or as a ‘liveability’ 
matter affects the production of knowledge and defines the options for action. The 
former favours producing knowledge on better care for hospitalised or elderly in 
nursing homes during heat waves, while I showed that the latter promoted the 
development of knowledge to strengthen the planner’s grip on the urban thermostat. 
In the Dutch discourse, urban warming has transformed into an issue for urban 
planning, construction and public health. As such, this vision remains blind for 
approaches framing it as a matter of social cohesion (Klinenberg, 2003) or social 
equity (Poumadère et al., 2005). This obscures the production of knowledge on 
particular ways to increase the resilience of the population, for example by 
strengthening social capital.
 In conclusion, transformation has a Janus face. On the one hand, it is through 
the process of transformation that the abstract scientific construct of global climate 
change gains meaning by embedding the phenomenon in local conditions and 
practices, as well as in normative desires and ideas on meaningful impacts. Thus, 
transformation aids the understanding of how scientific knowledge on climate 
change is brought in conversation with localised meaning in order to ‘work’ for 
concrete adaptation responses (Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2010a). Transformation 
opens up new understandings in societies’ engagement with its environment. On 
the other hand, it is through the process of transformation that choices are made to 
invest resources to develop knowledge on about particular climate questions, while 
leaving others unexplored. Transformation also closes down. Transformation 
illuminates the process of what Rayner (2012) terms “the social construction of 
ignorance”, the implicit yet systematic exclusion of particular questions or knowledges 
from a discourse. In a context of a limited budget, restricted administrative capacity 
and bounded cognitive possibilities, reduction is inevitable. Still, the cost of 
blindness for particular climate effects may be maladaptation. 
6.4  Transformation is affected by the policy field 
The third and final conclusion of this dissertation is that in the process of taming 
climate change and mainstreaming it in a policy domain, knowledge claims 
transform because of a tailoring process to fit the opportunities and demands of the 
policy field. In the same process, the issues of governance and the way of governing 
change. The transformation of knowledge can thus be understood as attempts to 
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stabilise support for claims within the requirements of the involved social worlds. 
When constructing meaningful knowledge about climate change for a particular 
policy domain, I have argued that it is fruitful to first consider how issues are 
framed. Second, I followed how claims are assembled by bringing together the 
elements that contribute to the problem at hand. Third, I studied how the legitimacy 
of constructions needs to be stabilised within the set of legitimacy criteria of social 
worlds. By studying these three activities, I could observe how the actors involved 
in the transformation processes anticipated on what qualities a knowledge claim 
should have to be effective. These observations are in line with the academic 
literature (Bijker et al., 2009; Cash et al., 2003; Guston, 2000; Jasanoff, 1990; Lentsch 
& Weingart, 2011a; Star & Griesemer, 1989) that insist that knowledge claims 
become stable when these claims, and the processes within which they are 
constructed, have the support of and are responsive to various relevant worlds 
involved. A claim needed to be simultaneously useful in the process of policy- 
development, needed expert support to back its authority, and needed to be 
politically and legally acceptable to base collectively binding decisions on. 
 In all my cases I, could observe how transformations were tailored to the needs 
and constraints of specific policy fields. The case of the Delta Committee showed 
the importance of the practices of external positioning of the Committee’s advice 
vis-à-vis the ideas of various political organs, policy-makers in ministerial 
departments, the water industry, representative groups from civil society and the 
important knowledge institutes. In a constant exchange process, the Committee 
had to become sensitive to scientific and political no-go areas, had to collect 
dominant ideas and studies to relate to, and had to gradually built support for its 
ideas. The example of the artificial islands made clear how the Committee had to be 
responsive for dominant ideas that had political supporters and had to invest 
substantial effort in order to disregard artificial islands in favour of beach 
nourishments. The case of climate scenarios made clear that using an extreme 
representation of climate change required the construction of an alternative 
scientifically credible scenario and positioning that as a plausible one next to the 
dominant set of climate projections by the KNMI. 
 On the one hand, positioning meant transforming knowledge claims 
substantially to the agendas of policy-makers, the dominant narratives in Dutch 
water management and earlier advice produced. On the other hand, positioning 
meant negotiating the substance of the report with powerful actors in order to enrol 
them to support the Committee’s vision. This enabled the Committee to credibly 
speak for a network of important actors. These actors comprised both politicians 
and policy-makers that were to accept the claims as useful, and the climate change, 
engineering, juridical experts that were to certify the claims as credible. For 
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example, the Veerman Committee assessed that, in order to advise politics 
effectively and acceptably, the Committee’s vision was to be univocal, not too 
complicated and with some limited room to bargain. For policy-makers “one 
should not come up with rock-hard solutions” (Veerman cited in Anonymous, 
2008b, my translation), but rather offer an institutional infrastructure and an 
agenda with themes the departments would find important and could work with 
later on. At the same time, I observed how the Committee had to carefully negotiate 
with climate scientists under which conditions it could present a scientifically 
supported worst case scenario to make the convincing case that institutional 
reorganisation was needed in the face of climate change.
 This relationship between positioning and transformation could also be 
observed in the case of regional water management. Climate change was 
transformed in order to fit the hydrological assessment machinery. In a context of a 
strongly institutionalised science-policy interface, recognised interdependencies 
among powerful actors, a struggle over decision competencies, and the pressure of 
imminent decision making, transformation here predominantly meant reduction 
and, within a strictly demarcated frame, extension. Much of the transformations of 
climate change actually preceded the DV2050 project and are sedimented in the 
institutions of the field. First, the relevant effects of climate change in this project 
were influenced by the fragmented bureaucratic institutionalization of water 
management and the agreements to retest regional flood norms. Second, the effects 
to be quantified in the DV2050 project were closely related to the obligations 
stipulated in the Water Act to assess the threshold probabilities. Third, a particular 
way of assessing climate risks was facilitated by an infrastructure of knowledge 
institutes, assessment guidelines, standardised statistical climate data for 
assessment purposes and computer models.
 The institutions of regional water management gave a lot of stability and 
certainty to the process of constructing knowledge claims. The institutions in water 
management had relatively hardened:  regulations were clear and formalised in 
laws, a cognitive infrastructure had materialised and there was substantial 
normative agreement over the current constellation of rules, roles and tasks. I 
observed that, on the one hand, the experience of actors working within these 
patterns provided them with relative certainty on important interdependencies and 
who to bargain with, what the consensus was on the current credible way of 
assessing, and when the construction of facts would be ruled legitimate by the 
Council of State. On the other hand, regional water management was also 
characterised by a substantial degree of rigidity. The obligations specified for the 
practice of flood risk assessment and the context of imminent decision making 
delimited the possibilities for directing resources to experimentation. The creation 
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of a hydrological assessment machinery enabled the production of particular 
answers, but remained blind some climate risks. Modifications through the lens of 
climate change, in this case the entrance of a coincidence factor and the correction 
of stochastic variables for past sea level rise, reconfirm the cognitive path 
dependency of this field towards an ever better prediction of threshold probabilities. 
In the case of urban warming, I observed how the transformation of claims about 
climate change related to the formation of new stable issues of governance. The 
question of whether urban warming was a legitimate subject to be addressed by 
public policy and, if so, which actors were to address it was indeterminate. Urban 
warming showed to be a much more volatile case than the regional water 
management case, and transformations of the phenomenon followed rapidly upon 
one another. Even though urban planning or public health might be considered 
more or less stable institutions, urban warming itself was weakly institutionalised. 
The issue was not embedded in sets of regulations, standardised cognitive infra-
structures to understand it, or normative structures stabilising legitimate ways of 
acting. Yet, financial means were available to explore ‘new’ risks of climate change. 
This relative lack of stable institutions to address the issue added to its volatility. 
I observed how initially science was dominant in framing the emerging issue of 
urban adaptation to heat. Via different pre-existing scientific methods and 
techniques, science could work on proving the existence of the phenomenon as an 
‘urban heat island’, making it more real through a topological representation.
 However, science did not specify why urban warming was a matter of public 
concern and hence one of collective governance. The constant erosion of legitimacy 
for this issue as a matter of collective concern, and the ongoing efforts to define it as 
such, were important to understand the transformation of knowledge claims on 
urban warming. The issue transformed by demonstrating the relevance of urban 
warming for policy fields such as public health, urban planning, city branding, or 
urban greening. In the process of demonstrating the relevance of the issue, 
particular information or implementable adaptive measures were developed 
anticipating on the needs of these policy fields. These policy fields demanded 
different types of knowledge on the phenomenon. For example, in the city of 
Arnhem I observed the transformative effects of integrating urban warming in the 
process of developing a comprehensive spatial vision for the city.
 The political support for climate adaptation as an urban branding strategy 
yielded a dilemma. To keep working on urban warming, maintaining legitimacy 
for the issue was important for the groups that worked on the topic. Negative 
consequences for the population’s health, labour productivity and urban 
infrastructure were potential arguments to strengthen the legitimacy of the issue. 
However, associating urban warming to health risks made the city look unattractive 
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and hence interfered with urban branding strategies. While scientific objectifica-
tion was pursued in the Dutch story on urban warming to varying degrees, it never 
was a sufficient condition for its acceptance as an issue of governance. The 
transformation of urban warming into something problematic and addressable by 
policy made it an issue of governance, and was necessary to mobilise the response 
by societal actors. Still, in neither urban warming case did the phenomenon 
stabilise as on issue perceived by many actors as worth adapting to. New rounds of 
destabilisation and transformation are likely to occur.
 What these three cases make clear, is that the transformation of climate change 
is affected by the goals and institutionalised preoccupations of pre-existing policy 
fields. In spatial planning, climate change is to be ‘spatialised’ to have spatial 
relevance and in quantitative flood risk assessment climate effects need to be 
‘probabilitised’. In advising strategic national policy to the Cabinet, the Delta 
Committee based its case for institutional reorganisation on a single plausible 
climatic future. The answer on the question “does climate change need probabilities?” 
(Dessai & Hulme, 2004) depends thus on the institutionalised practices of particular 
policy fields. 
 My cases differed to the extent to which stabilised and codified relations 
between science and policy had been formed in the policy field in which climate 
change is mainstreamed. What the criteria of ‘valid’ knowledge on climate risks 
are, is the result of a learning process of a policy field and of materialization in 
procedures. The formation of an infrastructure of tools, certified numbers and 
guidelines in regional water management facilitated the rapid transformation of 
climate change into useful knowledge claims fit for decision making. Such an 
infrastructure had not materialised for urban warming risks. In the former case, 
the strong institutionalisation of the definition of what matters for the policy field 
made redefinition difficult. In the case of urban warming there was more room for 
volatility and it was exactly establishing why the phenomenon mattered that 
influenced rounds of transformation. In the case of the Delta Committee, the status 
of an ad hoc advisory organ at some distance of the departments enabled space for 
redefining the meaning of climate change for the Netherlands. Still, the Committee 
had to carefully position its advice in the historically grown constellation of 
political interests, national expert institutes and dominant ideas.
 On a more abstract level, the conclusion can be drawn that to understand the 
usefulness of knowledge for climate adaptation it is not enough to study the claims 
themselves. Never was the claim made that the knowledge produced was absolute 
and certain. Rather, the knowledge claims, i.e. the model outcomes, predictions, 
imaginaries, scenarios, etc., were presented as persuasive and legitimate proxies of 
climate change, serviceable for acting in an uncertain world. This means that there 
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is a need for research to not only focus the knowledge claims themselves, but also 
the context within which the production, legitimisation and use of a claim is 
situated (Clarke, 2005; Fujimura, 1992; Jasanoff, 2004). It is within this context that 
one finds the enmeshing of what is and what ought that makes climate change a 
meaningful phenomenon to engage with.
 Following Miller (2001), I found that it is not productive to overhomogenise 
this context in the two-world metaphor of science and politics. For ‘science’, I showed 
that e.g. climate and engineering science are not self-evidently connected and may 
have different norms and rationalities. The climate scenarios, without probabilities, 
are not coupled to probabilistic hydrological models without substantial effort. 
Under the heading of ‘politics’, I found different domains of policy that put different 
demands on knowledge when taming and integrating climate change in pre-existing 
policy programmes and operating procedures. Also, legal requirements are different 
from political requirements on policies. To get legal support for claims, construction 
processes had to follow requirements that are to guarantee that assessments were 
legally sound. Recruiting political support required transforming claims to meet 
the agendas of influential actors. Keeping the multiplicity of audiences in play 
enables a sharper understanding of why particular transformations occur and what 
requirements useful knowledge has to live up to.
6.5  Reflections for policy 
According to the 2007 Dutch National Programme for Spatial Adaptation to Climate 
Change (VROM et al., 2007), all planning and design should be done on the basis of 
scientific insights of future climatic changes (p. 26). This requires “increasing 
knowledge about climate developments in the Netherlands, especially more 
certainty on the speed and magnitude, as well as the translation into the physical 
and social consequences on the local level” (p. 35, my translation, emphasis added). 
However, a knowledge push strategy of solely filling a reservoir with adaptation 
knowledge is not sufficient for climate adaptation action. According to the authors 
of the adaptation strategy, a more “demand-based” knowledge development is 
needed in the future. The strategy was aimed at cooperation between government, 
knowledge institutes, industry and societal organisations. The 2013 climate agenda 
reconfirms that the cabinet aims to build on a cooperative knowledge infrastructure 
(I&M, 2013, p. 30).
 This thesis has argued that, on close empirical inspection, knowledge does not 
travel freely and unaltered from a scientific inventory to a climate adaptation 
decision. Rather, through a process of deconstruction and reconstruction, knowledge 
about climate change transforms in order to meet the demands of policy fields that 
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take up the issue of adaptation. In all my cases, knowledge development was already 
‘demand-based’, making that plea sound somewhat of a platitude. Still, it is exactly 
through the engagement of scientific knowledge with such concerns that meaningful 
impacts are constructed, fit for the problems a policy domain faces. Only when the 
abstract phenomenon of climate change transforms into contextually meaningful 
knowledge, it can mobilise effective adaptive action. The perspective of transformation 
may help to render the processes of creating relevant climate change adaptation 
knowledge more transparent. Furthermore, the perspective of transformation 
offers reflections for the governance of knowledge for climate adaptation, and 
especially for the debate on whether effective climate change adaptation is best 
served with a mainstreaming or a dedicated approach (Klein et al., 2005; Kok & De 
Coninck, 2007; Massey & Huitema, 2013; Swart & Raes, 2007; The Netherlands 
Court of Audit, 2012; Uittenbroek et al., 2014).
 The current adaptation policy strategy in the Netherlands and in Europe is 
aimed at an incremental and stepwise processes of mainstreaming. This approach 
can be characterised as one of offering incentives for voluntary adaptation. First, 
one can see a set of instruments aimed at communicating knowledge and raising 
awareness for the need to adapt. Some examples are the Platform on Climate 
Change Communication, the inventories compiled by the knowledge institutes, the 
brochures on climate scenarios or campaigns that the Dutch have to ‘live with 
water’. Second, the mainstreaming strategy has yielded various collaborative 
governance structures where actors work on climate adaptation on a voluntary 
basis. For example, the Delta Programme on urban redevelopment offered tools to 
make a climate risk assessment, to collaboratively set ambitions, and to translate 
ambitions into policies for urban actors to use. Knowledge co-creation trajectories 
proliferated. The large Dutch research programmes are a case in point, and so are 
the initiatives by the KNMI to engage more with users of climate knowledge. The 
agenda of climate knowledge production is thus deliberately shaped by sectoral 
demands. Third, the use of financial incentives is part of this strategy. The Dutch 
strategy aims at persuading actors to incorporate climate concerns in ongoing 
affairs, by pooling resources in policy-oriented Knowledge for Climate hot spots or 
by integrating climate demands in financial investment programmes. Also in the 
EU Climate Adaptation Strategy (EC, 2013) the five European Structural and 
Investment Funds are used to mainstream adaptation throughout the EU’s sectoral 
policies.
 A mainstreaming strategy could yield a rich patchwork of adaptive initiatives 
with faster acceptance of climate concerns and better attuned knowledge to local 
needs. Filling a reservoir with one size-fits-all risk analyses is not useful when 
dealing with complex local problems. Making adaptations mandatory in a top 
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down way may overburden the state with new tasks and could interfere with 
principles of subsidiarity and local autonomy. However, I have argued that 
knowledge constructed in processes of mainstreaming comes with the downside of 
blindness for some of the risks of climate change. Because of the dominant 
perspectives in a policy field and the institutionalisation of particular operating 
procedures, mainstreaming also leads to cognitive path dependency. The 
understanding of particular risks fuels the demand to invest in more knowledge to 
alleviate these risks. However, the mainstreaming approach has no good answer to 
the question of how to organize knowledge production for problems that have no 
clear owner who can influence ‘demand-based’ knowledge production. Also, as I 
have observed in all my cases, the mainstreaming approach does not do a very good 
job in making transparent whose interests are served when knowledge agendas are 
set and why particular risks are left out of the scope. 
 To overcome the problems of blindness and to make the process more 
transparent, an alternative strategy could be a more dedicated one that makes use 
of binding regulation. As the Dutch adaptation strategy observed (VROM et al., 
2007, p. 35) there was no regulative instrumentarium for climate adaptation except 
for flood risk management. Almost a decade later, the formal institutionalisation of 
climate concerns into guidelines and regulations has made limited progress. As the 
case on regional flood risk management made clear, the binding agreements to 
periodically reassess flood safety yielded a rapid uptake of the anticipation of 
climate effects. Integrating an exercise on climate impact foresight in the obligatory 
processes of doing Environmental Impact Assessments might be a first step to 
broaden the set of climate concerns on the policy agenda. For more radical changes 
inspiration could, for example, be found in the British Climate Change Act, which 
stipulates requirements about making climate change risk assessments and 
formulating adaptive responses. By making a periodical reassessment of the 
consequences of climate change for vulnerable sectors mandatory, and by setting 
up an expert organisation to review these assessments on robustness, a more 
comprehensive set of future risks may come into play. Checks and balances on the 
process of transformation could be strengthened by opening up the scope of climate 
risk assessments for broader participation. Disclosing these reports to civil society 
may open up the debate of how climate risks matter and whether and why these 
risks require collective effort. To break open cognitive path dependencies, more 
institutional change is necessary than the piggy-back approach of mainstreaming 
entails. Hence, adaptation requires more adaptation than the success stories of 
mainstreaming suggest.

169
References
Adger, W. N., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D., Naess, L., Wolf, J., & 
Wreford, A. (2009). Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Climatic Change, 
93(3-4), 335-354. 
Anonymous. (1999a, 6 January). Miljoenenclaim Gasunie op de staat, Trouw. 
Anonymous. (1999b, 25 january). Spoorlijn door Tussenklappenpolder weer in gebruik, ANP. 
Anonymous. (2008a). KNMI: nuance ontbreekt in plan Deltacommissie. NRC Handelsblad (11 December 
2008). 
Anonymous. (2008b, 6 November). Veerman: ‘We wilden het dit keer anders doen dan eerdere commissies’, 
WaterForum Online. 
Argyris, C. (2004). Reasons and Rationalizations: The Limits to Organizational Knowledge. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1989). Participatory action research and action science compared: A 
commentary. American Behavioral Scientist, 32(5), 612-623. 
Arnhem. (2012). Structuurvisie Arnhem 2020 l doorkijk 2040. Arnhem: Municipality of Arnhem.
Barkhuysen, T., Damen, L. J. A., De Graaf, K. J., Marseille, A. T., Den Ouden, W., Schuurmans, Y. E., & 
Tollenaar, A. (2007). Feitenvaststelling in beroep. Den Haag: Boom juridische uitgevers.
Barnes, J., Dove, M., Lahsen, M., Mathews, A., McElwee, P., McIntosh, R., Moore, F., O’Reilly, J., Orlove, 
B., Puri, R., Weiss, H., & Yager, K. (2013). Contribution of anthropology to the study of climate 
change. [Perspective]. Nature Clim. Change, 3(6), 541-544. 
Beck, U. (2009). World at risk. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Berg, P. (2013). Samenvatting resultaten onderzoeken Hitte in de stad in de provincie Utrecht. Utrecht: 
Natuur en Milieufederatie Utrecht.
Berrang-Ford, L., Ford, J., Lesnikowski, A., Poutiainen, C., Barrera, M., & Heymann, S. J. (2014). What 
drives national adaptation? A global assessment. Climatic Change, 124(1-2), 441-450. 
Berrang-Ford, L., Ford, J. D., & Paterson, J. (2011). Are we adapting to climate change? Global 
Environmental Change, 21(1), 25-33. 
Biesbroek, G. R. (2014). Challenging barriers in the governance of climate change adaptation. Wageningen: 
Wageningen University.
Biesbroek, G. R., Swart, R. J., Carter, T. R., Cowan, C., Henrichs, T., Mela, H., Morecroft, M. D., & Rey, 
D. (2010). Europe adapts to climate change: Comparing National Adaptation Strategies. Global 
Environmental Change, 20(3), 440-450. 
Biesbroek, G. R., Termeer, C. J. A. M., Klostermann, J. E. M., & Kabat, P. (2014). Rethinking barriers to 
adaptation: Mechanism-based explanation of impasses in the governance of an innovative 
adaptation measure. Global Environmental Change, 26(0), 108-118. 
Bijker, W. E. (2007). American and Dutch Coastal Engineering: Differences in Risk Conception and 
Differences in Technological Culture. Social Studies of Science, 37(1), 143-151. 
Bijker, W. E., Bal, R., & Hendriks, R. (2009). The paradox of scientific authority: the role of scientific advice 
in democracies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boezeman, D., Ganzevoort, W., Van Lier, M., & Louwers, P. (2014). De klimaatbestendige stad. Adaptatie-
strategieën van Europese koplopers. Geografie, 23(2), 30-34. 
Boezeman, D., & Kooij, H. J. (2015). Heated Debates: The Transformation of Urban Warming into an 
Object of Governance in the Netherlands. In R. Beunen, K. Van Assche & M. Duineveld (Eds.), 
Evolutionary Governance Theory: Theory and Applications (pp. 185-203). New York: Springer.
170
REFERENCES
Boezeman, D., Vink, M., & Leroy, P. (2013). The Dutch Delta Committee as a boundary organisation. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 27, 162-171. 
Boezeman, D., Vink, M., & Leroy, P. (2015). Understanding institutionalized ways of knowing climate 
risks: reflections on action research for participatory knowledge production. In A. Van Buuren, J. 
Eshuis & M. Van Vliet (Eds.), Action Research for Climate Change Adaptation: Developing and 
Applying Knowledge for Governance (pp. 76-93). London: Routledge.
Boezeman, D., Vink, M., Leroy, P., & Halffman, W. (2014). Participation under a spell of instrumental-
ization? Reflections on action research in an entrenched climate adaptation policy process. Critical 
Policy Studies, 8(4), 407-426. 
Bos, S., Van Veen, J. W., Kamkuiper, S., & Groen, M. (2014). PlanMER Droge Voeten 2050 voor het 
beheergebied van het Waterschap Noorderzijlvest. Deventer: Royal HaskoningDHV.
Bourblanc, M., Crabbé, A., Liefferink, D., & Wiering, M. (2013). The marathon of the hare and the 
tortoise: Implementing the EU Water Framework Directive. Journal of Environmental Planning 
and Management, 56(10), 1449-1467. 
Boykoff, M. T., & Boykoff, J. M. (2004). Balance as bias: global warming and the US prestige press. Global 
Environmental Change, 14(2), 125-136. 
Brandsma, T., Können, G. P., & Wessels, H. R. A. (2003). Empirical estimation of the effect of urban heat 
advection on the temperature series of De Bilt (The Netherlands). International Journal of 
Climatology, 23(7), 829-845. 
Brandsma, T., & Wolters, D. (2012). Measurement and Statistical Modeling of the Urban Heat Island of 
the City of Utrecht (the Netherlands). Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology, 51(6). 
Buijs, S., & Streng, J. (2013). Rotterdamse adaptatiestrategie. Themarapport stadsklimaat. Rotterdam: 
Rotterdam Climate Initiative.
Bulkeley, H. (2013). Cities and climate change. London: Routledge.
Burghardt, R., Katzschner, L., Kupski, S., Ren, C., & Spit, T. (2010). Urban Climatic Map of Arnhem City. 
Arnhem: Future Cities.
Burkunk, R. (2012). Project Droge Voeten 2050. Province of Groningen: NR.: 2012-14.383/13, LGW.
Callon, M. (1986). Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In J. Law (Ed.), Power, action and belief: A new sociology of knowledge? 
(pp. 196-233). London: Routledge.
Caplan, N. (1979). The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 22(3), 459-470. 
Carter, J. G. (2011). Climate change adaptation in European cities. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability, 3(3), 193-198. 
Cash, D., Clark, W., Alcock, F., Dickson, N., Eckley, N., Guston, D., Jäger, J., & Mitchell, R. (2003). 
Knowledge systems for sustainable development. PNAS, 100(14), 8086-8091. 
Chilvers, J. (2013). Reflexive Engagement? Actors, Learning, and Reflexivity in Public Dialogue on 
Science and Technology. Science Communication, 35(3), 283-310. 
Clark, W. C., Tomich, T. P., van Noordwijk, M., Guston, D., Catacutan, D., Dickson, N. M., & McNie, E. 
(2011). Boundary work for sustainable development: Natural resource management at the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). PNAS. 
Clarke, A. (1997). A social worlds research adventure: the case of reproductive science. In A. Strauss & J. 
Corbin (Eds.), Grounded theory in practice (pp. 63-94). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Clarke, A. (2005). Situational analysis: grounded theory after the postmodern turn. Thousand Oakes: 
SAGE.
Clarke, A., & Star, S. L. (2008). The social worlds framework: A theory/methods package. In E. J. Hackett, 
O. Amsterdamska, M. Lynch & J. Wajcman (Eds.), The Handbook of Science & Technology Studies 
(3 ed., pp. 113-137). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Coalities Klimaatbestendige Stad. (2013). Manifest Klimaatbetstendige Stad. The Hague: Deelprogramma 
Nieuwbouw en Herstructurering.
171
REFERENCES
Collingridge, D., & Reeve, C. (1986). Science speaks to power: the role of experts in policy making: Pinter 
London.
Conrads, L. A. (1975). Observations of Meteorological Urban Effects: The Heat Island of Utrecht. Utrecht: 
Utrecht University.
Conrads, L. A., & Van Der Hage, J. C. H. (1971). A new method of air-temperature measurement in 
urban climatological studies. Atmospheric Environment (1967), 5(8), 629-635. 
Corburn, J. (2009). Cities, Climate Change and Urban Heat Island Mitigation: Localising Global 
Environmental Science. Urban Studies, 46(2), 413-427. 
Daanen, H., Simons, M., & Janssen, S. (2010). De invloed van hitte op de gezondheid, toegespitst op de 
stad Rotterdam. Utrecht: TNO.
De Boer, J., Wardekker, J. A., & Van der Sluijs, J. P. (2010). Frame-based guide to situated decision-mak-
ing on climate change. Global Environmental Change, 20(3), 502-510. 
De Vries, J., & Wolsink, M. (2009). Making Space for Water: Spatial Planning and Water Management in 
the Netherlands. In S. Davoudi, J. Crawford & A. Mehmood (Eds.), Planning for Climate Change. 
Strategies for Mitigation and Adaptation for Spatial Planners (pp. 191–204). London: Earthscan.
De Weme, A., Boer, J., Bosch, S., & De Hulster, N. (2014). Maatregelenstudie Droge Voeten 2050. 
Waterschap Noorderzijlvest. Apeldoorn: Arcadis.
Deltacommissie. (2008). Working together with water: a living land builds for its future. Findings of the 
Deltacommissie. Rotterdam: Deltacommissie.
Den Exter, R., Lenhart, J., & Kern, K. (2014). Governing climate change in Dutch cities: anchoring local 
climate strategies in organisation, policy and practical implementation. Local Environment, 1-19. 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). The Sage handbook of qualitative research: Sage.
Dessai, S., & Hulme, M. (2004). Does climate adaptation policy need probabilities? Climate Policy, 4(2), 
107-128. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. 
Disco, C. (2002). Remaking “Nature”: The Ecological Turn in Dutch Water Management. Science, 
Technology & Human Values, 27(2), 206-235. 
Döpp, S. (Ed.). (2011). Kennismontage Hitte en Klimaat in de stad. Utrecht: Climate Proof Cities 
Consortium.
Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1983). Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technological and 
environmental dangers. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Dovers, S. R., & Hezri, A. A. (2010). Institutions and policy processes: the means to the ends of 
adaptation. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(2), 212-231. 
Dunn, W. N. (1980). The Two-Communities Metaphor and Models of Knowledge Use: An Exploratory 
Case Survey. Science Communication, 1(4), 515-536. 
EC. (2009). White paper - Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action. 
Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
EC. (2013). An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change.
Edelenbos, J., van Buuren, A., & van Schie, N. (2011). Co-producing knowledge: joint knowledge 
production between experts, bureaucrats and stakeholders in Dutch water management projects. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 14(6), 675-684. 
Eliasson, I. (2000). The use of climate knowledge in urban planning. Landscape and Urban Planning, 
48(1–2), 31-44. 
Few, R., Brown, K., & Tompkins, E. L. (2007). Public participation and climate change adaptation: 
avoiding the illusion of inclusion. Climate Policy, 7(1), 46-59. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry 12(2), 
219-245. 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems. 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30(1), 441-473. 
172
REFERENCES
Fresco, L. O., & Veerman, C. P. (2008, 24 September). De Delta kan zelfs zwartste scenario aan, De 
Volkskrant. 
Friedman, V. J., & Rogers, T. (2009). There is nothing so theoretical as good action research. Action 
Research, 7(1), 31-47. 
Fröhlich, J., & Knieling, J. (2013). Conceptualising Climate Change Governance. In J. Knieling & W. 
Leal Filho (Eds.), Climate Change Governance (pp. 9-26). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer 
Fujimura, J. H. (1987). Constructing `Do-able’ Problems in Cancer Research: Articulating Alignment. 
Social Studies of Science, 17(2), 257-293. 
Fujimura, J. H. (1992). Crafting science: Standardized packages, boundary objects, and “translation”. In 
A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as practice and culture (pp. 168-211). Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press.
Fujimura, J. H., & Chou, D. Y. (1994). Dissent in science: Styles of scientific practice and the controversy 
over the cause of AIDS. Social Science & Medicine, 38(8), 1017-1036. 
Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for the post-normal age. Futures, 25(7), 739-755. 
Füssel, H. M. (2007). Adaptation planning for climate change: concepts, assessment approaches, and key 
lessons. Sustainability Science, 2(2), 265-275. 
Füssel, H. M., & Hildén, M. (2014). How Is Uncertainty Addressed in the Knowledge Base for National 
Adaptation Planning? In T. Capela Lourenço, A. Rovisco, A. Groot, C. Nilsson, H.-M. Füssel, L. 
Van Bree & R. B. Street (Eds.), Adapting to an Uncertain Climate (pp. 41-66): Springer International 
Publishing.
Garssen, J., Harmsen, C., & De Beer, J. (2005). The effect of the summer 2003 heat wave on mortality in 
the Netherlands. Euro Surveill, 10(7), 165-168. 
Gerson, E. M. (1983). Scientific Work and Social Worlds. Science Communication, 4(3), 357-377. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1997). The new 
production of knowledge: dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies. London: Sage.
Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and 
Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists. American Sociological Review, 48(6), 781-795. 
Gieryn, T. F. (1995). Boundaries of science. In S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Petersen & T. Pinch (Eds.), 
Handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 393-443). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Gieryn, T. F. (1999). Cultural boundaries of science: Credibility on the line. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. Handbook of 
qualitative research, 2, 163-194. 
Guston, D. H. (2000). Between politics and science: assuring the integrity and productivity of research. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guston, D. H. (2001). Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction. 
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 26(4), 399-408. 
Guston, D. H. (2005). Institutional Design for Socially Robust Knowledge: The National Toxicology 
Program’s Report on Carcinogens. In S. Maasen & P. Weingart (Eds.), Democratization of 
Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms in Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making (pp. 63-79). 
Dordrecht: Springer.
Haas, P. M. (1989). Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control. 
International Organization, 43(03), 377-403. 
Hage, M., Leroy, P., & Petersen, A. C. (2010). Stakeholder participation in environmental knowledge 
production. Futures, 42(3), 254-264. 
Halffman, W. (2003). Boundaries of Regulatory Science. Eco/toxicology and aquatic hazards of chemicals 
in the US, England and the Netherlands, 1970-1995. University of Amsterdam.
Halffman, W. (2005). Science-policy boundaries: national styles? Science and Public Policy, 32(6), 457-467. 
Halffman, W. (2009). Measuring the stakes: The Dutch planning bureaus. In P. Weingart & J. Lentsch 
(Eds.), Scientific advice to policy making: International comparison (pp. 41-65). Opladen, Germany: 
Barbara Budrich.
173
REFERENCES
Hallegatte, S. (2009). Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change. Global Environmental Change, 
19(2), 240-247. 
Hannigan, J. A. (2006). Environmental sociology (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
Havekes, H. (2009). Functioneel decentraal waterbestuur: borging, bescherming en beweging. de 
institutionele omwenteling van het waterschap in de afgelopen vijftig jaar. The Hague: SDU.
Hazeleger, W. (2008). Zoveel haast is niet nodig bij k ustverdediging. NRC Handelsblad (11 December 
2008). 
Health Council. (2009). Mondiale milieu-invloed op onze gezondheid. The Hague: Health Council.
Health Council. (2013). Een gezond binnenmilieu in de toekomst. The Hague: Health Council.
Hebbert, M., & Jankovic, V. (2013). Cities and Climate Change: The Precedents and Why They Matter. 
Urban Studies, 50(7), 1332-1347. 
Hebbert, M., & Mackillop, F. (2013). Urban Climatology Applied to Urban Planning: A Postwar 
Knowledge Circulation Failure. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(5), 
1542-1558. 
Hegger, D., Lamers, M., Van Zeijl-Rozema, A., & Dieperink, C. (2012). Conceptualising joint knowledge 
production in regional climate change adaptation projects: success conditions and levers for 
action. Environmental Science & Policy, 18(0), 52-65. 
Heusinkveld, B. G., Steeneveld, G. J., van Hove, L. W. A., Jacobs, C. M. J., & Holtslag, A. A. M. (2014). 
Spatial variability of the Rotterdam urban heat island as influenced by urban land use. Journal of 
Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 119(2), 2012JD019399. 
Hezri, A. A., & Dovers, S. R. (2006). Sustainability indicators, policy and governance: Issues for 
ecological economics. Ecological Economics, 60(1), 86-99. 
Hoppe, R. (2005). Rethinking the science-policy nexus: from knowledge utilization and science 
technology studies to types of boundary arrangements. Poiesis & Praxis, 3(3), 199-215. 
Hoppe, R. (2011). Institutional constraints and practical problems in deliberative and participatory 
policy making. Policy & Politics, 39(2), 163-186. 
Hordijk, D. (2013). Kostenraming verhoogde kadenormen Eemskanaal-Dollardboezem (EKDB). 
Verkenning van de kosten voor de aanpak van macrostabiliteit. Rotterdam: Royal HaskoningDHV.
Howlett, M. (2014). Why are policy innovations rare and so often negative? Blame avoidance and 
problem denial in climate change policy-making. Global Environmental Change. 
Huitema, D., Van de Kerkhof, M., Ovaa, E., & Bos-Gorter, L. (2009). Innovative Approaches to Public 
Participation in Water Management. In S. Reinhard & H. Folmer (Eds.), Water Policy in the 
Netherlands: Integrated Management in a Densely Populated Delta. (pp. 225-248). Washington, 
USA: RFF Press.
Huizinga, T. (2008). Kabinetsreactie op advies Deltacommissie. VenW/DGW 2008/1403. The Hague: 
Ministerie van V&W.
Hulme, M. (2009). Why we disagree about climate change: understanding controversy, inaction and 
opportunity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hulme, M. (2010). Problems with making and governing global kinds of knowledge. Global 
Environmental Change, 20(4), 558-564. 
Hunt, J., & Shackley, S. (1999). Reconceiving Science and Policy: Academic, Fiducial and Bureaucratic 
Knowledge. Minerva, 37(2), 141-164. 
Huynen, M., de Hollander, A., Martens, P., & Mackenbach, J. (2008). Mondiale milieuveranderingen en 
volksgezondheid: stand van de kennis. Bilthoven: RIVM.
Huynen, M., Martens, P., Schram, D., Weijenberg, M. P., & Kunst, A. E. (2001). The impact of heat waves and 
cold spells on mortality rates in the Dutch population. Environmental health perspectives, 109(5), 463. 
I&M. (2013). Klimaatagenda: weerbaar, welvarend en groen. The Hague: Ministerie van infrastructuur 
en Milieu.
Inderberg, T., & Eikeland, P. (2009). Limits to adaptation: Analysing institutional constraints. In W. N. 
Adger, I. Lorenzoni & K. L. O’Brien (Eds.), Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values, 
governance (pp. 433-447). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
174
REFERENCES
IPCC. (2014). Summary for Policymakers. In C. B. Field, V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. 
Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, 
A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea & L. L. White (Eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. (pp. 1-32). Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Irwin, A. (1995). Citizen science: A study of people, expertise and sustainable development. New York: 
Routledge.
Irwin, A. (2001). Sociology and the environment: a critical introduction to society, nature and knowledge. 
Cambridge: Polity.
Jasanoff, S. (1990). The fifth branch: Science advisers as policymakers. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
Jasanoff, S. (2003). Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science. Minerva, 
41(3), 223-244. 
Jasanoff, S. (2004). Ordering knowledge, ordering society. In S. Jasanoff (Ed.), States of knowledge: The 
co-production of science and social order (pp. 13-45). New York: Routledge.
Jasanoff, S. (2005). Designs on nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jasanoff, S. (2010a). A New Climate for Society. Theory, Culture & Society, 27(2-3), 233-253. 
Jasanoff, S. (2010b). Testing Time for Climate Science. Science, 328(5979), 695-696. 
Jasanoff, S. (2011). The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science. In C. Camic, N. Gross & M. 
Lamont (Eds.), Social Knowledge in the Making (pp. 307-337). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Jasanoff, S., & Wynne, B. (1998). Science and decision making. In S. Rayner & E. Malone (Eds.), Human 
Choice and Climate Change, vol. 1: The Societal Framework (pp. 1-87). Columbus: Battelle Press.
Jones, R. N., Patwardhan, A., Cohen, S. J., Dessai, S., Lammel, A., Lempert, R. J., Mirza, M. M. Q., & von 
Storch, H. (2014). Foundations for decision making. In C. B. Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. 
Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. 
Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea & L. L. White (Eds.), Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (pp. 195-228). Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press.
Jordan, A., Huitema, D., Van Asselt, H., Rayner, T., & Berkhout, F. (2010). Climate change policy in the 
European Union: confronting the dilemmas of mitigation and adaptation? Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kabat, P., & Driessen, P. (2009). Editorial. In M. Heinen (Ed.), Climate research Netherlands: Research 
Highlights (pp. 4-5). Utrecht, the Netherlands: Climate changes Spatial Planning & Knowledge for 
Climate.
Kabat, P., Fresco, L. O., Stive, M. J. F., Veerman, C. P., van Alphen, J. S. L. J., Parmet, B. W. A. H., 
Hazeleger, W., & Katsman, C. A. (2009). Dutch coasts in transition. Nature Geoscience, 2(7), 
450-452. 
Karl, H. A., Susskind, L. E., & Wallace, K. H. (2007). A Dialogue, Not a Diatribe: Effective Integration of 
Science and Policy through Joint Fact Finding. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable 
Development, 49(1), 20-34. 
Katsman, C., Sterl, A., Beersma, J., van den Brink, H., Church, J., Hazeleger, W., Kopp, R., Kroon, D., 
Kwadijk, J., Lammersen, R., Lowe, J., Oppenheimer, M., Plag, H., Ridley, J., von Storch, H., 
Vaughan, D., Vellinga, P., Vermeersen, L., van de Wal, R., & Weisse, R. (2011). Exploring high-end 
scenarios for local sea level rise to develop flood protection strategies for a low-lying delta—the 
Netherlands as an example. Climatic Change, 1-29. 
Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (2nd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown.
175
REFERENCES
Kirchhoff, C. J., Lemos, M. C., & Dessai, S. (2013). Actionable Knowledge for Environmental Decision 
Making: Broadening the Usability of Climate Science. Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources, 38(1), 393-414. 
Kirchhoff, C. J., Lemos, M. C., & Engle, N. L. (2013). What influences climate information use in water 
management? The role of boundary organizations and governance regimes in Brazil and the U.S. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 26, 6-18. 
Kleerekoper, L., Van Esch, M., & Salcedo, T. B. (2012). How to make a city climate-proof, addressing the 
urban heat island effect. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 64(0), 30-38. 
Klein, R. J. T., Midgley, G. F., Preston, B. L., Alam, M., Berkhout, F. G. H., Dow, K., & Shaw, M. R. (2014). 
Adaptation opportunities, constraints, and limits. In C. B. Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. 
Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. 
Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea & L. L. White (Eds.), Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of 
Climate Change (pp. 899-943). Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press.
Klein, R. J. T., Schipper, E. L. F., & Dessai, S. (2005). Integrating mitigation and adaptation into climate 
and development policy: three research questions. Environmental Science & Policy, 8(6), 579-588. 
Klinenberg, E. (2003). Heat wave: A social autopsy of disaster in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Klok, E., Schaminée, S., Duyzer, J., & Steeneveld, G. (2012). De stedelijke hitte-eilanden van Nederland in 
kaart gebracht met satellietbeelden. Utrecht: TNO.
Klok, E., Zwart, S., Verhagen, H., & Mauri, E. (2012). The surface heat island of Rotterdam and its 
relationship with urban surface characteristics. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 64, 23-29. 
KNMI. (2000). Handbook for the Meteorological Observation De Bilt: Koninklijk Nederlands 
Meteorologisch Instituut.
Knowledge for Climate. (2009). Voorbereiding Uitvoering Nationaal Onderzoeksprogramma Kennis voor 
Klimaat. Utrecht: Knowledge for Climate.
Kok, M. T. J., & De Coninck, H. C. (2007). Widening the scope of policies to address climate change: 
directions for mainstreaming. Environmental Science & Policy, 10(7–8), 587-599. 
Korff, M., Visschedijk, M., Landwehr, H., Verweij, A., & Meijers, P. (2014). Effecten aardbevingen op 
kritische infrastructuur Groningen. Samenvatting resultaten onderzoek Deltares. Delft: Deltares.
Kovats, R. S., & Hajat, S. (2008). Heat Stress and Public Health: A Critical Review. Annual Review of 
Public Health, 29(1), 41-55. 
Kuijpers-Linde, M., De Groot, S. M., & Koomen, E. (2011). Kennis, Klimaat en Regionale Planprocessen. 
Advies over de beschikbaarheid en gebruik van klimaatkennis in het provinciale ruimtelijke plan-
vormingsproces. KVR: 025/11.
Kuks, S. M. (2009). Institutional evolution of the Dutch water board model. In S. Reinhard & H. Folmer 
(Eds.), Water policy in the Netherlands: Integrated management in a densely populated delta (pp. 
155-170). Washington, DC: RFF Press.
Kunst, A., & Britstra, R. (2013). Implementation evaluation of the Dutch national heat plan among 
long-term care institutions in Amsterdam: a cross-sectional study. BMC Health Services Research, 
13(1), 1-7. 
Landry, R., Amara, N., & Lamari, M. (2001). Utilization of social science research knowledge in Canada. 
Research Policy, 30(2), 333-349. 
Lass, W., Haas, A., Hinkel, J., & Jaeger, C. (2011). Avoiding the avoidable: Towards a European heat 
waves risk governance. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 2(1), 1-14. 
Lasswell, H. D. (1936). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cmbridge: 
Harvard University Press.
176
REFERENCES
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Lemos, M. C., Kirchhoff, C. J., & Ramprasad, V. (2012). Narrowing the climate information usability 
gap. Nature Climate Change, 2(11), 789-794. 
Lemos, M. C., & Morehouse, B. J. (2005). The co-production of science and policy in integrated climate 
assessments. Global Environmental Change Part A, 15(1), 57-68. 
Lenschow, A. (2001). Environmental policy integration: greening sectoral policies in Europe. London: 
Earthscan.
Lentsch, J., & Weingart, P. (2011a). Introduction: The quest for quality as a challenge to scientific policy 
advice: an overdue debate? In J. Lentsch & P. Weingart (Eds.), The Politics of Scientific Advice: 
Institutional Design for Quality Assurance (pp. 3-18). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lentsch, J., & Weingart, P. (2011b). Quality control in the advisory process: towards an institutional 
design for robust science advice. In J. Lentsch & P. Weingart (Eds.), The Politics of Scientific Advice: 
Institutional Design for Quality Assurance (pp. 353-374). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lenzholzer, S., & Brown, R. D. (2013). Climate-responsive landscape architecture design education. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 61, 89-99. 
Leroy, P., Driessen, P., & Van Vierssen, W. (2010a). Climate, Science, Society, and Politics: Multiple 
Perspectives on Interaction and Change. In P. Driessen, P. Leroy & W. Van Vierssen (Eds.), From 
climate change to social change. Perspectives on science-policy interactions (pp. 15-30). Utrecht: 
International books.
Leroy, P., Driessen, P., & Van Vierssen, W. (2010b). From climate change to social change: not just a 
better science-policy interface. In P. Driessen, P. Leroy & W. Van Vierssen (Eds.), From climate 
change to social change. Perspectives on science-policy interactions (pp. 161-172). Utrecht: 
International books.
Mahony, M. (2013). Boundary spaces: Science, politics and the epistemic geographies of climate change 
in Copenhagen, 2009. Geoforum, 49(0), 29-39. 
March, J. G., & Olson, J. P. (2006). The logic of appropriateness. In M. Moran, M. Rein & R. Goodin 
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public policy (pp. 689-708). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Massey, E., Biesbroek, R., Huitema, D., & Jordan, A. (2014). Climate policy innovation: The adoption and 
diffusion of adaptation policies across Europe. Global Environmental Change, 29, 434–443. 
Massey, E., & Huitema, D. (2013). The emergence of climate change adaptation as a policy field: the case 
of England. Regional Environmental Change, 13(2), 341-352. 
McNie, E. C. (2007). Reconciling the supply of scientific information with user demands: an analysis of 
the problem and review of the literature. Environmental Science & Policy, 10(1), 17-38. 
Mees, H. P., Driessen, P. J., & Runhaar, H. C. (2014). “Cool” governance of a “hot” climate issue: public 
and private responsibilities for the protection of vulnerable citizens against extreme heat. Regional 
Environmental Change, online first. 
Meijerink, S. (2005). Understanding policy stability and change. the interplay of advocacy coalitions 
and epistemic communities, windows of opportunity, and Dutch coastal flooding policy 
1945–20031. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(6), 1060-1077. 
Merkx, F. (2007). A Bird’s Eye View of Coastal Defense Research in the Netherlands. The Hague: 
Rathenau Institute.
Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: 
University of Chicago press.
Miller, C. A. (2001). Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental 
Governance in the Climate Regime. Science, Technology & Human Values, 26(4), 478-500. 
Miller, C. A. (2008). Civic Epistemologies: Constituting Knowledge and Order in Political Communities. 
Sociology Compass, 2(6), 1896-1919. 
177
REFERENCES
Millstone, E. (2009). Science, risk and governance: Radical rhetorics and the realities of reform in food 
safety governance. Research Policy, 38(4), 624-636. 
Ministry of VWS, RIVM, Red Cross Netherlands, ActiZ, GHOR Netherlands, & GGD Netherlands. 
(2007). Nationaal Hitteplan. The Hague: Ministry of VWS.
Molle, F., Mollinga, P. P., & Wester, P. (2009). Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows 
of Water, Flows of Power. Water Alternatives, 2. 
Moser, S. C., & Ekstrom, J. A. (2010). A framework to diagnose barriers to climate change adaptation. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(51), 22026-22031. 
Mostert, E. (2006). Integrated Water Resources Management in The Netherlands: How Concepts 
Function. Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education, 135(1), 19-27. 
Nederpel, A., & Jungermann, N. (2013). Veiligheidsklassen regionale waterkeringen. Actualiseren 
normering regionale waterkeringen. Lelystad: HKV Lijn in water.
Nijhuis, L. (2011). Hittestress in Rotterdam. Rotterdam: Gemeentewerken Rotterdam.
Noorderzijlvest. (2006). Beleidsplan reconstructie kaden Noorderzijlvest. Groningen: Water board Noor-
derzijlvest.
Noorderzijlvest. (2012). Droge Voeten 2050 waterschap Noorderzijlvest: Plan van aanpak. Groningen, 
the Netherlands: Water Board Noorderzijlvest.
Nowotny, H. (2003). Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge. Science and Public Policy, 
30(3), 151-156. 
O’Brien, K. (2012). Global environmental change II: From adaptation to deliberate transformation. 
Progress in Human Geography, 36(5), 667-676. 
O’Brien, K. (2013). Global environmental change III: Closing the gap between knowledge and action. 
Progress in Human Geography, 37(4), 587-596. 
OECD. (2014). Water governance in the netherlands: fit for the future? Paris: OECD Publishing.
Owens, S. (2012). Experts and the Environment—The UK Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution 1970–2011. Journal of Environmental Law, 24(1), 1-22. 
Parker, J., & Crona, B. (2012). On being all things to all people: Boundary organizations and the 
contemporary research university. Social Studies of Science, 42(2), 262-289. 
Parry, M., & Carter, T. (1998). Climate impact and adaptation assessment: a guide to the IPCC approach. 
London: Earthscan.
Phillips, L. J. (2011). Analysing the dialogic turn in the communication of research-based knowledge: 
An exploration of the tensions in collaborative research. Public Understanding of Science, 20(1), 
80-100. 
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004). Discourse and institutions. The Academy of Management 
Review, 29(4), 635-652. 
Pielke, R. (2005). Misdefining “climate change”: consequences for science and action. Environmental 
Science & Policy, 8(6), 548-561. 
Pielke, R. (2007). The honest broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Pielke, R., Prins, G., Rayner, S., & Sarewitz, D. (2007). Lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature, 445(7128), 
597-598. 
Pinch, T. J., & Bijker, W. E. (1984). The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology 
of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other. Social Studies of Science, 
14(3), 399-441. 
Poumadère, M., Mays, C., Le Mer, S., & Blong, R. (2005). The 2003 Heat Wave in France: Dangerous 
Climate Change Here and Now. Risk Analysis, 25(6), 1483-1494. 
Radaelli, C. M. (1995). The role of knowledge in the policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 
2(2), 159-183. 
Raman, S. (2005). Introduction: Institutional perspectives on science-policy boundaries. Science and 
Public Policy, 32(6), 418-422. 
178
REFERENCES
Rayner, S. (2003). Democracy in the age of assessment: Reflections on the roles of expertise and 
democracy in public-sector decision making. Science and Public Policy, 30(3), 163-170. 
Rayner, S. (2007). The rise of risk and the decline of politics. Environmental Hazards, 7(2), 165-172. 
Rayner, S. (2012). Uncomfortable knowledge: the social construction of ignorance in science and 
environmental policy discourses. Economy and Society, 41(1), 107-125. 
Rayner, S., Lach, D., & Ingram, H. (2005). Weather forecasts are for wimps: Why water resource 
managers do not use climate forecasts. Climatic Change, 69(2-3), 197-227. 
Reason, P., & Bradbury, H. (Eds.). (2008). The SAGE handbook of action research: Participatory inquiry 
and practice (2 ed.). London: Sage.
Rein, M., & Schön, D. (1993). Reframing Policy Discourse. In F. Fischer & J. Forester (Eds.), The 
Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning (pp. 145–166). Durham: Duke University 
Press.
Reinecke, S., Bauer, A., Pregernig, M., Tony, A., Hermann, T. P., & Hogl, K. (2013). Scientific climate 
policy advice: An overview of national forms of institutionalization. Vienna: BOKU.
Ren, C., Spit, T., Lenzholzer, S., Yim, H. L. S., Heusinkveld, B., van Hove, B., Chen, L., Kupski, S., 
Burghardt, R., & Katzschner, L. (2012). Urban climate map system for Dutch spatial planning. 
International Journal of Applied Earth Observation and Geoinformation, 18, 207-221. 
Renn, O. (2008). Risk governance: coping with uncertainty in a complex world. London: Earthscan.
Rich, R. F., & Oh, C. H. (2000). Rationality and Use of Information in Policy Decisions: A Search for 
Alternatives. Science Communication, 22(2), 173-211. 
Rittel, H. J., & Webber, M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2), 
155-169. 
RIVM. (2012). GGD-richtlijn medische milieukunde: Gezondheidsrisico’s van zomerse omstandigheden. 
Bilthoven: RIVM.
Roders, M., Straub, A., & Visscher, H. (2013). Evaluation of climate change adaptation measures by 
Dutch housing associations. Structural Survey, 31(4). 
Roodenburg, J. (1983). Adaptation of rural minimum temperature forecasts to an urban environment. 
Archives for meteorology, geophysics, and bioclimatology, Series B, 32(4), 395-401. 
Root, L., van der Krabben, E., & Spit, T. (2014). Bridging the financial gap in climate adaptation: Dutch 
planning and land development through a new institutional lens. Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management, 1-18. 
Rotterdam. (2013). Rotterdam climate change adaptation strategy. Rotterdam: Rotterdam Climate 
Initiative.
Runhaar, H., Mees, H., Wardekker, A., Van der Sluijs, J. P., & Driessen, P. (2012). Adaptation to climate 
change-related risks in Dutch urban areas: stimuli and barriers. Regional Environmental Change, 
12(4), 777-790. 
Salcedo Rahola, T. B., Van Oppen, P., & Mulder, K. (2009). Heat in the city - an inventory of knowledge 
and knowledge deficiencies regarding heat stress in Dutch cities and options for its mitigation. 
Utrecht: Climate changes Spatial Planning.
Sarewitz, D. (2004). How science makes environmental controversies worse. Environmental Science & 
Policy, 7(5), 385-403. 
Sarewitz, D., & Pielke, R. (2007). The neglected heart of science policy: reconciling supply of and demand 
for science. Environmental Science & Policy, 10(1), 5-16. 
Schreuder, A. (2008). Gekozen: de maximale marge van de bovengrens NRC Handelsblad (9 October 
2008). 
Schulz, M., Ferket, J., & Van der Steen, M. (2013). Het commissierapport: inhoud als uitdrukking van 
een proces. Bestuurskunde, 22(4), 17-26. 
Schuurman, H. G., & Van der Wijk, J. (2011). Quick Scan HOWA 3. Province of Groningen: 2011-
01184/3/A.7, LGW.
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. 
New haven: Yale University Press.
179
REFERENCES
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Shackley, S. (1997). Trust in models? The mediating and transformative role of computer models in 
environmental discourse. In M. Redclift & R. Woodgate (Eds.), The International Handbook of 
Environmental Sociology (pp. 237-260). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Shackley, S., & Wynne, B. (1996). Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and 
Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority. Science, Technology & Human Values, 21(3), 
275-302. 
Shapin, S. (1995). Cordelia’s Love: Credibility and the Social Studies of Science. Perspectives on Science, 
3(3), 255-275. 
Sismondo, S. (2010). An introduction to science and technology studies (2nd ed.). Malden: John Wiley & 
Sons.
Smit, B., & Wandel, J. (2006). Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability. Global Environmental 
Change, 16(3), 282-292. 
Star, S. L., & Griesemer, J. R. (1989). Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: 
Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39. Social Studies 
of Science, 19(3), 387-420. 
Steeneveld, G., Koopmans, S., Heusinkveld, B., Van Hove, L., & Holtslag, A. (2011). Quantifying urban 
heat island effects and human comfort for cities of variable size and urban morphology in the 
Netherlands. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres (1984–2012), 116(D20). 
Stirling, A. (2008). “Opening Up” and “Closing Down”: Power, Participation, and Pluralism in the Social 
Appraisal of Technology. Science, Technology & Human Values, 33(2), 262-294. 
Stive, M. J. F., Fresco, L. O., Kabat, P., Parmet, B. W. A. H., & Veerman, C. P. (2011). How the dutch plan 
to stay dry over the next century. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Civil Engineering, 
164(3), 114-121. 
Stone, D. (2002). Using Knowledge: The dilemmas of ‘Bridging Research and Policy’. Compare: A Journal 
of Comparative and International Education, 32(3), 285-296. 
STOWA. (2004). Statistiek van extreme neerslag in Nederland (Vol. 26). Utrecht: STOWA.
STOWA. (2007). Leidraad toetsen op veiligheid regionale waterkeringen. Utrecht: STOWA.
STOWA. (2010). Addendum op de leidraad toetsen op veiligheid regionale waterkeringen betreffende de 
boezemkaden. Amersfoort: STOWA.
Stuurgroep Water 2000+. (2001). Fase 1: de waterhuishouding tot 2010. Groningen.
Stuurgroep Water 2000+. (2003). Maatregelen tegen wateroverlast in Groningen en Noord-Drenthe. Groningen.
Swart, R., Biesbroek, R., Binnerup, S., Carter, T., Cowan, C., Henrichs, T., Loquen, S., Mela, H., 
Morecroft, M., Reese, M., & Rey, D. (2009). Europe adapts to climate change: comparing national 
adaptation strategies. Helsinki: Partnership for European Environmental Research.
Swart, R., Biesbroek, R., & Capela Lourenço, T. (2014). Science of adaptation to climate change and 
science for adaptation. [Review]. Frontiers in Environmental Science, 2. 
Swart, R., & Raes, F. (2007). Making integration of adaptation and mitigation work: mainstreaming into 
sustainable development policies? Climate Policy, 7(4), 288-303. 
Termeer, C., Dewulf, A., van Rijswick, H., van Buuren, A., Huitema, D., Meijerink, S., Rayner, T., & 
Wiering, M. (2011). The regional governance of climate adaptation: A framework for developing 
legitimate, effective, and resilient governance arrangements. Climate law, 2(2), 159-179. 
The Netherlands Court of Audit. (2012). Aanpassing aan klimaatverandering: strategie en beleid. The 
Hague: SDU.
Tribbia, J., & Moser, S. C. (2008). More than information: what coastal managers need to plan for climate 
change. Environmental Science & Policy, 11(4), 315-328. 
Turnhout, E., Stuiver, M., Klostermann, J., Harms, B., & Leeuwis, C. (2013). New roles of science in 
society: Different repertoires of knowledge brokering. Science and Public Policy, 40(3), 354-365. 
Uittenbroek, C. J., Janssen-Jansen, L. B., Spit, T. J. M., Salet, W. G. M., & Runhaar, H. A. C. (2014). 
Political commitment in organising municipal responses to climate adaptation: the dedicated 
approach versus the mainstreaming approach. Environmental Politics, 1-21. 
180
REFERENCES
UNEP, & UNDP. (2011). Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation into Development Planning: A 
Guide for Practitioners. Nairobi: UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Facility.
UvW, & IPO. (2004). Visie op regionale keringen. The Hague: Unie van Waterschappen & Interprovin-
ciaal Overleg.
Van Assche, K., Duineveld, M., Beunen, R., & Teampau, P. (2011). Delineating locals: Transformations 
of knowledge/power and the governance of the Danube delta. Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning, 13(1), 1-21. 
Van Buuren, A., Eshuis, J., & Van Vliet, M. (Eds.). (2015). Action research for climate change adaptation: 
Developing and applying knowledge for governance. London: Routledge.
Van Buuren, A., Klijn, E.-H., & Edelenbos, J. (2012). Democratic legitimacy of new forms of water 
management in the Netherlands. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 28(4), 
629-645. 
Van den Brink, M. (2009). Rijkswaterstaat on the horns of a dilemma. Delft: Eburon.
Van den Brink, M., Termeer, C., & Meijerink, S. (2011). Are Dutch water safety institutions prepared for 
climate change? Journal of Water and Climate Change, 2(4), 272-287. 
Van den Hove, S. (2007). A rationale for science–policy interfaces. Futures, 39(7), 807-826. 
Van den Hurk, B., Klein Tank, A., Lenderink, G., van Ulden, A., Van Oldenborgh, G., Katsman, C., Van 
den Brink, H., Keller, F., Bessembinder, J., & Burgers, G. (2006). KNMI climate change scenarios 
2006 for the Netherlands: KNMI De Bilt.
Van den Hurk, M., Mastenbroek, E., & Meijerink, S. (2014). Water safety and spatial development: An 
institutional comparison between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Land Use Policy, 
36(0), 416-426. 
Van der Brugge, R., Rotmans, J., & Loorbach, D. (2005). The transition in Dutch water management. 
Regional Environmental Change, 5(4), 164-176. 
Van der Vat, M., & Verhoeven, G. (2010). Quick Scan HOWA 3 Hunze & Aa’s. Delft: Deltares.
Van Eijsbergen, E., Poot, K., & Van de Geer, I. (Eds.). (2007). Waterveiligheid. Begrippen begrijpen. The 
Hague: Ministry of Public Works, DG water.
Van Heeringen, K., & Heynert, K. (2010). Analyse T=100 boezemmodel Noorderzijlvest. Delft: Deltares.
Van Rijswoud, E. (2012). Public faces of science: Experts and identity work in the boundary zone of science, 
policy and public debate. (Dissertation), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen.   
Van Tatenhove, J., & Leroy, P. (2000). The Institutionalisation of Environmental Politics. In J. van 
Tatenhove, B. Arts & P. Leroy (Eds.), Political Modernisation and the Environment: The Renewal of 
Environmental Policy Arrangements (pp. 17-33). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Van Twist, M. J. W., Schulz, M., Van der Steen, M., & Ferket, J. (2013). De deltacommissaris: een kroniek 
van de instelling van een regeringscommissaris voor de Nederlandse delta. The Hague: NSOB.
Van Vliet, L., De Bruin, H. T. J., & Zwanenburg, C. (2012). Stabiliteit veenkade m.o. klimaatverandering. 
Utrecht: Stowa.
Vellinga, P., Stive, M. J. F., Vrijling, J. K., Boorsma, P. B., Verschuuren, J. M., & Van Ierland, E. C. (2006). 
Tussensprint naar 2015. Advies over de financiering van de primaire waterkeringen voor de 
bescherming van Nederland tegen overstroming. Amsterdam: Adviescommissie Financiering 
Primaire Waterkeringen.
Verduijn, S., Meijerink, S., & Leroy, P. (2012). How the Second Delta Committee set the agenda for 
climate adaptation policy: A Dutch case study on framing strategies for policy change. Water 
Alternatives, 5(2), 469-484. 
Verhoeven, G. (2009). Stochastenberekening Electra- en Fivelingoboezem. Delft: Deltares.
Verkerk, J., & Van Buuren, A. (2013). Integrated Water Resources Management in the Netherlands. 
Historical Trends and Current Practices in the Governance of Integration. International Journal of 
Water Governance, 1(3), 427-452. 
Versteeg, R., & Jungermann, N. (2013). Statistische analyse extreme waterstanden. Lelystad: HKV Lijn in 
water.
181
REFERENCES
Vink, M. J., Benson, D., Boezeman, D., Cook, H., Dewulf, A., & Termeer, C. J. A. M. (2015). Do state 
traditions matter? Comparing deliberative governance of adaptation to climate change in 
corporatist and plural state traditions Journal of Water and Climate Change, 6 (1), 71-88.
Vink, M. J., Boezeman, D., Dewulf, A., & Termeer, C. J. A. M. (2013). Changing climate, changing 
frames: Dutch water policy frame developments in the context of a rise and fall of attention to 
climate change. Environmental Science & Policy, 30, 90-101. 
VROM, V&W, LNV, EZ, IPO, VNG, & Unie van Waterschappen (2007). Maak ruimte voor klimaat! 
Nationale adaptatiestrategie - de beleidsnotitie. TK, 2007–2008, 31 269, nr. 1.
Wagenaar, H. (2011). Meaning in action: interpretation and dialogue in policy analysis. Armonk, NY: ME 
Sharpe.
Warbroek, B. (2008). Bestuurlijk pact moet de zee temmen. Binnenlands Bestuur, 5 September 2008. 
Waterschap Hunze & Aa’s, Provincie Groningen, & Provincie Drenthe. (2014). Project Droge Voeten 
2050. Advies voor het beheergebied van het waterschap Hunze en Aa’s. Groningen.
Waterschap Noorderzijlvest, Provincie Groningen, & Provincie Drenthe. (2014). Project Droge Voeten 
2050. Advies voor het beheergebied van het waterschap Noorderzijlvest. Groningen.
Weingart, P. (1999). Scientific expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of science in politics. 
Science and Public Policy, 26(3), 151-161. 
Weiss, C. H. (1998). Have We Learned Anything New About the Use of Evaluation? American Journal of 
Evaluation, 19(1), 21-33. 
Wesselink, A., Buchanan, K. S., Georgiadou, Y., & Turnhout, E. (2013). Technical knowledge, discursive 
spaces and politics at the science–policy interface. Environmental Science & Policy, 30(0), 1-9. 
Wesselink, A., Vriend, H. d., Barneveld, H., Krol, M., & Bijker, W. (2009). Hydrology and hydraulics 
expertise in participatory processes for climate change adaptation in the Dutch Meuse. Water 
science & technology, 60(3), 583-595. 
White, D. D., Corley, E. A., & White, M. S. (2008). Water Managers’ Perceptions of the Science–Policy 
Interface in Phoenix, Arizona: Implications for an Emerging Boundary Organization. Society & 
Natural Resources, 21(3), 230-243. 
White, D. D., Wutich, A., Larson, K. L., Gober, P., Lant, T., & Senneville, C. (2010). Credibility, salience, 
and legitimacy of boundary objects: water managers’ assessment of a simulation model in an 
immersive decision theater. Science and Public Policy, 37(3), 219-232. 
WHO. (2008). Improving public health responses to extreme weather/heat-waves: EuroHEAT, report on 
a WHO meeting. Copenhagen: World Health Organization.
Wiering, M., & Arts, B. (2006). Discursive Shifts in Dutch River Management:‘Deep’Institutional 
Change or Adaptation Strategy? Hydrobiologia, 565(565), 327-338. 
Wiering, M., & Immink, I. (2006). When water management meets spatial planning: a policy-arrange-
ments perspective. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 24(3), 423-438. 
Wilby, R. L., & Dessai, S. (2010). Robust adaptation to climate change. Weather, 65(7), 180-185. 
Wilby, R. L., & Wigley, T. M. L. (1997). Downscaling general circulation model output: a review of 
methods and limitations. Progress in Physical Geography, 21(4), 530-548. 
Willers, S. M. (2012). luchtkwaliteit, temperatuur en klimaatverandering in het rijnmondgebied. 
Rotterdam: DCMR.
Wolters, D., & Brandsma, T. (2012). Estimating the Urban Heat Island in Residential Areas in the 
Netherlands Using Observations by Weather Amateurs. Journal of Applied Meteorology & 
Climatology, 51(4). 
Yanow, D. (2006). Thinking interpretively: philosophical presuppositions and the human sciences. In D. 
Yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the 
Interpretive Turn (pp. 5-26). Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.
Yanow, D. (2009). Dear author, dear reader: the third hermeneutic in writing and reviewing ethnography. 
In E. Schatz (Ed.), Political ethnography: what immersion contributes to the study of power (pp. 
275-302). Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
182
REFERENCES
Yanow, D., & Schwartz-Shea, P. (2006). Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the 
interpretive turn. New York: ME Sharpe.
Yearley, S. (2009). Sociology and Climate Change after Kyoto: What Roles for Social Science in 
Understanding Climate Change? Current Sociology, 57(3), 389-405. 
183
REFERENCES

185
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Date Name Function
30 March 2011 Vlak, Kees Member secretariat Second Delta Committee, 
senior policy advisor VROM
11 April 2011 Berkum, Pieter van Member secretariat Second Delta Committee, 
policy advisor
13 April 2011 Alphen, Jos van Member secretariat Second Delta Committee, 
responsible for knowledge management, senior 
policy advisor Rijkswaterstaat
19 April 2011 Bussel, Bart van Member secretariat Second Delta Committee, 
director INFRAM
28 April 2011 Kabat, Pavel Member Second Delta Committee, professor 
Wageningen University, Director Iiasa Laxenburg
4 May 2011 Metz, Tracy Member Second Delta Committee, journalist
14 June 2011 Parmet, Bart Secretary Second Delta Committee, director Delta 
Programme
21 July 2011 Verhoef, Tim Member secretariat Second Delta Committee, 
writer, senior policy advisor LNV
Date Name Function
16 July 2012 & 
30 October 2013
Jong, Kees de Senior project leader and policy advisor 
Noorderzijlvest
16 July 2012 & 
30 October 2013
Gooijer, Jan Hydrologist Noorderzijlvest
16 July 2012 Groen, Harry Project leader HOWA Noorderzijlvest
17 September 
2012
Besten, Jan den Senior policy advisor Hunze & Aa’s
17 September 
2012
Jolink, Eric Hydrologist Hunze & Aa’s
7 March 2013 Burkunk, Rob Project leader Droge Voeten 2050, senior policy 
advisor Province of Groningen
7 March 2013 Blom, Eric Senior policy advisor Province of Groningen
7 March 2013 Oosterom, Wim 
van
Senior policy advisor Province of Groningen
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Date Name Function
20 March 2012 & 17 
October 2013
Ammers,  
Hans van
Chief advisor public space, water & ecology, 
municipality of Arnhem.  Project member Future 
Cities
22 March 2013 Verhoeven,  
Ton
Senior advisor water and urban green, 
municipality of Nijmegen. Project member 
Future Cities
10 July 2013 Lenzholzer, Sanda Ass. professor landscape architecture Wageningen 
University
23 July 2013 Josten, Ron Senior advisor sustainable buildings city region 
Arnhem-Nijmegen
17 September 2013 Nijhuis, Lissy project leader heat stress in Rotterdam / 
Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy
18 September 2013 Hove, Bert van Ass. professor urban meteorology Wageningen 
University
19 September 2013 Goossen, Hasse Alterra, project leader Climate Ateliers, Climate 
Adaptation Services foundation
19 September 2013 Groot,  
Monique de
PhD researcher visualisation of climate change, 
Wageningen University
19 September 2013 Loenhout,  
Joris van
Community Health Service Gelderland-midden 
VGGM (Arnhem), researcher Heat in the City of 
Academic Workshop Health and Environment
20 September 2013 Berg, Pine project leader “heat in the city” at NMU (Nature 
and Environmental Organisation Utrecht (NGO))
20 September 2013 Bessembinder, 
Janette
KNMI project leader climate information services
24 September 2013 Bosch, Peter TNO, consortium leader Climate Proof Cities, 
Knowledge for Climate
24 September 2013 Kruse, Hans Senior ecological advisor, municipality of Utrecht
24 September 2013 Stein, Paul Policy advisor housing and climate, province of 
Gelderland
26 September 2013 Klok, Lisette Researcher air quality and climate, TNO
2 October 2013 Meijdam, Jan Senior advisor healthy building and land-use 
planning, Community Health Service (GGD) 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond
4 October 2013 Klundert,  
Inge van de
Senior policy advisor sustainability/
Environmental policy, municipality of Utrecht
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18 October 2013 Buijs, Suzanne Theme coordinator Urban climate, Municipality 
of Rotterdam
25 October 2013 Bree,  
Leendert van
Policy advisor at Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency
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Summary
Since the turn of the millennium, climate change adaptation has been receiving an 
enormous increase in attention in various public policy domains and as well as in 
academic research. Two developments stand out in the governance of adaptation. 
Firstly, adaptation research programmes aim to produce knowledge in closer 
relation with policy needs. Secondly, governance strategies aim at mainstreaming 
climate adaptation issues in ongoing policy actions instead of developing dedicated 
approaches. This thesis takes stock with the consequence of those developments for 
the production of knowledge in science-politics relations. It deals with the question 
of how the effects of climate change are rendered into meaningful and actionable 
problems for public policy in the Netherlands and how authoritative knowledge is 
created on relevant climate effects. While a lot of the literature on climate adaptation 
research has been prescriptive about how such research should be organised or 
taken to policy, this thesis studies how such research is organised in practice and 
how it is brought to bare on local and regional adaptation policies.
 In the governance of climate change adaptation, scientific knowledge plays a 
pivotal role in the identification, assessment and evaluation of climate impacts. 
However, research and practice has shown that producing relevant and authoritative 
knowledge for policy is rife with challenges. Firstly, the complexities and 
uncertainties of climate impacts push science to its cognitive limits, in times when 
climate science itself has frequently become subject of controversy. Secondly, the 
stakes of adaptation are high, while societal actors hold conflicting positions on 
climate change. Thirdly, the present institutions, established to enable the exchange 
of knowledge between science and policy, are thought to be unable to deal with the 
wicked problem of climate change. Fourthly, as climate impacts are felt at the 
regional level, the global phenomenon of climate change needs to get translated 
into meaningful effects that fit the demands of the local situation.
 In the academic literature, an influential way to grasp science-policy problems 
is one of conceiving science and politics as two separate social worlds and their 
relationships in terms of supply and demand. In this understanding, packages of 
knowledge, once discovered through scientific practice, need to be transferred to 
the political domain in order to make policies more rational. However, this concep-
tualisation is challenged for having fundamental flaws that obscure the mutual 
shaping of knowledge and policy. To overcome these flaws, the approach followed 
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in this thesis aligns with constructionist social science that sees knowledge claims 
not as a mirror of reality, but as representations of reality that are the product of 
social work. Because knowledge and social order are intertwined, the stabilisation 
and institutionalisation of authoritative knowledge in society should be critically 
examined.
 This thesis argues that the development of authoritative policy knowledge 
about climate adaptation can productively be analysed by studying how multiple 
social worlds intersect. Examples of social worlds are climate science, engineering, 
urban planning, politics or the law. I studied how these social worlds cooperate in 
order to reframe their wicked problem into something tractable, how serviceable 
knowledge claims are constructed to contribute to the problematic issue at hand, 
and how the legitimacy of those claims is stabilised by making these claims 
responsive to the varying demands of the social worlds involved. With ever more 
policy domains engaging with climate change adaptation, this thesis aims to answer 
the question: how are claims about the impacts of climate change constructed in 
different policy fields, and how do knowledge claims about climate change adaptation 
transform and get stabilised in the direct relation to decision making?
 At the heart of this study are three qualitative case studies. All three address 
climate impacts in different policy domains in the Netherlands. With an interpretative 
approach based on interviews, participant observation and document analysis, 
I analyse the process of constructing knowledge claims in direct relation to decision 
making. The first case is the Second Delta Committee that presented a science-based 
vision on adaptive policies and institutional reform to the Dutch cabinet in 2008. 
The Delta Committee is particularly interesting as it presented a crucial case in the 
transformation of both the understanding of what climate change means for the 
Netherlands, as well as how to strategically govern climate change adaptation. The 
second case concerns regional water management in the north-eastern part of the 
Netherlands. The longstanding tradition of regional water management and its 
strongly institutionalised character make regional water management a particularly 
interesting case to study how pre-existing institutions respond to the new demands 
of climate change. The third case goes into the construction of policy-relevant 
knowledge for the emerging issue of urban warming in the Netherlands. I zoom in 
on projects in Rotterdam, Arnhem and Utrecht. These three cases reveal interesting 
insights about the effects on knowledge transformation of attempts to stabilise 
emerging governance issues in different ways. 
 In the cases studied, climate change adaptation can be characterised as a process of 
incremental and stepwise mainstreaming of climate concerns into pre-existing 
policy fields. I did not observe the emergence and institutionalisation of a new 
dedicated policy domain for adaptation, nor did I see radical changes materialising 
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in the way knowledge was handled or governed in the pre-existing policy fields. 
Rather, the wicked issue of climate change was tamed and made tractable for the 
policy field in which it was mainstreamed.
 Based on the observation of  co-construction of knowledge and policy, this thesis 
criticises the notion of ‘knowledge transfer’ for obscuring a thorough understanding 
of the role of knowledge in climate adaptation governance. In contrast, my study 
shows how knowledge transforms in the process of mainstreaming the phenomenon 
into policy. Based on post hoc coding of the empirical observations in the cases, I 
propose five concepts to enable the understanding of what happens during moments 
of transformation: reduction, extension, rhetorical packaging, redefinition and 
modification.
 Reduction refers to the intentional or unintentional dissociation of elements 
from the construction of climate change. Extension is the logical opposite of 
reduction and refers to the process of coupling new elements to the construction of 
what climate change means for a policy field. Rhetorical packaging denotes the 
process of clothing claims in substantial rhetorical justifications to strengthen the 
persuasive power of that claim. Redefinition refers to the process of recasting the 
representation of climate change in another category. Modification points to 
changes in the dimensions or in some of the parts of a knowledge claim.
 The thesis concludes that transformation has a Janus face. While transformation 
brings climate change in conversation with localised meaning to create concrete 
adaptation responses, it also closes down and becomes blind to particular climate risks. 
As aspects remain unexplored, intentionally or unintentionally, transformation comes 
at the cost of potential maladaptation. Due to the Delta Committee, the Dutch 
climate adaptation policy agenda got transformed from a more comprehensive one, 
into one dominated by flood and drought safety. While hailed for enabling an 
in-depth understanding of climate change effects on the Dutch water sector, the 
strategy that resulted from the Committee’s advice was severely criticised for 
leaving the state blind to various health and infrastructure risks. In the regional 
water management case, I observed how its particular transformation of climate 
change yielded blindness to potential climate effects outside the narrow flood risk 
scope, such as on water quality or summer flash floods, but also within that scope, 
such as on the increased probability of dike failure. The urban warming case 
showed how particular climate effects, such as on air quality, or on potential societal 
responses, were removed from the construction of knowledge. 
 What these three cases make clear, is that the transformation of climate change 
is affected by the goals and institutionalised preoccupations of pre-existing policy 
fields. Knowledge claims transform because they are tailored to fit the opportunities 
and demands of the policy field. Therefore, universalist or essentialist characteristics 
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of climate knowledge are not fit for specific policy fields. Useful knowledge depends 
on the institutionalised practices of particular policy fields and the way in which 
dominant actors define the issue of climate change into something tractable for 
their particular field. In spatial planning, climate change is to be ‘spatialised’ to 
have relevance, while in quantitative flood risk assessment climate effects need to 
be ‘probabilitised’. The case of the Delta Committee showed the importance of the 
practices of external positioning of the Committee’s advice vis-à-vis the ideas of 
important institutional actors. In the case of regional water management, climate 
change was transformed in order to fit the hydrological assessment machinery. The 
strongly codified science-policy interface provided certainty, but also rigidity. 
Transformations in the urban warming case followed rapidly upon one another. 
The constant erosion and re-building of legitimacy were important that process.
 Two governance strategies are discussed in the debate on effective climate 
change adaptation. Both the mainstreaming and the dedicated approach have 
strengths and weaknesses. The perspective of transformation, central in this thesis, 
informs further reflections on the governance of knowledge for climate adaptation. 
The currently dominating strategy of mainstreaming could yield a rich patchwork 
of adaptive initiatives with faster acceptance of climate concerns and better attuned 
knowledge to local needs. However, I have argued that knowledge constructed in 
processes of mainstreaming comes with the downside of blindness for some of the 
risks of climate change. Because of the dominant perspectives in a policy field and 
the institutionalisation of particular operating procedures, mainstreaming also 
leads to cognitive path dependency. The mainstreaming approach has no adequate 
answer to the question of how to organize knowledge production for problems that 
have no clear owner capable to influence ‘demand-based’ knowledge production. 
Also, it does not do a very good job in making transparent whose interests are 
served when some knowledge agendas are pursued and particular risks are left 
unexplored.
 To overcome the problems of blindness and cognitive path dependencies, more 
institutional change is necessary than the piggyback approach of mainstreaming 
entails. Integrating an exercise on climate impact foresight in the obligatory 
processes of doing Environmental Impact Assessments might be a first step to 
broaden the set of climate concerns on the policy agenda. More radical changes 
could be to require a mandatory periodical reassessment of the consequences of 
climate change for vulnerable sectors, which could raise a more comprehensive set 
of future risks. One could set up an expert organisation to review the robustness of 
these assessments. Disclosing these reports opens up the debate of which climate 
risks matter and whether they require collective effort.
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Samenvatting
Sinds het begin van het millennium krijgt de aanpassing aan klimaatverandering 
steeds meer aandacht, zowel in tal van beleidsvelden als in het wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek. Twee ontwikkelingen in het sturen van klimaatadaptatie vallen op. Ten 
eerste proberen klimaatonderzoeksprogramma’s kennis te produceren in die dichter 
aansluit bij de behoeften van beleidsmakers. Ten tweede zijn sturingsstrategieën er 
vaak op gericht om klimaatkwesties onderdeel te maken van, en mee te laten liften 
op, reeds bestaande beleidsinitiatieven. Dat wordt ‘mainstreaming’ genoemd. 
Strategieën om van klimaatadaptatie een eigen beleidsveld te maken met eigen 
instrumenten komen minder voor. In dit proefschrift kijk ik kritisch naar welke 
consequenties die ontwikkelingen hebben voor de productie van kennis op het 
grensvlak van wetenschap en politiek. Het proefschrift behandelt de vraag hoe de 
effecten van klimaatverandering worden vertaald in betekenisvolle problemen voor 
publiek beleid in Nederland en hoe gezaghebbende kennis wordt gecreëerd over 
relevante klimaateffecten. Terwijl veel academische literatuur een prescriptieve 
benadering kiest, bestudeert dit proefschrift juist in detail hoe dergelijke onder-
zoeksprocessen in de praktijk georganiseerd zijn en hoe de resulterende kennis 
ingebracht wordt in lokaal en regionaal klimaatadaptatiebeleid.
 Bij de sturing van klimaatadaptatie speelt wetenschappelijke kennis een cruciale rol 
in de identificatie, inschatting en beoordeling van klimaateffecten. Ervaringen uit 
het onderzoek en de praktijk geven aan dat de productie van relevante en gezagvolle 
kennis voor beleid tal van uitdagingen kent. Ten eerste vragen de complexiteiten en 
onzekerheden waarmee klimaatverandering omgeven is het uiterste van de wetenschap, 
in tijden waarin de klimaatwetenschap zelf frequent onderwerp van controverse is 
geworden. Ten tweede zijn de belangen van de aanpassing aan klimaatverandering 
groot, maar nemen maatschappelijke actoren daar soms conflicterende posities 
over in. Ten derde wordt vaak gedacht dat de huidige instituties, die gevormd zijn 
om de uitwisseling van kennis tussen wetenschap en beleid te faciliteren, niet toegerust 
zijn op het weerbarstige (in het Engels: ‘wicked’) probleem klimaatverandering. 
Ten vierde is het onduidelijk wat precies de regionale gevolgen zullen zijn van 
mondiale klimaatverandering. Het mondiale fenomeen klimaatverandering moet 
dus worden vertaald naar betekenisvolle effecten die passen bij de lokale situatie.
 Veel theoretische modellen om de problemen met kennis en beleid te begrijpen 
stellen de wetenschap en de politiek voor als twee aparte sociale werelden en bekijken 
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hun relatie in termen van vraag en aanbod. In deze voorstelling moeten pakketjes 
kennis, nadat ze in de wetenschappelijke praktijk ontdekt zijn, overgeplaatst worden naar 
het politieke domein om beleid rationeler te maken. Echter, deze conceptualisering 
wordt betwist omdat zij fundamentele tekortkomingen heeft en niet in staat is te 
begrijpen hoe kennis en beleid juist elkaar vormgeven. Vanwege deze tekort-
komingen sluit dit proefschrift aan bij constructionistische perspectieven in de 
sociale wetenschappen.  Kennisclaims worden niet als spiegel van de werkelijkheid 
gezien, maar als representaties van de werkelijkheid die het product zijn van sociaal 
werk. Omdat kennis en sociale orde nauw verstrengeld zijn, zou de stabilisering en 
institutionalisering van gezaghebbende kennis in de samenleving kritisch 
onderzocht moeten worden.
 Dit proefschrift stelt dat de ontwikkeling van gezaghebbende kennis over 
 klimaatadaptatie op een vruchtbare manier kan worden geanalyseerd door te 
onderzoeken hoe verschillende sociale werelden samenkomen. Voorbeelden van 
sociale werelden zijn de klimaatwetenschap, de hydrologie, de stadsplanning, de 
politiek of het recht. Ik heb bestudeerd hoe die sociale werelden samenwerken om 
het ‘wicked’ probleem waarvoor ze zich gesteld zien te herformuleren in iets 
hanteerbaars; hoe kennisclaims worden geconstrueerd die dienstbaar zijn voor de 
specifieke problematische kwestie waarmee zij zich geconfronteerd zien; en hoe de 
legitimiteit van die claims wordt gestabiliseerd door claims te laten voldoen aan de 
eisen van de verschillende betrokken sociale werelden. Verschillende beleidsdo-
meinen gaan met klimaatverandering aan de slag. In dit proefschrift staat daarom 
de vraag centraal: hoe worden claims over de gevolgen van klimaatverandering 
geconstrueerd in verschillende beleiddomeinen, en hoe transformeren en stabiliseren 
kennisclaims over klimaatadaptatie in de directe relatie met besluitvorming?
 De kern van dit proefschrift wordt gevormd door drie kwalitatieve case studies 
over processen van kennisconstructie over klimaatimpacts in verschillende beleids - 
velden in Nederland. Met een interpretatieve benadering gebaseerd op interviews, 
participatieve observatie en documentenanalyse analyseer ik de constructie van 
kennisclaims in de directe samenhang met besluitvorming over die claims. De eerste 
casus is de tweede Deltacommissie die in 2008 haar wetenschapsgebaseerde visie 
over adaptief beleid en institutionele hervorming aan het kabinet aanbood. De Delta - 
commissie is interessant omdat het een cruciale casus betrof in de transformatie 
van enerzijds de betekenis van klimaatverandering voor Nederland en anderzijds 
voor het begrip van hoe de aanpassing aan klimaatverandering strategisch zou 
moeten worden bestuurd. De tweede casus gaat over regionaal waterbeheer in het 
noordoostelijke deel van Nederland. Haar lange traditie en haar sterk geïnstitutio-
naliseerde karakter maakt het regionaal waterbeheer tot een interessante casus om 
te bestuderen hoe bestaande instituties reageren op nieuwe eisen die klimaat-
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verandering met zich mee brengt. In de derde en laatste casus onderzoek ik hoe 
beleidsrelevante kennis wordt geconstrueerd over stedelijke opwarming in 
Nederland. Ik bekijk de opkomst van dit nieuwe fenomeen in Rotterdam, Arnhem 
en Utrecht. Deze drie casus bieden interessante inzichten over de effecten van pogingen 
om nieuwe fenomenen als beleidskwesties te stabiliseren op de transformatie van 
kennis.
 In alle casus die ik bestudeerd heb kan de aanpassing aan klimaatverandering 
worden gekarakteriseerd als een proces waarin incrementeel en stapsgewijs 
geprobeerd wordt klimaataangelegenheden tot een normaal onderdeel te maken 
(‘mainstreamen’) binnen reeds bestaande beleidsprocessen. Ik heb geen opkomst 
en institutionalisering van een nieuwe en specifiek op adaptatie gericht beleidsveld 
zien ontstaan. Evenmin zag ik radicale veranderingen in de wijze waarop kennis 
wordt behandeld en gestuurd in bestaande beleidsvelden. Het ‘wicked’ probleem 
klimaatverandering werd getemd en hanteerbaar gemaakt voor het beleidsveld 
waar klimaat een onderdeel van werd gemaakt.
 Gebaseerd op mijn observaties over co-constructie van kennis en beleid, 
bekritiseer ik in deze thesis de notie van ‘kennis overplaatsen’ omdat het een goed 
begrip van de rol van kennis in de sturing van klimaatadaptatie belemmert. In 
contrast met die notie laat mijn onderzoek zien hoe kennis transformeert om te 
passen in bestaande beleidsprocessen. Gebaseerd op het post hoc coderen van mijn 
empirische observaties in mijn casus stel ik vijf concepten voor die een beter begrip 
moeten opleveren wat er precies gebeurt tijdens transformatiemomenten: reductie, 
extensie, retorisch verpakken, herdefiniëren en modificeren.
 Het begrip reductie verwijst naar het bewust of onbewust dissociëren van 
sommige elementen uit de constructie van klimaatverandering. Extensie is juist het 
tegenovergestelde daarvan en verwijst naar het proces van nieuwe elementen 
koppelen aan het construct van betekenisvolle klimaatverandering voor een 
beleidveld. Retorisch verpakken verwijst naar het inkleden van kennisclaims in 
uitvoerige retorische argumentatiemiddelen om de overtuigingskracht van die 
claim te versterken. Met herdefiniëring wordt het proces bedoelt waarin de 
representatie van klimaatverandering wordt omgewerkt en weergegeven in een 
andere categorie. Modificatie verwijst naar veranderingen in de dimensies of in 
sommige elementen waarmee een kennisclaim is geconstrueerd.
 Deze thesis concludeert dat transformatie een januskop heeft. Aan de ene kant 
zorgt transformatie ervoor dat klimaatverandering betekenis krijgt in lokale 
 betekenissystemen zodat concrete adaptieve reacties mogelijk worden. Aan de 
andere kant sluit transformatie af en leidt het tot blindheid voor sommige klimaat-
risico’s. Omdat, bewust of onbewust, sommige aspecten van klimaatverandering 
onderbelicht blijven, brengt transformatie dus een kostprijs mee van potentieel 
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slechte aanpassing. Door het advies van de Deltacommissie werd de veelomvattende 
Nederlandse adaptatieagenda getransformeerd naar één gedomineerd door water-
veiligheid en droogte. Dat leidde tot veel en diepgaande kennis van de klimaat-
effecten op de Nederlandse watersector. Echter, de adaptatiestrategie, die resulteerde 
uit het advies van de commissie, werd ook flink bekritiseerd omdat het blinde 
vlekken had voor onder meer de gezondheids- en infrastructuurrisico’s van  klimaat - 
verandering. In de casus regionaal waterbeheer observeer ik hoe de transformatie 
van klimaatverandering tot blindheid leidde voor gevolgen zowel buiten de beperkte 
oversstromingsscope - zoals op waterkwaliteit of overstromingen in de zomer - als 
binnen die scope - zoals op de toenemende kans op dijkfalen. De casus over 
stedelijke opwarming laat zien hoe sommige klimaateffecten, zoals het effect op 
luchtkwaliteit, en sommige potentiële maatschappelijke respons uit de constructie 
van kennis werden verwijderd.
 De drie casus maken duidelijk dat de transformatie van klimaatverandering 
wordt beïnvloed door de doelen en verpatroonde preoccupaties van bestaande 
beleidsvelden. Kennisclaims transformeren omdat ze aangepast worden om te 
voldoen aan de eisen en mogelijkheden binnen een beleidsveld. Daarom passen 
geen universele of essentialistische karakteristieken van klimaatkennis bij specifieke 
beleidsvelden. Bruikbare kennis hangt af van de geïnstitutionaliseerde praktijken 
van beleidsvelden en van de wijze waarop dominante actoren de kwestie klimaat-
verandering in iets hanteerbaars voor hun beleidsveld definiëren. In de ruimtelijke 
planning moet klimaatverandering ‘verruimtelijkt’ worden om relevant te zijn en 
in de overstromingsrisicobeoordeling moeten klimaateffecten worden ‘geprobabi-
liseerd’. De casus Deltacommissie laat het belang zien van de praktijken van de 
commissie om haar advies te positioneren ten opzichte van de ideeën van belangrijke 
actoren. In de casus regionaal waterbeheer werd klimaatverandering getransformeerd 
om in de hydrologische beoordelingsmachinerie te passen. De sterk gecodificeerde 
interface tussen wetenschap en beleid zorgde daar voor zekerheid in het transfor-
matieproces, maar ook voor rigiditeit. De transformaties in het de casus stedelijke 
opwarming volgden elkaar in snel tempo op. De voortdurende erosie en herbouw 
van legitimiteit waren belangrijke factoren in dat proces.
 In het debat over effectieve aanpassing aan klimaatverandering worden veelal 
twee benaderingen bediscussieerd. Zowel de strategie om klimaatverandering te 
mainstreamen als om er een eigen beleidsveld van te maken hebben voor- en nadelen. 
Het in deze dissertatie centrale transformatieperspectief biedt mogelijkheden voor 
reflectie op de sturing van kennis voor klimaatadaptatie. Het huidige dominerende 
mainstreaming strategie kan een rijke lappendeken opleveren van allerhande 
 adaptatie-initiatieven met snelle acceptatie van klimaatoverwegingen en kennis die 
beter toegesneden is op lokale behoeften. Echter, ik heb beargumenteerd dat de 
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kennis die in mainstreamingprocessen wordt geconstrueerd wel blindheid voor 
sommige klimaatrisico’s met zich mee brengt. Door de dominante perspectieven in 
een bepaald beleidsveld en door de institutionalisering van procedures van handelen 
leidt mainstreaming ook tot cognitieve padafhankelijkheid. De mainstreaming- 
benadering heeft geen goed antwoord op de vraag hoe kennisproductie moet worden 
georganiseerd voor die problemen die nog geen duidelijke eigenaar hebben. In die 
gevallen is vraaggestuurde kennisontwikkeling niet vanzelfsprekend. Bovendien 
slaagt die benadering er niet goed in transparant te maken welke belangen er worden 
gediend met nagestreefde kennisagenda’s en waarom sommige risico’s onderbelicht 
blijven.
 Om de problemen van blinde vlekken en cognitieve padafhankelijkheid te 
voorkomen is meer institutionele verandering nodig dan de meekoppelende benadering 
van mainstreaming doet voorkomen. Het integreren van een verkenning naar 
 klimaatgevolgen in de reeds verplichte milieueffectrapportage zou een eerste stap 
kunnen zijn om de set van klimaatoverwegingen op de politieke agenda te 
verbreden. Radicaler veranderingen zouden een periodieke herbeoordeling van de 
gevolgen van klimaatverandering voor kwetsbare sectoren kunnen verplichten. 
Dat zou een meer omvattend beeld opleveren van toekomstige klimaatrisico’s. Er zou 
een expertorganisatie kunnen worden opgezet om die beoordeling kritisch te 
beoordelen. Het openbaar maken van deze rapporten zou aanleiding kunnen geven 
voor een breder debat over welke klimaatrisico’s daadwerkelijk van belang zijn en 
welke er onderwerp moeten zijn van collectieve inspanningen.

